Soft Shells, Deep States: Strategic Placement of Mossad-Adjacent Assets in U.S. and Canadian Bureaucracies

Not every operative carries a gun or a cover identity. In the intelligence trade, assets are often polished professionals, policy fellows, or ideologically aligned insiders granted access to the most sensitive corridors of Western power. This investigation explores how Israel’s Mossad – through soft-power placement, think tank pipelines, and dual-allegiance ecosystems – may exert covert influence in Canada and the U.S. via “asset-shaped voids.” We focus on the case of Merav Ceren’s 2025 U.S. National Security Council appointment, and map broader patterns of likely asset vectors across the Five Eyes alliance.

The Case of Merav Ceren: A Soft-Power “Asset” in the NSC

Merav Ceren’s trajectory offers a textbook example of how a well-placed insider can raise questions about foreign influence. Ceren, an Israeli-American dual citizen and former Congressional staffer, was appointed in early 2025 as the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) Director for Israel and Iran policy. Her background immediately drew scrutiny. According to her own biography at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) – a hawkish pro-Israel think tank – Ceren “worked at Israel’s Ministry of Defense,” participating in West Bank negotiations between Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and the Palestinian Authority. In other words, she had direct experience liaising with Israeli defense officials.

The White House officially denied that Ceren had ever been an Israeli government employee, framing her past role as a policy fellowship requiring liaison with the Israeli MoD, rather than formal employment. “She was never employed by the Israeli Defense Ministry… She did a policy fellowship… overseen by [Israel’s MoD], which required her to liaison with them for her research,” said NSC spokesperson Brian Hughes. Hughes emphasized that Ceren is “a patriotic American” who had served U.S. institutions (indeed, she’d worked for Senator Ted Cruz and Rep. James Comer) and was simply bringing her Middle East expertise to advance U.S. policy.

Despite those assurances, concerns persisted that Ceren’s appointment was “raising questions” in Washington because her Israeli ties were “well known among GOP circles.” Advocacy groups like the Council on American-Islamic Relations openly objected to “a former Israeli defense ministry employee” managing U.S. policy on Israel and Iran. For critics, the issue was not a smoking gun of espionage, but a pattern: a hard-line pro-Israel policy advocate, groomed via a think tank fellowship and a stint with Israel’s security apparatus, suddenly placed in a U.S. decision-making seat directly affecting Israeli interests. “We’re not saying she’s Mossad. We’re saying if Mossad wanted a liaison, it would look exactly like this,” quipped one observer, noting how perfectly the profile fit.

Timeline & outcome: Ceren’s NSC tenure proved short-lived. By May 2025, she was dismissed amid a broader shake-up of Trump’s foreign policy team. In what some media termed an “Iran hawk purge,” the acting national security adviser removed several officials seen as overly aligned with Israeli hardline positions. Ceren – pointedly identified as a “dual U.S.-Israeli citizen… who had previously worked with the Israel government” – was among those let go. Her removal came as President Trump pivoted to an “America First” course correction, reportedly frustrated with Israel’s aggressive stance on Iran. The ouster of figures like Ceren “stunned officials in Jerusalem, where she [was] viewed as closely aligned with Israel’s interests”.

The Merav Ceren case encapsulates the subtle dynamic of “asset-adjacent” influence. There is no evidence that Ceren was a spy or ever violated U.S. law. Yet her presence “carrying out the President’s agenda on Middle East issues” effectively ensured that a voice intimately familiar with (and arguably sympathetic to) Israeli security paradigms was whispering into U.S. policy deliberations. Whether or not that was by Mossad’s design, it certainly served Mossad’s interests. As one analyst remarked, “If Israel’s intelligence services could custom-design an NSC staffer, they’d come up with someone like this – highly credentialed, security-cleared, and ideologically in sync with Israel’s strategic outlook.” Ceren’s rise and fall highlight both the means of placement (think tank fellowships, political networking) and the potential checks (internal policy shifts, public scrutiny) that define this game of influence.

Mossad Asset Typology: Agents vs. Assets vs. Fellow Travelers

When assessing covert influence, it’s crucial to distinguish between formal agents, informal assets, and ideological fellow travelers. Not every person advancing a foreign power’s agenda is a “spy” in the classic sense. Below is a breakdown of categories, with precedents that clarify the differences:

• Agent (Tasked, Trained, Controlled): A fully recruited operative who clandestinely collects intelligence or influences policy under the direction of a foreign intelligence service. Agents often receive training, payment, or specific tasking from handlers. Example: Jonathan Pollard, a U.S. Navy intelligence analyst turned Israeli spy, is a notorious case. Pollard was recruited by Israeli intelligence in 1984, handing over suitcases of classified documents on U.S. military secrets to his Israeli handler in exchange for cash and jewelry. He became “the first American to go to jail for life for passing secrets to a U.S. ally,” as the damage from his espionage was considered immense. Pollard’s case exemplifies a classic agent: directly controlled by Israeli operatives, clandestinely stealing secrets, and ultimately caught and convicted of espionage.
• Asset (Witting or Unwitting Vector for Influence): A person who provides information or access, or who steers discussions in favor of a foreign power’s interests, but may not be formally on that country’s payroll. Assets can be witting (consciously cooperating due to money, ideology, or compromise) or unwitting (their normal advocacy just happens to align with what a foreign intelligence service desires). They occupy “asset-shaped voids” – strategic positions where their influence benefits the foreign power. Example: Arnon Milchan, the Hollywood billionaire and Israeli citizen, blurs the line between asset and agent. In the 1970s-80s, Milchan clandestinely “worked for an Israeli agency that negotiated arms deals and supported Israel’s secret nuclear program,” using his business empire as cover. Recruited by legendary Israeli spymaster Shimon Peres, Milchan operated dozens of front companies across 17 countries to procure sensitive technology for Israel’s bomb program. He later bragged about how “his country let him be James Bond” in his 20s. Milchan was not a career intelligence officer; he was an influential civilian turned covert operative – a prized asset who provided service to Mossad (and its scientific espionage arm, LAKAM) while pursuing his own ventures. Another example of an asset might be an academic or think tank scholar who isn’t on a spy agency’s payroll, but whose access and advocacy are quietly “leveraged” by a foreign service. In the late 1990s, U.S. officials suspected an Israeli mole codenamed “Mega” inside the Clinton administration – someone at policymaker level feeding Israel information. The FBI’s hunt for “Mega” never publicly identified the person, if they existed. Whether real or proverbial, “Mega” symbolized the concept of a high-placed asset: not an obvious spy, but a trusted insider purportedly tipping off a foreign ally.
• Fellow Traveler (Ideological Ally, Not Operational): Individuals who are not under any direct control by a foreign power but who, out of shared ideology or goals, end up pushing that foreign power’s line. They can be lawmakers, lobbyists, pundits, or donors whose worldview aligns so neatly with a country’s interests that they act as de facto advocates. Fellow travelers often operate in plain sight, sometimes loudly so, and their activities are legal – yet their “passionate attachment” can be a vector for foreign influence. Example: Billionaire philanthropist Haim Saban, a major political donor, openly proclaims, “I’m a one-issue guy, and my issue is Israel.”. Saban has poured tens of millions into U.S. politics and think tanks to shape policy in ways favorable to Israel, including founding the Saban Center at Brookings and seeking to buy media outlets to ensure sympathetic coverage. He is not a spy; he’s an American-Israeli business mogul exercising free speech and spending. Yet his outsized influence – essentially acting as an amplifier of Israeli government positions – exemplifies how an ideological actor can function as a force-multiplier for a foreign agenda. Similarly, many politicians and commentators might simply share an ideological alignment with Israel’s security narrative (“fellow travelers”), requiring no covert direction to champion policies that Mossad would welcome.

It’s important to note that these categories can blur. An asset may start as a fellow traveler whose access becomes so useful that intelligence services cultivate them quietly. Or an agent might masquerade as just another ideological advocate. The Jonathan Pollard case in fact had elements of both ideology and tasking: he claimed he acted because he believed the U.S. should share more intelligence with Israel – a genuine ideological conviction – but he nonetheless knowingly became a paid agent, trained in tradecraft (dead drops, secret communication) and financially rewarded by Israeli handlers.

For our purposes, “Mossad-adjacent assets” refer primarily to that gray zone of witting assets and fellow travelers embedded within bureaucracies or policy circles, rather than outright recruited spies. These individuals might never break a law or oath, yet their career trajectories, allegiances, and actions consistently align with another nation’s strategic interests – sometimes to the detriment of objective policy-making. In Western democracies that value openness, such people can rise high without tripping legal wires, making them far more effective long-term influencers than a traditional agent who risks arrest.

Detecting the Hidden Influence: Red Flags and Methodologies

How can one detect the subtle presence of Mossad-aligned influence within North American governments? The challenge is akin to finding signal in noise – identifying patterns in legitimate careers that might indicate an illegitimate foreign hand. Intelligence agencies and watchdogs increasingly turn to metadata analysis and behavioral modeling to spot these potential “asset vectors.” Key indicators and methods include:

• Career Trajectory Metadata: Scrutinize resumes for telltale stops: Has the individual spent time at institutions known to be ideologically aligned with a foreign government? Fellowships or employment at certain think tanks, NGOs, or academic programs can be a flag. In Ceren’s case, her FDD fellowship and the stint “studying resource management in the West Bank” under Israeli MoD auspices stood out. A pattern of alternating between U.S. government roles and jobs at strongly pro-Israel advocacy groups suggests someone moving within a “talent pipeline” cultivated by the Israel lobby. Similarly, an official who formerly worked for an Israeli military or intelligence-linked entity (even in a civilian capacity) merits extra scrutiny. This is not to impugn dual-experience professionals per se; rather, it’s acknowledging that a revolving door between a foreign government’s orbit and one’s own national security apparatus creates a potential conflict of interest. Modern data tools can scan public CVs and LinkedIn for such overlaps at scale.
• Op-Ed and Narrative Analysis: One can analyze an official’s public statements, writings, or social media for narrative alignment with a foreign government’s talking points. An intelligence-aligned asset often echoes the threat perceptions and policy preferences of that foreign power with notable consistency. For example, if a defense analyst always pushes the line that “Iran must be confronted immediately” and downplays any criticism of Israel’s actions, those views might be sincerely held – but they also happen to mirror Mossad’s priority set. It’s the consistency and exclusivity of the stance that raises a flag. Using AI-driven text analysis, investigators can map networks of narratives: e.g., does this person frequently cite Israeli security sources, attend Israel-sponsored conferences, or coordinate messaging with known pro-Israel lobbyists? A clustering of narrative alignment might indicate ideological grooming.
• Gatekeeping and Anomalies in Behavior: Within bureaucracies, potential assets might act as gatekeepers of information or champions of certain agendas in ways that stick out. Signs could include: selectively sharing intelligence that supports one agenda (e.g. emphasizing Iranian malfeasance while ignoring data that counters it), or consistently steering policy discussions to focus on Israel-centric issues even when peripheral. Another flag is overzealous classification or compartmentalization of briefings involving Israel – e.g., an official who insists on keeping certain Israel-related discussions off normal channels without clear rationale. While circumstantial, such behaviors – especially if combined with outside affiliations – may signal someone “bending the system” around a foreign ally’s sensitivities.
• Unusual Clearance or Access Patterns: Security clearance processes typically probe foreign contacts and loyalties, yet lapses happen. Watch for cases where an individual with significant foreign ties sails through clearance or is placed in a role unusually fast. Jonathan Pollard’s saga, for instance, was a cautionary tale of ignoring red flags: he had multiple disqualifiers (past drug use, debt, false statements) and even got caught in unauthorized information-sharing early on, yet was allowed to keep rising in U.S. intelligence positions. That institutional complacency enabled his spying. In modern terms, if, say, a dual citizen or recent immigrant from Country X suddenly gets a top security job despite a thin vetting file, one should ask why. It may be innocent – or it may reflect intervention from high places smoothing their entry (a known Mossad tactic is leveraging friendly intermediaries to champion an asset’s career). Tracking clearance adjudications for inconsistencies can thus hint at hidden influence.
• Metadata Cross-Referencing (AI-driven): With the advent of big data, one proposed tool is an AI-based flagging system that cross-references various metadata: travel records, foreign contacts, donation records, academic and employment history, even social network connections indicating connections to the Mossad Sayanim. For example, if an incoming advisor took multiple “fellowship trips” to Israel funded by advocacy groups, has relatives in the IDF, and is connected on LinkedIn to a cluster of Israeli think tank personnel, an algorithm might flag this composite picture for human review. Crucially, this isn’t to assume nefarious intent – many patriotic Canadians and Americans have such links due to cultural and familial ties. Rather, it’s a way to identify candidates for closer background checks or counterintelligence interviews. The goal is to ensure that genuine loyalty to the home country is uncompromised. (Indeed, such AI screening is conceptually similar to financial compliance algorithms that flag unusual transaction patterns for possible money laundering – here it’s ideological/behavioral laundering being watched.)

It must be stressed that none of these indicators alone prove wrongdoing. The methodology is about risk-based detection. A strong democracy can accommodate officials with diverse national backgrounds and views – so long as their ultimate allegiance is to the home constitution. The above approaches aim to catch the outliers: those few who might be leveraging their positions primarily to serve another nation’s agenda. In practice, detection often relies on a mix of automated scanning and old-fashioned human intelligence (e.g. whistleblowers noticing a colleague’s odd affinity for a foreign cause).

Merav Ceren’s appointment triggered exactly this kind of scrutiny. It was press reports and NGO watchdogs that connected the dots on her background, forcing NSC spokespeople to respond publicly. The fact that her prior fellowship was discovered and debated in media shows that transparency – even involuntary – is a powerful disinfectant. In the ideal scenario, however, such questions would be resolved at the vetting stage, not after someone is installed in a sensitive job.

Asset Pipelines in Washington: Think Tanks, Gatekeepers, and “Friendly” Networks

The United States, with its vast national security apparatus, is a prime target for soft-power asset placement. Over decades, pro-Israel organizations have built an extensive policy pipeline that can serve to identify and elevate Israel-aligned talent into government roles. Understanding this pipeline is key to mapping likely Mossad-adjacent vectors:

• Think Tank Fellowships and the “Revolving Door”: Washington’s Middle East policy sphere is heavily populated by think tanks that, while independent, often reflect Israeli security perspectives. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), for example, was founded with AIPAC’s support and is considered “part of the core of the Israel lobby”. WINEP and similar institutes (e.g. Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA)) act as talent incubators. They host former and future government officials, grooming them with research roles and networking opportunities. Crucially, these institutions actively facilitate the flow of personnel into U.S. government positions. WINEP boasts of alumni who “have gone on to serve in virtually every arm of government that plays a role in Middle East policy”. It even runs one-year fellowships in cooperation with the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and State Department, allowing rising military officers to immerse in its programs. This means a young officer or analyst can spend formative time at a think tank heavily attuned to Israeli views, then return to federal service carrying those contacts and ideas with them. When such individuals later ascend to policy-making roles, their analysis may closely mirror the narratives they absorbed – effectively baking in a pro-Israel bias without any need for direct Mossad intervention.
• Identifying the Fellows Turned Officials: A number of recent U.S. officials exemplify this track. Eric Trager, mentioned in the context of the 2025 NSC purge, is one. Trager had been “the Esther K. Wagner Fellow at the pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy” before being appointed to the NSC’s Middle East portfolio. When Trager was abruptly removed in 2025, it was notable that his WINEP lineage was part of the story – highlighting how entwined that network is with government staffing. Merav Ceren herself, as noted, was an FDD national security fellow prior to her NSC role, and FDD publicly cheered her appointment as a victory for their alumna. Another example: Morgan Ortagus, a State Department spokesperson in the Trump era, was later appointed special envoy and was considered one of the “strongest pro-Israel supporters in the administration”. Her deep ties with Israeli officials were so pronounced that when she too was shuffled out in 2025, Israeli media described Jerusalem as “stunned” by the loss of such an ally. Ortagus had come through positions at the Institute for the Study of War and Fox News – part of a wider ecosystem that often aligns with Likud-esque foreign policy. These cases show a clear pattern: affiliations with certain think tanks and advocacy groups are a common denominator among many who end up handling U.S. policy on Israel, Iran, or Middle East security. It doesn’t mean they’re spies; it does mean Israel has a kind of “farm team” pipeline seeding the U.S. government with sympathetic voices.
• Congressional Staff and “Gatekeeper” Roles: Beyond the NSC and State Department, influence is pursued in legislative corridors. AIPAC and allied organizations invest heavily in cultivating Congressional staffers and advisors. Often the staff level is where details of bills, aid packages, and oversight reports get crafted – a perfect choke point for an asset to shape outcomes. Many staffers take sponsored trips to Israel (through groups like the American Israel Education Foundation) and form relationships that long outlast the travel. If a particular committee (say, armed services or intelligence) repeatedly hires directors who previously worked for pro-Israel lobbying outfits, that could indicate structural capture. One historic case involved the Pentagon analyst Lawrence Franklin, who in the early 2000s passed classified information on Iran to AIPAC lobbyists (and indirectly to an Israeli official). Franklin was caught and convicted, and while the charges against the AIPAC contacts were dropped, the episode revealed an informal info-sharing channel from inside the Pentagon to Israel. It highlighted how a well-placed mid-level official, acting as a witting asset, can funnel policy intelligence to a foreign ally through ostensibly “friendly” civilian intermediaries. Congress has since become more wary, but the fundamental risk remains: staff or advisors with strong ties to foreign organizations may prioritize those over national interests when the two diverge.
• JINSA and Law Enforcement Exchange: The influence pipeline isn’t just at the federal policy elite level; it also runs through the military and law enforcement communities via exchange programs. JINSA (Jewish Institute for National Security of America) runs a Generals and Admirals Program that routinely brings U.S. military brass to Israel for high-level briefings. It also has a Law Enforcement Exchange Program that takes senior American police and security officials to Israel “to study methods and observe techniques used in preventing and responding to terrorism”. These programs are openly advertised as pro-Israel networking opportunities. The implicit message: Israel is the model ally, and those who engage deeply with it are patriots and security experts. There is genuine value in sharing counter-terrorism lessons, of course. But these trips also serve to bind American officers emotionally and professionally to Israel’s security establishment. Many participants come home as enthusiastic boosters of Israeli methods (and Israeli interests). Later, when some become decision-makers – a police chief, a military commander, a Homeland Security director – their instinct often is to echo that Israeli perspective in strategy and procurement. Here again, no clandestine recruitment is needed; the cultivation happens via hospitality, flattery, and the forging of personal camaraderie with Israeli counterparts. In effect, these programs widen the pool of potential assets by ensuring that when Israel calls with a request, it reaches a friendly ear.

In summary, Washington’s national security ecosystem has multiple built-in conduits for Israeli influence. Think tanks supply personnel and ideas; lobby groups supply campaign money and “suggestions;” exchange programs supply inter-agency friendships. The Mossad or other Israeli agencies can and do leverage these channels. Leaked documents have shown Israeli officials strategizing how to work through American nonprofits to avoid legal scrutiny while advancing Israel’s agenda. For instance, a 2018 strategy memo from Israel’s Ministry of Strategic Affairs (hacked and revealed in 2024) discussed creating a U.S. nonprofit to covertly funnel support to pro-Israel advocacy, explicitly to dodge Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) transparency. Such efforts prove that the Israeli state is consciously aware of, and actively managing, its influence networks in the U.S. – blurring the line between public diplomacy and covert action.

What makes this landscape tricky is that most individuals involved see themselves as friends and allies of Israel, not agents of a foreign power. Indeed, many will bristle at any insinuation of “dual loyalty.” The U.S.-Israel alliance is so institutionalized that working passionately to advance Israel’s security is often viewed as part and parcel of being a pro-American hawk. This very normalization is what a cunning intelligence service exploits: it can insert an asset into a think tank or congressional office under the cover of “shared values and interests,” achieving outcomes that a declared foreign agent never could.

Northern Exposure: Canadian Bureaucracy and the Dual-Allegiance Dilemma

Canada might not appear as obvious a target for Mossad influence as the U.S., but that complacency is itself a vulnerability. As a Five Eyes member and close NATO ally, Canada holds intelligence, technology, and diplomatic access of immense value. Moreover, Canada’s political culture – while strongly pro-Israel in many quarters – has less intense scrutiny on Israeli lobbying than exists in Washington. This can make Canada a tempting soft underbelly for influence operations: what can’t be slipped into Washington might be laundered through Ottawa, then quietly shared back across the border via intelligence-sharing agreements.

Several factors and hypothetical vectors illustrate the Canadian risk:

• Shared Intelligence Channels: Canada has an extensive security-sharing arrangement with both the U.S. and Israel. Notably, since 2014 Canada and Israel have a formal “Strategic Partnership MOU” on security cooperation, and Israel enjoys observer status in certain Five Eyes activities. Intelligence collected by Canada’s SIGINT agency (CSE) often flows to the NSA, and the NSA in turn shares raw intelligence with Israel with minimal filtering. This means Israel can potentially gain Canadian-sourced intel without ever placing a single spy in Canada – a structural exposure. However, it also suggests that if an Israeli asset were embedded in Canadian intelligence, they could directly siphon or influence Five Eyes information at the source. A mole in CSIS or CSE could, for example, tag certain shared data for special handling or quietly exclude reports that Israel might prefer the alliance not see. Historically, Western agencies worry about Russian or Chinese spies; an Israeli spy is rarely expected, given the friendship, which ironically could make it easier for one to operate undetected.
• Diaspora and Dual Citizens in Public Service: Canada’s multicultural fabric includes a significant Jewish and Israeli diaspora. It is not uncommon for Canadian citizens (especially young adults) to volunteer or serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) – indeed a recent public database by a Canadian journalist identified at least 85 Canadians who served in the IDF in recent years, and the true number over decades is likely higher. Many eventually return to Canada. Typically, such individuals enter normal civilian life, but a few might pursue careers in government, security, or politics. This raises delicate questions: Should an IDF veteran be treated any differently in, say, a Canadian Armed Forces or CSIS job application? Legally, Canadian citizens can serve in foreign militaries (unless fighting Canada, which Israel is not), and they aren’t automatically disqualified from security roles. Yet from a security perspective, someone who has sworn military oaths to another country – and likely retains strong personal ties there – represents at least a potential loyalty conflict. It’s a “grey zone” of dual allegiance. To be clear, most Canadian–Israeli dual nationals are loyal, law-abiding Canadians. But as a structural matter, this grey zone could be exploited: if even a handful of ex-IDF or Israeli-trained tech professionals land sensitive Canadian jobs (say, in defense procurement, cybersecurity, or foreign policy planning), an intelligence service like Mossad might see them as access points. They could be approached not with threats, but with appeals to shared heritage: “You understand Israel’s security needs – can you quietly help us on this small matter?” It’s a subtle seduction of patriotism in two directions.
• Policy Influence and Ideological Alignment: On the political front, Canada has seen periods of unusual deference to Israeli narratives. For instance, under Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2006–2015), Ottawa’s foreign policy was outspokenly pro-Israel, often echoing Israeli positions in international forums. Some of that was overt political ideology. But one wonders if behind the scenes, key advisors or bureaucrats helped lock in that one-sided posture. Are there “Merav Cerens” of Canada? Perhaps a senior policy advisor in Global Affairs Canada who interned in an Israeli ministry, or a speechwriter in the PMO with fellowship ties to AIPAC-associated groups. These individuals generally stay out of headlines, but their fingerprints show in policy language (“Canada and Israel share identical values,” “unwavering support,” etc., phrased without nuance). Given Canada’s smaller pool of Middle East experts, having even a few highly placed voices can tilt the consensus. For example, if the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) consistently hires advisors who came out of pro-Israel advocacy NGOs or who have family living in Israel, it’s likely not coincidental. The result can be a sort of institutional capture, where dissenting views (e.g. more pro-Palestinian or neutral stances) are filtered out before they ever reach the decision-maker.
• Private Sector Backdoors (Tech and Defense): An emerging vector is via the private sector, especially as governments contract more cybersecurity and defense work to private firms. Israel is a powerhouse in cyber tech, surveillance, and defense startups – many founded by ex-Mossad or Unit 8200 (Israeli signals intelligence) alumni. Companies like NSO Group (maker of Pegasus spyware) and Cellebrite have sold to North American security agencies. Canada’s police and intelligence have indeed used such Israeli technologies in investigations. The danger is two-fold: these tools might come with hidden “extras” (backdoors transmitting data to Israel), or the companies’ consultants embedded with Canadian clients might themselves act as info-gatherers. In one notable U.S. case, an Israeli private intel firm Black Cube (staffed by former Mossad) was caught in a sprawling undercover effort to influence U.S. politics and media. In Canada, while no such scandal has surfaced, one could imagine a scenario: a Canadian law enforcement agency contracts a security consultancy run by Israeli ex-intel personnel – those consultants then gain personal rapport with Canadian officials, even informal access to internal information, all under the guise of providing a service. This blurs the line between contractor and infiltrator. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and Communications Security Establishment (CSE) must now vet not just employees but also vendors and their staff.
• Case Study in Planning – Not Execution: It is worth mentioning that Israeli intelligence interest in Canada has been documented in at least planning stages. In 2024, reports surfaced that Israel’s Minister for Diaspora Affairs discussed hiring Black Cube to spy on North American activists in the anti-Israel boycott movement (BDS), including on Canadian campuses. The plan purportedly was dropped due to fears of legal repercussions if exposed, but the very fact it was considered confirms that Israel does count Canada as fair game for covert initiatives when its interests are at stake. Former Israeli diplomats openly warned that using Israeli spies on Canadian (and U.S.) soil against civil society targets would “be considered an attack on [host nation] sovereignty” and could severely harm relations. In other words, the line is there, and Israel is aware when it’s crossing it – but it will edge right up to that line in pursuit of its goals.

In summary, Canada’s exposure to Mossad-adjacent influence is qualitatively similar to the U.S. but quantitatively smaller and often overlooked. The same patterns – think tank grooming, political donations (Canada has strict campaign finance limits, but influence can be exerted through community organizations and media), dual-national networks, and tech partnerships – all play out on a Canadian stage. The key difference is a matter of scale and attention. U.S. media and Congress occasionally shine a spotlight on Israeli lobbying (e.g., the AIPAC affair, or debates around FARA and the Israel lobby. In Canada, such scrutiny has been comparatively muted. This could mean that a well-placed asset in Ottawa might operate with even less fear of exposure than one in D.C. The Canadian ethos of politeness and the small foreign policy community might inadvertently provide cover – no one wants to be the one implying a respected colleague might secretly serve another flag.

Canadian officials would therefore do well to proactively apply the same metadata and behavioral analyses discussed earlier. The goal is not witch-hunts, but to fortify the hiring and vetting processes. As Canada establishes its new Foreign Influence Transparency registry (in 2024 the government passed Bill C-70, creating a public registry of foreign agents and tightening counter-interference lawsen.wikipedia.org), much of the focus is on China and Russia. However, these tools should be country-agnostic. If an individual or NGO is lobbying on behalf of ANY foreign state’s interests – whether adversary or ally – transparency and oversight should apply. Israel should be no exception. True friends, after all, don’t sneak around in the dark.

Influence Laundering: Think Tanks, NGOs, Fellowships and Philanthropy

To understand how foreign influence can permeate Western decision-making without blatant espionage, consider the concept of “laundering” influence through soft power channels. Instead of a direct command from a spy handler, ideas and loyalties are shaped via intermediaries that appear benign or even benevolent. Key vectors include:

• Think Tanks and Policy Institutes: As discussed, organizations like FDD, WINEP, JINSA, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its spinoffs use the veneer of research or advocacy to advance specific agendas. AIPAC itself, the most powerful pro-Israel lobby in the U.S., has long avoided registering under FARA by portraying itself as a domestic lobby (its membership is American). Leaked Israeli legal memos in 2018 show that Israeli officials were concerned that stricter FARA enforcement could “ensnare” American groups working in coordination with Israel, and even considered setting up a new U.S. nonprofit as a front to avoid scrutiny. In essence, Israel recognized that think tanks and NGOs are its force multipliers – trojan horses that enter policy circles on the pretext of objective expertise or grassroots lobbying, all while being at least partly guided (and often funded) by foreign interests. These entities “launder” influence by converting a foreign government’s desired policy outcomes into domestic recommendations. By the time a Congressmember or MP hears it, the idea sounds like it came from a respected American or Canadian think tank – not from Tel Aviv – even if in substance it did.
• “Democracy Promotion” and Civil Society NGOs: Western countries are proud of their civil society and often fund NGOs abroad to promote democracy and human rights. However, this concept can be flipped. Israel and its allies fund NGOs in North America under the banner of fighting anti-Semitism, educating about the Holocaust, promoting interfaith dialogue, etc. While many do noble work, some also have quiet mandates to combat criticism of Israel’s policies. For example, an NGO might sponsor workshops for journalists on recognizing anti-Israel bias in reporting – which may cross into advocating the Israeli government line. These NGOs provide an ideal cover: who would suspect a “peace and tolerance” nonprofit of furthering an intelligence agenda? Yet by shaping public discourse and training future leaders, they gently massage the environment to be more receptive to Israel’s viewpoints. It’s a subtler form of influence laundering, where the cause is noble but the side effects are politically useful to a foreign state.
• Academic Fellowships and Tours: Scholarships, exchange programs, and study tours are another laundering mechanism. When a rising Canadian diplomat gets a “generous grant” to study for a year at an institute in Israel, or an American congressional aide goes on a week-long VIP tour of Israel, these are not just educational experiences – they are investments. The Wexner Foundation’s Israel Fellowship at Harvard, for instance, has for decades brought elite Israeli officials to study at Harvard’s Kennedy School, integrating them into Ivy League networks. There isn’t an exact mirror for Americans in Israel (for security reasons, perhaps), but plenty of programs exist to send Western professionals over. These visits almost invariably include meetings with Israeli military brass, defense contractors, and government ministers. The travelers receive briefings that present Israel’s perspective forcefully – e.g., gazing at the Syrian border while an IDF officer explains existential threats, or touring a rocket-damaged home in Sderot to feel the fear Israelis live with. Such visceral experiences create emotional loyalty. When those participants later sit in a policy meeting back home, they recall those briefings and often become de facto advocates for the Israeli position (whether consciously or not). In effect, their worldview has been “curated” during the fellowship. The cost to Israel or its donors is minor (plane tickets, some hospitality), but the payoff can be huge if that individual one day influences a critical decision about military aid or a U.N. vote.
• Philanthropic Grants and “Joint Ventures”: Wealthy pro-Israel philanthropies often fund joint research projects or community initiatives with Western governments. For instance, an Israeli tech firm and a Canadian university might co-sponsor a cyber security lab. Or an American police department might accept a donor-funded training program in Krav Maga (Israeli martial art) for its officers. These cooperative efforts build goodwill and networks. However, they also open backchannels. The Israeli partner in a joint research project can gain insights into the Canadian side’s capabilities and even guide the research toward outcomes favorable to Israel’s defense industry. When philanthropic money is involved, the arrangement looks apolitical – private charity for mutual benefit. But one must ask, who ultimately benefits? If the outcome is that the foreign country’s narrative or product gets privileged, then the influence laundering succeeded.
• Dual Citizenship and Legal Grey Zones: Dual nationals holding office pose a particularly thorny challenge. Western liberal democracies generally do not bar dual citizens from any office (with a few exceptions), trusting in individual integrity. But consider scenarios: A dual Canadian-Israeli citizen is negotiating an intelligence-sharing agreement – can we be 100% sure which interest they will favor when tough calls arise? Notably, Israel’s Law of Return means any Jewish person (and certain non-Jewish family of Jews) can obtain Israeli citizenship relatively easily. Thus, a non-Israeli Jew working in a North American security agency could quietly get an Israeli passport without publicity. They might not even see it as disloyal – perhaps it’s just symbolic or for ease of travel. Yet once in hand, that passport might encourage deeper ties. The person becomes, in the eyes of Israeli law, one of Israel’s own. Some nations (e.g., the U.S.) prohibit dual citizens from accessing certain high-clearance jobs unless they renounce the foreign citizenship, specifically because of this concern. In practice though, enforcement can be uneven and controversial (again, because of the risk of ethnic profiling accusations). Dual citizenship isn’t wrongdoing, but it is a legal grey zone that intelligence agencies can exploit by appealing to the “other” loyalty if it exists. It’s one more layer to watch in influence mapping.

All these vectors – think tanks, NGOs, fellowships, philanthropy, dual status – have something in common: they operate in the daylight. They don’t “feel” like spycraft. That’s exactly why they are effective for deep influence. Intelligence agencies like Mossad often prefer to let these soft channels do the heavy lifting, reserving classic espionage for truly hard targets. As an Israeli strategist might say, “Why risk a spy scandal to plant one mole in a ministry, when we can fund ten bright young ideologues to climb the ranks there on their own?” It’s the difference between hacking a system and socially engineering the users – the latter can be more effective and far less likely to trigger alarms.

Legal and Ethical Guardrails: Balancing Security with Rights

Any discussion of “Mossad assets” in Western governments must tread carefully to avoid slipping into conspiratorial or prejudiced territory. It is all too easy for legitimate concern about foreign influence to morph into unfair suspicion of individuals based on ethnicity or politics. Therefore, robust legal and ethical guardrails are needed as we shore up defenses:

• No Witch Hunts or Guilt by Association: Being pro-Israel, of Israeli descent, or having served in an allied military is not a crime. Democratic societies rightly protect free expression and dual heritage. Thus, identifying structural vulnerabilities should never turn into blanket accusations against officials with Jewish or Israeli ties. The focus must remain on specific, evidenced cases of improper influence. In practice, that means hard attribution before naming someone as a malign asset. For example, Merav Ceren’s story was reported with reference to her documented fellowship and roles – concrete facts – and even then most outlets stopped short of alleging disloyalty, only conflict of interest. This is the correct tone. Analysts and journalists should use careful language like “asset-adjacent”, “strategically placed”, or “dual loyalty risk” – phrasing that flags potential issues without asserting treachery. Terms like “spy,” “traitor,” or “mole” carry legal and moral weight that should be reserved for cases with clear evidence (e.g., Pollard was justly called a spy because he was convicted as one).
• Respect for Privacy and Rights: Metadata analysis and AI flagging, as proposed, can conflict with privacy and civil liberties. We must ensure any monitoring is lawful, proportional, and judicious. If an algorithm flags an individual due to certain affiliations, that should trigger quiet, internal vetting – not public smears or career sabotage absent cause. Perhaps a secondary security interview or a closer look at their work products is warranted, but it must not devolve into harassment. Likewise, if a public servant is found to have undisclosed foreign contacts, due process is key. Transparency with oversight bodies (like legislative intelligence committees) can strike a balance: security agencies can confidentially brief lawmakers if they suspect foreign targeting of an official, ensuring a check on executive overreach and preventing political abuse of such allegations.
• Avoiding Ethnic/Religious Bias: History is littered with shameful episodes of ethnic profiling (from the Dreyfus Affair to Japanese-American internment to more recent Islamophobic discrimination). Guarding against foreign espionage must not become a cover for xenophobia or antisemitism. The “dual loyalty” trope has been weaponized against Jews in the past; our task is to differentiate between baseless slander and legitimate security questions. One way is to anchor every concern to identifiable actions or connections, not personal identity. For example, pointing out that an official failed to disclose a meeting with a foreign ambassador, or that they received large gifts from a foreign billionaire, is objective. By contrast, speculating that “Person X might be loyal to Israel because they’re Jewish” is unacceptable and wrong – not to mention counterproductive, as it alienates communities whose cooperation is needed in counterintelligence. Intelligence services should also diversify their own ranks and cultural training, so that they are equipped to tell normal cultural exchange from suspicious activity.
• Public Accountability vs. Smear Risks: Journalists and watchdog groups play a critical role in exposing undue influence (as seen in the Ceren case and others). However, they too carry responsibility to be meticulous. Publishing a name alongside the word “Mossad” is almost guaranteed to ruin a career, even if the person did nothing illegal. Thus, standards of evidence and clarity of accusation are paramount in public reports. If a piece identifies someone as a possible Mossad asset, it should present the concrete reasons (e.g., “individual did XYZ which aligns with known Mossad modus operandi, according to sources or documents”) and allow the person a chance to respond. When dealing with non-public figures (career civil servants not in the limelight), extra caution is needed; one should ideally avoid naming them unless there is confirmed wrongdoing. Instead, discuss the role or pattern in general terms. This protects individuals from reputational harm while still informing the public of real concerns.

In essence, democracies must walk a tightrope: we have to be vigilant against covert influence, including from allies, without undermining the openness and pluralism that are our strengths. The solution lies in more transparency and accountability, not in paranoia. Sunlight can expose foreign lobbying (through registries and investigative journalism) and thus inoculate policy debates against hidden agendas. Strong ethical guardrails ensure that in combating shadowy influence, we don’t betray our own values of fairness and justice.

Countermeasures: Hardening the System Against Covert Influence

Having mapped the threat, how do we counter it? A multi-pronged strategy is needed to fortify U.S. and Canadian institutions while upholding democratic principles. Below are concrete measures being discussed or implemented to close the “asset-shaped voids” that foreign influence can slip through:

• Strengthen Foreign Agent Registration and Transparency: Laws like the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and Canada’s new Foreign Influence Transparency registry must be robustly enforced and, if needed, expanded. Historically, enforcement of FARA was lax – many organizations lobbying for foreign interests (including close allies) flew under the radar. That is changing. The U.S. Senate has held hearings on FARA enforcement and attempts to influence elections, and leaked Israeli communications show that even Israel’s government grew fearful of tougher FARA enforcement impeding its U.S. advocacy. The message: double down. For example, AIPAC and related groups could be required to file more detailed disclosures about any coordination with Israeli officials, even if not officially “agents.” In Canada, Bill C-70 (2024) creates a public registry of foreign agents and broadens definitions of foreign interference. This law should be implemented to include not just hostile states but any state that clandestinely directs activities in Canada. Proper resourcing of enforcement units is key – transparency laws mean little if violations aren’t investigated and prosecuted.
• Conflict-of-Interest and Foreign Contact Reporting: Within government, implement stricter disclosure rules for officials’ foreign ties. For instance, anyone appointed to the NSC, a minister’s office, or a security-sensitive post could be required to disclose past foreign fellowships, military service, or consultancy work – and to recuse themselves from files where those ties present a conflict. The goal is not to ban people with international experience (which can often be an asset), but to manage risks openly. If Merav Ceren’s Israel fellowship had been flagged in a public appointment hearing, perhaps conditions or monitoring could have been applied (e.g. limiting her access to certain Israel-related intelligence). In Canada, there have been calls for a more formal vetting of political staff; currently, ministers’ aides are not always security cleared to the level of info they might see. Instituting at least mid-level clearance and background checks for such staff, with attention to foreign influence risk, would close an exploitable gap.
• Mandatory Security Training and Pledges: Education can be a powerful tool. Make it standard for incoming officials (especially those with any dual allegiances) to undergo counterintelligence briefings where agencies like CSIS or the FBI explain how foreign recruitment and influence work. Often, people don’t realize they are being targeted until it’s too late. An informed official who, say, attends a cocktail party at an embassy might recognize a subtle pitch for what it is and report it. Additionally, requiring periodic reaffirmation of oaths and perhaps supplemental pledges (e.g. a statement of exclusive allegiance for dual citizens in security roles) can reinforce the seriousness of their duties. While a signed paper won’t stop a determined spy, it does create a legal tool to charge those who betray it, and serves as a clear line that employees know not to cross.
• Leverage Intelligence Alliances (With Caution): The irony of Five Eyes is that member nations share so freely amongst themselves that they might let their guard down with each other – or with close partners like Israel. The alliance should develop collective norms for allied spying: perhaps even an informal pact not to recruit from each other’s ranks. At the very least, Five Eyes members could quietly agree to alert each other if they catch wind of a third ally’s intel service approaching one of their officials. (There have been whispers that such gentleman’s agreements exist, though Israel, not being a Five Eyes member, wouldn’t be party to them.) Another idea floated by experts is a “counter-influence charter”: allied democracies pledge transparency in their lobbying and no covert ops on each other’s soil. It’s aspirational – after all, friends have spied on friends (the U.S. famously bugged German Chancellor Merkel’s phone). But putting it in writing would set a normative expectation and make violations diplomatically costlier.
• Technological Countermeasures – AI in Clearance and Monitoring: As mentioned earlier, artificial intelligence can assist in scanning for red flags. The security clearance process can be modernized by incorporating AI tools that continuously vet open-source data on clearance holders for foreign ties or unusual behavior. For example, if a defense official suddenly connects on social media with a cluster of foreign defense contractors, or if their name appears in leaked foreign documents (as happened with the 2024 Israeli hack leaks, where names of U.S. contacts might surface), an AI system could alert security officers. Pilot programs could test such continuous evaluation, balancing privacy (maybe it only looks at professional data, not personal). This is essentially an extension of existing insider threat programs which monitor for signs of espionage or extremism. We would be adding “possible foreign asset activity” to the watch list of behaviors. While one must avoid algorithmic overreach, used wisely this could catch, for instance, an official who starts uncharacteristically advocating one foreign country’s stance after returning from a private trip there – a potential sign of recruitment or pressure.
• Robust Enforcement and Examples: Laws and systems mean little if violators walk free or even perceived violators suffer no consequence. The U.S. handling of the AIPAC espionage case (Franklin, Rosen, Weissman) in 2005 was seen by some as dropping the ball – charges against the lobbyists were dropped, leaving an impression that influential figures are above the law. In contrast, the conviction of Jonathan Pollard and the fact he served 30 years sent a message that even allies’ spies will pay a heavy price. Going forward, if a case of an “asset” crossing the line is uncovered (say, leaking classified info to a foreign official), prosecutors should pursue it aggressively regardless of the ally in question. Likewise, administrative penalties should be used: demotions, loss of clearance, public firing if merited. Each well-publicized action serves as a deterrent and a signal that we are watching. It also builds public trust that the government isn’t turning a blind eye due to political sensitivities.
• Encourage Ethical Whistleblowing: Often the people who first sense something is off are co-workers. There should be safe, confidential channels for officials to report concerns if, for example, “Bob from analysis seems to be pushing only Israeli-sourced intel and dismissing our assessments”. If Bob is just passionate, no harm; but if Bob has undeclared ties, this tip could be invaluable. Ensuring whistleblower protection and a culture that rewards alertness (without fostering a snitch mentality) is delicate but important. It could be as simple as internal newsletters reminding staff, “If you see something that worries you – an unexplained foreign contact or pressure – please speak up; you will be protected.” The earlier a potential asset is flagged, the easier it is to investigate quietly and take preventive action.

In implementing all the above, political will is crucial. Influence from powerful allies is a blind spot many leaders would rather not discuss. But times are changing. The public is more aware of foreign interference threats (witness the extensive coverage of election meddling by China/Russia, and growing awareness of lobbying by Gulf states, etc.). Israel’s case should be part of that conversation – treated neither with hostility nor with kid gloves, but with sober recognition that any foreign agenda, if covertly advanced, needs checking. A democratic government owes its citizens a singular loyalty. Achieving that means sometimes saying to a friend: “We value you, but we will still verify. We will trust, but we will also cut off avenues for abuse.”

Conclusion: Soft shells, deep states. In Western halls of power, the most effective foreign influence often wears a friendly face – a trusted advisor, a think tank report, a joint flag on a conference podium. The Mossad and its peers understand that “assets” need not carry espionage kits; they can carry briefcases and resumes. By analyzing cases like Merav Ceren and the broader metadata of career paths, we get a glimpse into how covert influence might snake its way into the bloodstream of our democracies. The evidence suggests a systematic effort to seed sympathetic figures in key positions on issues critical to Israel, from Washington to Ottawa.

Can we detect them? Yes – if we’re willing to look, using the tools of modern data analysis and old-school investigative rigor. Can we deter them? Only by reinforcing a culture of transparency and loyalty in our institutions, and by updating laws to shed light on the shadows where influence likes to hide. Importantly, defending against covert influence does not mean treating allies as enemies. It means upholding a standard of integrity that ultimately benefits all parties. After all, if Israel (or any nation) has a sound argument or policy to advance, it should be able to withstand the sunlight of open debate rather than rely on hidden hand maneuvers.

In the end, the paradox of “soft-shell” assets is that they exploit our openness. The antidote is not closing ourselves – it’s being even more open, in the sense of demanding openness from anyone seeking to sway our policies. A foreign country’s strongest asset is our ignorance or apathy. Our strongest defense is knowledge and vigilance. By mapping the subtle circuits of influence and calling them out, we begin to insulate our democracies from undue foreign sway – even when it comes disguised as a colleague in a suit with an impressive CV.

Through prudent countermeasures and ethical vigilance, North America can harden its defenses against covert influence while still warmly embracing genuine alliance and exchange. In doing so, we send a respectful but firm message: in our house, decisions will be made in the interest of our people, based on facts and merits – not insider allegiances. That is the cornerstone of sovereignty, and it is worth protecting in the dark and in the light.