The Velvet Glove of Colonialism: USAID’s Road from Altruism to Absolution

Report by Kevin J.S. Duska Jr., Margot Lanihin and Lucas Nyemcsik

Aesthetic Over Aid: The Performative Theatre of USAID Contractors

Imagine this: a sunlit conference room in a five-star Nairobi hotel, where USAID contractors sip oat milk lattes from reusable tumblers plastered with “Decolonize Everything” stickers. The men shuffle around in Allbirds and Patagonia vests, but the women? They float through the room in loose Eileen Fisher linen dresses, their ethically sourced Turkish cotton scarves draped just so, wrists jangling with beaded bracelets bought at artisan markets during “field visits.” Wide-leg trousers, Veja sneakers, and tote bags from The New Yorker festival complete the look—because nothing screams “saving the world” like $300 minimalist basics and a half-read copy of Half of a Yellow Sun peeking out from a tote that probably cost more than a local aid worker’s monthly salary.

Case Studies in Failure: Chemonics, DAI, and the Afghan Debacle

Meanwhile, a thousand miles away, in Somalia’s Bay region, a famine is tearing through villages. Families ration their last grains of sorghum while waiting for promised aid that’s been stuck in procurement hell, managed by Chemonics International—the same fucking firm awarded a $9.5 billion USAID contract for global health supply chains, only to deliver critical HIV and malaria medications months late, if at all. Launched in 2016, this initiative was meant to streamline supply chains but became a textbook case of mismanagement, with only 7% of shipments arriving on time and in full during its early stages, despite repeated restructuring efforts that highlighted systemic flaws in USAID’s oversight mechanisms (Devex, 2023).

In Haiti, post-earthquake rubble still litters the streets years after USAID pledged billions, much of which disappeared into “feasibility studies” conducted by DAI, whose consultants spent more time crafting donor reports than building infrastructure (Kushner, 2019). And let’s not forget Afghanistan, where USAID’s $400 million Kandahar-Herat Highway project, managed by Louis Berger Group, became a symbol of wasted aid: a partially paved death trap where insurgent attacks and shoddy construction made travel more dangerous than when NATO forces were taking fire daily (Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2021).

DEI Distractions: When Optics Trumped Outcomes

This essay isn’t here to defend Trump’s chaotic hatchet job or Musk’s meme-fueled intervention. It’s here to lay bare the truth: USAID’s death was long fucking overdue, not because of political ideology, but because it had become a self-referential parasite, a colonial grift wrapped in layers of DEI jargon and PowerPoint presentations. While global crises mounted, USAID staff found themselves trapped in endless DEI workshops, diverting attention from critical humanitarian needs (Devex, 2023). By 2023, USAID’s localization initiative—aiming to allocate 25% of its funds directly to local organizations—had delivered only 9.6%, with the lion’s share still going to Washington-based contractors (Devex, 2025).

DEI became another hustle, exemplified by grants like the $1.5 million initiative to promote workplace diversity in Serbia while maternal mortality rates fucking skyrocketed in South Sudan due to underfunded clinics (Goldin, 2025). USAID’s reliance on a cadre of mid-level contractors—more concerned with their next grant than with saving lives—further eroded its effectiveness, leaving vulnerable communities subjected to theoretical "capacity-building" sessions while their basic needs went unmet (Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2021).

The Inevitable Collapse: A Grift Too Big to Sustain

Like Arcade Fire, who went from raw brilliance on Funeral to whatever the fuck Everything Now was, USAID lost the plot. Its collapse wasn’t a tragedy; it was the inevitable implosion of an agency more invested in grant renewals than human lives

So light a fucking cigarette, or whatever will calm your nerves, pour a stiff drink or a Red Bull, and let’s cut open this festering corpse. This is going to be an autopsy, not a eulogy.

II. USAID and the Green Berets: Building Local Capacity for U.S. Imperialism

A Dual Strategy: Development and Military Intervention

In the early 1960s, the United States orchestrated a dual-pronged approach to curb the spread of communism and bolster its geopolitical influence in developing nations. This strategy intertwined economic development initiatives spearheaded by USAID with military interventions executed by Special Forces units, notably the Green Berets. While these programs ostensibly aimed to build local capacity, their underlying objective was to serve U.S. imperial interests rather than genuinely empower local populations.

USAID: Economic Development as a Means of Control

Established in 1961 during the Kennedy Administration, USAID was tasked with administering economic assistance to foster political stability and economic growth in developing countries. However, this aid often came with strings attached, compelling recipient nations to align with U.S. foreign policy objectives. USAID's programs were designed to integrate local economies into the global capitalist system, thereby extending American influence and control. This form of economic intervention served as a tool of coercive diplomacy, leveraging aid to secure political and economic concessions from recipient countries (U.S. Agency for International Development, n.d.).

One illustrative example is the Strategic Hamlet Program implemented in South Vietnam. This initiative aimed to relocate rural populations into fortified villages to isolate them from communist insurgents. While presented as a protective measure, it disrupted traditional communities and coerced villagers into a system that served U.S. strategic interests more than local needs (Catton, 1999).

The Green Berets: Militarized Capacity Building

Concurrently, the U.S. military deployed the Green Berets, also created during the Kennedy Administration, to engage in counterinsurgency operations and train local forces. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program, initiated in 1961, exemplifies this approach. Green Beret teams established Area Development Centers in South Vietnamese villages, training and arming local militias to combat insurgent forces. While portrayed as efforts to enhance local security and self-reliance, these programs primarily aimed to suppress movements opposing U.S.-backed regimes and to maintain American geopolitical interests in the region (Clarke, 1988).

The CIDG program often recruited from ethnic minority groups, such as the Montagnards, who were marginalized within Vietnamese society. By arming and training these groups, the U.S. sought to create paramilitary forces loyal to American objectives, further entrenching divisions within the local populace (Nagl, 2002).

Intertwined Efforts: A Unified Imperial Agenda

The collaboration between USAID and the Green Berets illustrates a coordinated strategy wherein economic aid and military assistance functioned in tandem to advance U.S. imperialism. USAID's development projects often laid the groundwork for military operations by attempting to win "hearts and minds," while the Green Berets provided the necessary force to quell resistance and enforce compliance with U.S. directives. This synergy ensured that local capacity building served not the interests of indigenous populations but the strategic objectives of the United States (Leepson, 2010).

For instance, the Strategic Hamlet Program required military enforcement to relocate and secure villages, a task often undertaken by Green Beret-led forces. This collaboration exemplified how development and military initiatives were interwoven to achieve overarching U.S. policy goals (Catton, 1999).

Popping Pills (NOT) and The Subaltern Silenced: USAID’s Failures and Imperial Consequences

This approach can be likened to the film The Matrix, where a fabricated reality is imposed upon individuals to control and manipulate them. Similarly, USAID and the Green Berets constructed a facade of development and security, masking an underlying agenda of dominance and control. Just as The Matrix presents an illusion of choice and freedom, these programs projected an image of benevolence while subverting the autonomy and genuine development of local populations. More tangibly, this is reminiscent of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s concept of the subaltern — those so marginalized by structures of power that their agency is rendered almost nonexistent (Spivak, 1988). Unlike Neo, who is offered a choice between the red and blue pills, the populations USAID purported to serve weren’t even given the dignity of a decision. USAID’s promises of aid were too often delayed, inadequate, or entangled in bureaucratic hell, leaving the subaltern not just unheard, but unfed, unserved, and fucked over repeatedly by a system that never truly saw them as human in the first place.

III. The Development-Industrial Complex: Profiteering in the Name of Aid

USAID has long been entangled with a network of private contractors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), forming what critics term the "development-industrial complex." This intricate web often prioritizes profit over genuine development, leading to inefficiencies and misaligned incentives that undermine the agency's stated mission.

A Symbiotic Relationship: USAID and Its Contractors

Over the past several decades, USAID has increasingly outsourced its projects to private firms and NGOs. This shift has given rise to a lucrative development contracting industry, with companies like Chemonics International and Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) securing substantial contracts. These entities have become integral to the implementation of USAID's programs, creating a symbiotic relationship where both the agency and contractors are mutually dependent (Roberts, 2014).

However, this dependency has fostered an environment where the lines between aid and profit blur. Contractors, driven by financial incentives, may prioritize projects that align with their business interests rather than the genuine needs of local communities. This misalignment can lead to the implementation of programs that are more beneficial to the contractors' bottom lines than to the intended beneficiaries.

The Cost of Doing Business: Financial Inefficiencies

A significant portion of USAID's budget is consumed by administrative costs, contractor fees, and overheads. Estimates suggest that a substantial percentage of aid funds are absorbed before reaching the ground, with development contractors operating on high overhead margins (Medium, 2025). This financial structure raises concerns about the efficacy of aid delivery and the actual impact on target communities.

The reliance on private contractors has also led to inflated project costs. For instance, the use of subcontractors and consultants can introduce additional layers of expenses, further diluting the funds intended for direct aid. This complex financial ecosystem often results in a smaller fraction of aid money reaching those in need, undermining the overall effectiveness of development initiatives.

Case Study: Chemonics International

Chemonics International stands as a prominent example within the development-industrial complex. Established in 1975, the company has become one of USAID's largest contractors, receiving billions in aid contracts over the years. Despite its extensive involvement, Chemonics has faced criticism for its performance and impact.

In 2017, reports indicated that only 7% of health commodity shipments delivered through a Chemonics-managed program arrived on time and in full. This shortfall had severe implications for health initiatives in developing countries, potentially jeopardizing lives and undermining trust in aid programs (Chemonics, 2023).

Furthermore, Chemonics has been scrutinized for its financial practices. The company's high overhead costs and profit margins have raised questions about the proportion of funds allocated to actual development work versus corporate profits. This scenario exemplifies the broader issues within the development-industrial complex, where financial gain can overshadow the mission of genuine aid.

Performative Processes: How Contractors Master Bureaucratic Bullshit

In the development-industrial complex, aid isn't just an afterthought — it’s collateral damage in the relentless pursuit of process for process’s sake. Few examples illustrate this better than Headlight Consulting Services’ Choose Your Own Adventure guide to the Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting (CLA) Maturity Self-assessment Process, a document that reads like a Pinterest board for overpaid consultants rather than a serious framework for delivering aid (Leo & Askin, 2023).

Comparing CLA assessments to feeding toddlers — balancing what they want with what they need — might be cute on a mommy blog, but in international development, it reeks of a privileged detachment from the realities of famine, displacement, and systemic poverty. While children starve, USAID-funded contractors are busy holding “discovery discussions” and “maturity self-assessments,” shuffling buzzwords around like they’re playing bureaucratic Scrabble (Leo & Askin, 2023).

Let’s call this what it is: an industry-wide grift. Headlight’s whimsical, almost farcical guide is emblematic of a system that’s mastered the art of looking busy while doing fuck-all. In this world, delivering aid is secondary to delivering polished PowerPoints and endless frameworks — none of which fill stomachs, build infrastructure, or save lives. It’s an ouroboros of self-referential nonsense where introspection is an aesthetic, not an action.

Headlight’s guide, offering “adaptation options” like some goddamn DLC for a dystopian role-playing game, perfectly captures this absurdity. It’s a glaring reminder that in USAID’s orbit, the only thing more bloated than the bureaucracy is the egos of the contractors cashing in on the illusion of impact.

The Trump Administration's Disruption

The recent actions by the Trump administration, particularly under the guidance of Elon Musk's Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), have brought the development-industrial complex into sharp focus. Efforts to dismantle USAID have led to halted aid programs, mass layoffs, and legal challenges from contractors and NGOs. These disruptions have exposed the fragility of a system heavily reliant on private entities for aid delivery

The abrupt cessation of funding and support has not only affected the contractors' financial stability but also jeopardized ongoing projects critical to global health, food security, and economic development. This turmoil underscores the risks inherent in outsourcing essential aid functions to profit-driven entities, highlighting the need for a reevaluation of how the U.S. administers foreign assistance.

Reassessing the Model: Towards Sustainable Development

The challenges presented by the development-industrial complex call for a reassessment of USAID's operational model. Prioritizing partnerships with local organizations, increasing transparency in fund allocation, and reducing dependency on large contractors may enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of aid programs.

Empowering local entities can lead to more culturally relevant and impactful interventions, fostering genuine development rather than perpetuating cycles of dependency. By addressing the profit motives embedded within the current system, USAID can realign its practices with its foundational mission of promoting sustainable development and humanitarian assistance.

***Editorial Disclosure***

One of the authors of this piece previously had a personal relationship with an individual employed by one or more of the firms discussed. No insider information was obtained from this individual, as there has been no contact for nearly a decade. Another author previously had a relationship with a State Department employee. No insider information was obtained from this individual, as there has been no contact for five years..