1. Executive Summary: USAID’s $114 Million Monument to Failure

Introduction: A Case Study in Foreign Aid Gone Wrong

The Gomal Zam Dam was supposed to be a crowning achievement of U.S. foreign aid strategy, a project that would deliver hydropower, irrigation, and flood control to Pakistan’s underdeveloped South Waziristan region. Instead, it became a black hole for development funds, a prime example of American mismanagement, and a strategic asset for the Taliban. Despite decades of planning, multiple funding rounds, and $114 million in USAID investment, the project has failed to deliver on almost every key objective.

The dam took nearly 50 years to complete, with delays caused by corruption, poor oversight, security threats, and fundamental engineering flaws. By the time it was finally operational in 2013, it was already showing signs of failure. Within three years, its hydropower turbines faced significant failures,, rendering the energy component useless. The irrigation system USAID funded never worked as planned, with water distribution marred by corruption, inefficiency, and outright theft. Meanwhile, the region remained deeply unstable, with Taliban militants continuing to use the dam as a strategic stronghold and revenue stream.

USAID played a critical financial role in not just one but two separate phases of this doomed project, making it an undeniable entry on the list of America’s worst foreign aid failures.

Two Rounds of USAID Investment, Two Expensive Failures

Round 1: The $40 Million to “Complete” the Dam (2011)

By 2011, the Pakistani government was struggling to finish the dam and appealed for international financial assistance. USAID stepped in with $40 million in funding to push the project to completion. The goal was simple: speed up construction, ensure the hydropower plant became operational, and provide water storage for irrigation.

However, this intervention failed to address underlying issues:

• The engineering defects baked into the project remained untouched.
• The security situation in South Waziristan continued to worsen, with Taliban militants attacking project workers and extorting contractors.
• USAID failed to ensure post-construction maintenance, meaning that just three years after opening, the dam's power generation collapsed.

Round 2: $74.22 Million for Irrigation and Agricultural Development (2011-2015)

Despite the initial failure to secure lasting benefits from the dam itself, USAID doubled down with an even larger investment—over $74.22 million for irrigation infrastructure and agricultural development. This included:

• The Gomal Zam Irrigation Project ($40 million, 2011) – Intended to build a 266-kilometer canal system to distribute the dam’s water supply.
• The Waran Canal ($12 million, 2012) – A separate 164-kilometer irrigation canal aimed at reaching additional farmland.
• The Gomal Zam Command Area Development Project ($22.22 million, 2015) – Focused on training farmers, building watercourses, and improving agricultural productivity.

Despite this massive cash infusion, the irrigation network has failed to deliver consistent water supply to the farmers who need it most. Corruption in water distribution, mismanagement of canals, and sedimentation buildup have left large portions of farmland dry.

The Core Failures: Why USAID’s Investment Collapsed

1. Fifty Years Late and Already Failing

Originally approved in 1963, the dam was supposed to be a Cold War-era development initiative. Instead, it remained incomplete for five decades, with construction stopping and restarting due to political instability, financial mismanagement, and outright neglect. By the time USAID stepped in to “save” the project in 2011, the damage had already been done—the project was structurally flawed from the start.

2. Taliban-Controlled Territory

At multiple points during its construction, the Gomal Zam Dam was effectively under Taliban control. Militants kidnapped workers, extorted contractors, and even extracted “protection payments” from companies working on the site. By failing to secure the project militarily, USAID funneled millions into a project that ultimately strengthened local insurgent networks.

3. Engineering Failures and Non-Functioning Hydropower

One of the biggest selling points of the dam was its supposed 17.4 MW hydropower capacity. However, in October 2016, a turbine system failure shut down power generation completely. Despite USAID’s $40 million contribution, the dam’s power plant lasted less than three years before breaking down.

4. The Canals That Lead to Nowhere

USAID’s second investment focused on irrigation canals, but the execution was a bureaucratic nightmare. The primary canal system was built, but the secondary and tertiary distribution systems never functioned properly. Farmers were promised irrigation benefits, but many never received water because of corrupt water distribution officials, bribery schemes, and outright misallocation of resources.

5. Financial Mismanagement: USAID’s Signature Move

USAID’s involvement in the dam project led to millions in questioned costs, inflated contracts, and wasteful spending. A 2025 financial audit uncovered $358,627 in direct “questioned costs”, though the real financial hemorrhaging was likely much higher.

Conclusion: A Disaster That USAID Will Never Acknowledge

The Gomal Zam Dam is a case study in USAID’s failure to plan, execute, and oversee large-scale infrastructure projects. Instead of delivering prosperity to Pakistan’s farmers and energy to the national grid, it became a symbol of corruption, broken promises, and wasted foreign aid.

• The dam was completed decades late and still failed.
• The turbines broke down within three years.
• The irrigation canals never delivered water where it mattered.
• The Taliban profited from ransom payments and contractor extortion.
• USAID burned through over $114 million and had nothing to show for it.

The Gomal Zam Dam deserves its place among USAID’s worst failures, proving that when it comes to American-funded infrastructure in fragile states, the money flows, but the results never come.

2. USAID’s Great Infrastructure Illusion: How to Burn $114 Million and Call It Success

The Myth of Development Through Infrastructure

USAID has a long history of throwing money at large-scale infrastructure projects in unstable countries under the illusion that roads, dams, and irrigation networks will somehow foster stability. The logic goes like this: Build infrastructure, improve economic conditions, reduce extremism. The problem? This theory has rarely—if ever—worked.

The Gomal Zam Dam was a textbook example of USAID’s misguided infrastructure fantasies. The dam was approved in 1963 but stalled for decades due to Pakistan’s political instability, bureaucratic incompetence, and lack of technical expertise. Yet, in 2011, USAID still thought it could swoop in, cut a check for $40 million, and miraculously turn a half-century-old, half-built disaster into a functioning hydropower and irrigation project.

Instead, it became a lesson in why development projects built on political convenience rather than practical feasibility are doomed to fail. The engineering problems, security risks, and governance failures that stalled the dam in the first place never disappeared—USAID just ignored them.

USAID’s First Mistake: Funding a Half-Dead Project (2011)

By the time USAID injected $40 million into the Gomal Zam Dam in 2011, it was already a sinking ship. The Pakistani government had restarted construction in 2002, awarding contracts to a Chinese joint venture (CWHEC-HPE), but by 2011, progress had slowed to a crawl due to:

• Militant attacks on construction crews.
• Massive cost overruns caused by delays and security expenses.
• Poor coordination between Pakistani government agencies and contractors.

USAID’s money was supposed to fix these problems and push the dam to completion. What actually happened?

• The hydropower plant technically "opened" in 2013—but its turbines experienced a catastrophic failure in 2016.
• The irrigation infrastructure USAID bankrolled didn’t work.
• Security continued to be a nightmare, with militants extorting and kidnapping project workers.

USAID’s Second Mistake: Doubling Down on a Bad Bet (2011-2015)

Rather than cutting its losses after the dam’s initial failures, USAID decided to spend another $74.22 million between 2011 and 2015 to fund an elaborate irrigation and agricultural development scheme.

This second round of funding went toward:

• The Gomal Zam Irrigation Project ($40 million, 2011) – Intended to build a 266-kilometer network of canals to distribute water from the dam.
• The Waran Canal ($12 million, 2012) – A secondary 164-kilometer irrigation system aimed at reaching additional farmland.
• The Gomal Zam Command Area Development Project ($22.22 million, 2015) – A program designed to teach farmers how to use the new irrigation system, build watercourses, and improve crop yields.

On paper, this sounds like an impressive rural development initiative. In reality?

• Farmers never got the water they were promised.
• The canals were built, but the water distribution network was broken from day one.
• Massive corruption led to preferential water allocations for politically connected landowners, leaving small-scale farmers dry.
• Sedimentation buildup started clogging the system almost immediately, reducing the canals’ capacity (Hussain, 2020).

The Geopolitical Fantasy Behind the Gomal Zam Investment

USAID’s Strategic Miscalculation: Containing China’s Influence

The Gomal Zam Dam wasn’t just about providing electricity and irrigation—it was also a strategic move in the broader U.S.-China competition for influence in Pakistan.

• China had already been funding massive infrastructure projects in Pakistan, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
• The U.S. feared that China was becoming Pakistan’s dominant development partner and wanted to maintain some leverage through USAID-funded projects.
• By investing in Gomal Zam, the U.S. hoped to keep Pakistan partially aligned with American interests in development aid.

The problem? China does infrastructure projects differently—and usually more effectively in terms of execution.

• China’s financing is tied to strict project management and contractor control.
• USAID’s financing, in contrast, gets funneled through multiple layers of bureaucracy and local government corruption.

By the time USAID’s money reached the ground, millions had already evaporated into administrative overhead, security costs, and sketchy contractor deals. The Chinese knew how to manage these projects—USAID did not.

The Taliban Factor: USAID’s Involuntary Development Partners

One of the most glaring blind spots in USAID’s funding decisions was the security situation in South Waziristan.

• Militants had controlled parts of the Gomal Zam Dam’s construction zone for years.
• Kidnappings and extortion were routine—contractors often had to pay protection money just to keep working.
• The Pakistani military had to station troops at the site just to prevent outright militant takeovers.

By failing to acknowledge that this was an active warzone, USAID ignored the fact that much of its funding was indirectly benefiting the Taliban.

• Construction companies had to pay local militants to operate.
• Materials and supplies meant for the project were routinely stolen or redirected.
• Even after the dam was finished, the Taliban retained influence over who got access to water.

This wasn’t development aid—this was a funding pipeline into a live insurgency.

Conclusion: The Infrastructure Mirage USAID Refuses to See

The Gomal Zam Dam fiasco is what happens when USAID prioritizes symbolism over substance.

• The dam took decades to complete, and within three years, its turbines were dead.
• The irrigation canals USAID funded were mostly useless.
• Security risks were ignored, allowing insurgents to extract value from a U.S.-funded project.
• USAID’s obsession with grand development projects in fragile states keeps producing the same failures.

Instead of learning from past mistakes, USAID continues to repeat them, dumping millions into large-scale infrastructure projects in unstable regions without securing governance, maintenance, or military stability first.

The Gomal Zam Dam was never just an engineering failure—it was a failure of planning, strategy, and oversight. USAID’s insistence on throwing money at a hopeless project in a hostile environment ensured that its $114 million investment produced nothing but headlines and an expensive lesson in futility.

3. A Warzone Megaproject: How the Taliban Profited from USAID

Introduction: The Development Project That Funded an Insurgency

When USAID pumped $114 million into the Gomal Zam Dam project, it wasn’t just investing in hydropower and irrigation—it was inadvertently financing one of the most active insurgent groups in Pakistan.

South Waziristan, where the dam was built, has been a hotbed for the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant factions for years. USAID, in its classic “just throw money at it” approach, ignored the fact that local militants controlled vast portions of the project area and had already established a lucrative business model of extorting infrastructure projects.

The result? The Gomal Zam Dam became both a symbol of failed U.S. foreign aid and a cash cow for insurgents.

The 2004 Kidnapping of Chinese Engineers: The Taliban’s First Payday

• In October 2004, two Chinese engineers working on the dam were kidnapped by TTP militants.
• A rescue operation by the Pakistani military went wrong—one of the engineers was killed, and the other was freed.
• After the incident, Chinese contractors pulled out of the project, and construction came to a halt.
• This was the first sign that the dam project was going to be an insurgent playground—but USAID ignored the warning.

The Taliban’s “Development Tax”: USAID-Funded Construction Paid for Militancy

By the time USAID jumped in with $40 million in 2011 to help complete the dam, it was widely known that South Waziristan was a Taliban stronghold. Yet, USAID and Pakistani officials acted as if they were funding a project in a stable country.

• Militants ran extortion rackets on project contractors.
  • Construction companies had to pay the Taliban for “protection” just to continue working.
  • Any company that refused to pay had equipment burned or workers kidnapped.
• Supply chains were compromised.
  • Materials intended for dam construction were routinely stolen by militant groups and either resold or used for their own fortifications.
• Wages were siphoned into insurgency networks.
  • Some workers on the project were later identified as Taliban sympathizers who funneled salaries into militant operations.

USAID’s response? Nothing. They kept the money flowing, knowing full well that some of it was ending up in militant hands.

The 2012 Mass Kidnapping of Gomal Zam Dam Workers

If the 2004 kidnapping of Chinese engineers wasn’t enough to convince USAID that this was an unworkable project, the 2012 abduction of eight dam workers should have been the final nail in the coffin.

• In August 2012, eight Pakistani engineers and project employees were kidnapped by the Taliban.
• The militants threatened to kill them unless ransom demands were met by December 3, 2012.
• After months of secret negotiations, seven of the eight were released. The fate of the eighth remains unknown.
• Pakistani authorities never confirmed whether a ransom was paid, but sources indicate large sums of money were exchanged for their freedom.

At this point, it was clear that the project had no security. If engineers couldn’t even survive in the region, what hope did farmers have of benefiting from the irrigation system USAID was still funding?

The Pakistani Military’s Halfhearted Intervention

After the 2012 mass kidnapping, the Pakistani government promised a crackdown to secure the dam site. The reality?

• Security forces were deployed but were mostly confined to guarding the dam itself.
• The surrounding areas remained Taliban-controlled.
• Workers still had to pay bribes and “protection fees” to militants to access parts of the irrigation network.
• Insurgents continued to collect tolls on key roads leading to the dam, ensuring a steady stream of illicit income from a U.S.-funded project.

USAID never conducted an independent security assessment, and no additional conditions were placed on funding to ensure the project was operating in a controlled environment.

Post-Completion: A Water Project the Taliban Still Uses to Their Advantage

Even after the dam was officially completed in 2013, insurgent control over the surrounding areas meant that access to water became a strategic asset for the Taliban.

• Farmers who wanted irrigation had to “register” with local militant groups.
  • Those who refused saw their water supply mysteriously disrupted.
• The irrigation canals USAID funded became a bargaining chip in Taliban-controlled land disputes.
  • Access to water was used as a reward for loyal communities and as a punishment for those suspected of cooperating with the Pakistani government.
• USAID spent $114 million and still had no control over the project’s long-term governance.

Conclusion: How USAID Became an Unwitting Taliban Donor

The Gomal Zam Dam project wasn’t just a development failure—it was a direct case of foreign aid funding insurgency.

• USAID ignored security risks from day one, assuming that throwing money at infrastructure could fix a warzone.
• Militants extracted millions from contractors through extortion and ransom schemes.
• The Pakistani military failed to secure the project, leaving much of the irrigation network in the hands of insurgents.
• Even after completion, the Taliban maintained control over water access, turning a U.S.-funded project into a tool of insurgent governance.

USAID never acknowledged the extent to which this project was compromised, because doing so would mean admitting that they helped fund the very people they were trying to weaken.

The Gomal Zam Dam isn’t just a symbol of USAID’s incompetence—it’s a case study in how bad development planning can actively make things worse.

4. Engineering for Disaster: Why the Dam is Already Dying

Introduction: A $114 Million Money Pit That’s Already Falling Apart

The Gomal Zam Dam was supposed to be a modern engineering marvel, bringing hydropower and irrigation to a remote region of Pakistan. Instead, it’s already failing.

• The hydropower system lasted less than three years before a catastrophic turbine failure.
• Sediment buildup is already reducing the dam’s lifespan decades ahead of schedule.
• The irrigation network USAID funded doesn’t deliver water where it’s needed.

USAID spent millions on infrastructure that was fundamentally broken from day one. The dam was never built to last, and no one planned for long-term maintenance. Instead of delivering sustainable energy and irrigation, USAID built a ticking time bomb of structural and operational failures.

The 2016 Hydropower Failure: When $40 Million Buys You Three Years of Electricity

The Gomal Zam Dam was supposed to generate 17.4 MW of electricity, enough to power thousands of homes. But by October 2016, just three years after going online, the turbines experienced a catastrophic failure.

Why did the power system fail so quickly?

• Cheap protection systems: The hydropower plant’s electrical protection system failed, damaging both turbines beyond repair.
• No backup plan: There was no redundancy in the system—once the turbines failed, the dam was completely offline.
• No long-term maintenance strategy: USAID funded the dam’s completion but had no plan for long-term repairs or replacements.

By the time repairs were considered, the cost of fixing the turbines was almost as much as the cost of building the power plant in the first place. In short, the dam’s hydropower component was already dead in the water before it even had a chance to prove useful.

Sedimentation: The Dam is Already Filling with Mud

One of the biggest engineering failures of the Gomal Zam Dam was sediment management.

What’s happening?

• The Gomal River carries a high sediment load, meaning large amounts of mud, silt, and debris get deposited in the dam’s reservoir.
• Sediment accumulation reduces the dam’s water storage capacity, making it less effective for both irrigation and flood control.
• Poor watershed management—deforestation, overgrazing, and soil erosion in the surrounding areas have accelerated the rate of sedimentation.

The long-term problem?

• The dam was supposed to last decades—but sediment buildup is already cutting its lifespan short.
• Water storage capacity is declining faster than expected, meaning less water for irrigation and higher risks of overflow during floods.
• Without dredging or proper sediment management, the dam could become practically useless in a fraction of its intended lifespan.

USAID funded the completion of a dam that is already failing its most basic function—storing and regulating water.

The Canals That Don’t Work: A $40 Million Irrigation Scam

USAID’s biggest investment in Gomal Zam wasn’t the dam itself—it was the irrigation network. Between 2011 and 2015, USAID dumped $74.22 million into a system that was supposed to deliver water to over 191,000 acres of farmland.

The result?

• The main canals were built—but the secondary and tertiary canals weren’t completed properly.
• Many farmers never received the water they were promised.
• Corruption and mismanagement led to water theft and bribery schemes.

What went wrong?

1. Poor Planning – The primary canal was constructed, but the network that distributes water to individual farms was never fully operational.
2. Water Theft – Powerful landowners and officials hijacked water flow, directing it to politically connected farms while smaller farmers got nothing.
3. Technical Failures – Water failed to reach intended areas due to poor maintenance, clogged canals, and sedimentation.

USAID invested millions in an irrigation system that only works for the elite, leaving the small farmers—the supposed beneficiaries—high and dry.

The Waran Canal Disaster: A Separate $12 Million Failure

USAID also spent $12 million on the Waran Canal, a 164-kilometer-long irrigation channel intended to bring an additional 28,000 acres under permanent irrigation.

Why did it fail?

• The canal exists, but water flow is inconsistent—some sections work, others are completely dry.
• Poor construction led to frequent blockages, collapses, and breaches.
• Farmers have to bribe officials to get access to water.

Like the main irrigation network, the Waran Canal is a perfect example of how USAID funds infrastructure that barely functions.

A Lack of Accountability: No One is Fixing the Problems

One of the biggest failures of the Gomal Zam Dam project is the complete lack of post-construction oversight.

• Once USAID’s money was spent, no one was held accountable for maintenance or performance.
• The Pakistani government has no long-term financial plan for the dam’s upkeep.
• The irrigation canals and power plant continue to degrade without serious intervention.

Without ongoing investment in repairs and sediment management, the dam will only continue to decline.

Conclusion: A Dam That’s Dying Faster Than Expected

The Gomal Zam Dam was supposed to be a long-term investment in Pakistan’s energy and water security. Instead, it has turned into a rapidly deteriorating liability.

• The hydropower system failed in three years.
• Sediment is choking the reservoir far earlier than expected.
• The irrigation canals USAID funded are unreliable, mismanaged, and corrupt.
• No one is maintaining the infrastructure, meaning it will only get worse.

USAID didn’t just fund a dam—it funded a slow-motion collapse of an entire regional development strategy. The U.S. government poured $114 million into a project that was doomed from the start, and now, just a few years later, it’s already breaking apart.

5. The Financial Black Hole: Where Did the Money Go?

Introduction: When $114 Million Disappears Into the Bureaucratic Abyss

The Gomal Zam Dam wasn’t just an engineering disaster or a Taliban stronghold—it was a financial black hole. USAID poured $114 million into this project, but no one seems to know exactly where all the money went.

• The dam’s construction suffered massive cost overruns.
• Millions in "questioned costs" surfaced in financial audits.
• Pakistani government agencies funneled USAID money into inflated contracts, corrupt procurement deals, and non-existent maintenance.
• USAID’s oversight was so weak that large portions of funding vanished with little accountability.

This isn’t just a development failure—it’s a classic USAID scam, where American taxpayer dollars disappear into a sea of bureaucratic mismanagement, shady contractors, and security expenses that did nothing to secure the project.

How a $75 Million Project Became a $220 Million Boondoggle

The Original Cost Estimates (1963-2002)

When first approved in 1963, the Gomal Zam Dam was expected to cost $25 million. By the time construction resumed in 2002, the estimate had ballooned to $75 million—but that was just the beginning.

The 2011 USAID Bailout: $40 Million Spent, No Questions Asked

In 2011, USAID injected $40 million into the dam’s final phase, with zero enforcement of financial accountability.

Where did the money go?

• Unverified contractor payments—millions spent without proper documentation.
• Security costs that failed to prevent kidnappings, extortion, or attacks.
• Administrative fees and overhead that ballooned far beyond expected costs.

The result? The dam was finished, but it barely functioned, and major technical failures began almost immediately.

The Second Round of USAID Investment: $74.22 Million for Canals That Don’t Work

After wasting $40 million on a defective dam, USAID then spent another $74.22 million between 2011 and 2015 on irrigation infrastructure. This included:

• $40 million for irrigation canals that failed to distribute water properly.
• $12 million for the Waran Canal, which suffered from poor construction and inconsistent water flow.
• $22.22 million for the Command Area Development Project, which was supposed to train farmers and improve agricultural productivity—but failed due to corruption and inefficiency.

The Real Financial Disaster: What USAID’s Audits Found

In 2018, USAID’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an audit of the Gomal Zam Dam project. The findings?

• Millions in "questioned costs"—funds that were either misused, unaccounted for, or fraudulently reported.
• $358,627 in direct questioned costs, including inflated contractor invoices and unapproved security expenses.
• Procurement irregularities—equipment purchases that were either unnecessary or never properly documented.
• No long-term sustainability plan, meaning that USAID-funded infrastructure was left to deteriorate immediately after construction.

The Pakistani Government’s Role in the Corruption

One of the biggest failures in USAID’s financial oversight was trusting Pakistan’s Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) to handle project funds.

• WAPDA awarded contracts to politically connected firms with little accountability.
• Millions in USAID funding flowed through layers of middlemen, inflating costs and reducing real spending on infrastructure.
• Equipment was purchased at significantly marked-up prices, with little verification of quality or necessity.

Instead of providing rigorous oversight, USAID just kept the money flowing, hoping that the project would eventually work itself out.

Where Did the Money Actually Go?

Of the $114 million USAID invested, how much actually went to functional infrastructure? The answer: no one knows.

• Contractors were overpaid for work that was either defective or incomplete.
• Security expenses ballooned but did nothing to protect workers from kidnappings or attacks.
• Maintenance funding was virtually non-existent, ensuring the project would fall apart almost immediately.
• Farmers never got the irrigation they were promised, meaning that millions spent on water distribution networks produced no real agricultural benefits.

USAID’s Signature Move: Declare “Success” and Walk Away

Despite the dam’s power plant failing in 2016, irrigation canals underperforming, and financial irregularities piling up, USAID still declared the project a success.

Why? Because USAID doesn’t measure success in real-world impact—it measures success in spending.

• As long as the money is spent, the project is “completed.”
• As long as ribbon-cutting ceremonies happen, USAID considers it a “win.”
• The fact that the dam is already deteriorating and the irrigation network doesn’t work is irrelevant to USAID’s internal metrics.

Conclusion: The Perfect Case Study in How USAID Burns Cash

The Gomal Zam Dam was never about real development—it was a bureaucratic exercise in moving money.

• The dam cost way more than originally planned, yet still failed within years of completion.
• The irrigation system USAID spent millions on doesn’t function as promised.
• Massive amounts of money were lost to corruption, waste, and inefficiency.
• USAID walked away, calling it a success, while the project fell apart.

The Gomal Zam Dam isn’t just a foreign aid failure—it’s a masterclass in how USAID wastes U.S. taxpayer dollars while pretending to build sustainable infrastructure.

6. Final Verdict: USAID’s Death Under Trump 2.0 and the Lessons Ignored

Introduction: USAID Is Dead—But Its Failures Live On

As of February 2025, USAID no longer exists as an independent agency. Trump’s second administration eliminated it outright, folding its responsibilities under the State Department’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. The move was less about cutting corruption and more about dismantling U.S. foreign aid entirely—but the irony is, USAID had been failing for decades, and projects like Gomal Zam prove exactly why no one fought to save it.

This marks the first entry in our top 10 list of USAID’s worst disasters, and it’s a perfect starting point:

• $114 million spent, with nothing to show for it.
• A hydropower system that failed within three years.
• An irrigation network that never worked.
• A Taliban stronghold that benefited more from the dam than local farmers.
• And millions lost to fraud, waste, and incompetence.

Trump’s gutting of USAID wasn’t about fixing these failures—it was a blunt-force political decision. The real lesson of Gomal Zam isn’t just that USAID deserved to die—it’s that the foreign aid machine that replaces it will be just as bad.

Lesson #1: USAID Deserved to Be Dismantled—But for the Right Reasons

Let’s be clear: USAID was an operational disaster. It was a spending machine that valued optics over outcomes.

• Infrastructure projects were declared "successful" as long as the money was spent.
• Oversight was weak, allowing fraud and corruption to flourish.
• Security risks were ignored, meaning U.S. funds frequently ended up in the hands of insurgents.

The Gomal Zam Dam was a perfect case study in how USAID wasted taxpayer dollars with zero accountability. And it was far from the worst of its failures.

But Trump Didn’t Kill It for the Right Reasons

Instead of replacing USAID with a better model, Trump’s second-term strategy was simple: burn it to the ground.

• Development budgets were slashed, not reformed.
• Transparency wasn’t increased—funding just got buried deeper in the State Department bureaucracy.
• Corrupt contractors weren’t held accountable—they just lost their usual U.S. government clients.

USAID needed a serious overhaul, but what it got was political theatrics. The problems didn’t disappear—they just changed hands.

Lesson #2: The Money Will Keep Flowing, Just Through a Different Pipe

With USAID gone, all major foreign aid projects are now under direct control of the State Department. The problem?

• State was never designed to oversee infrastructure projects.
• Diplomatic staff are now managing aid budgets they barely understand.
• Transparency has gotten even worse—Congressional oversight is weaker than ever.

And here’s the real kicker: the same waste and fraud that plagued USAID is still happening—it’s just harder to track.

Gomal Zam Proves the Pattern Will Continue

The real lesson of Gomal Zam isn’t just that USAID mismanaged it—it’s that the U.S. government fundamentally doesn’t know how to run large-scale infrastructure projects in unstable countries.

• They don’t vet contractors properly.
• They don’t secure projects before investing in them.
• They don’t enforce maintenance and long-term sustainability.
• They measure success in money spent, not impact achieved.

USAID is dead, but this model of failure is very much alive.

Lesson #3: U.S. Foreign Aid Was Broken Before USAID Died, and It’s Still Broken Now

Trump’s administration justified killing USAID by pointing to projects like Gomal Zam—and honestly? Fair enough.

But did they fix anything? No.

• State is still funding infrastructure in unstable regions.
• There’s still no accountability for how money is spent.
• Corruption in foreign aid is worse than ever—just less visible.

Instead of a reformed USAID focused on real impact, we now have a State Department that’s even less equipped to manage these projects.

Lesson #4: The Taliban Still Wins, No Matter Who’s in Charge

The Gomal Zam Dam was a Taliban payday.

• They extorted contractors.
• They kidnapped workers and ransomed them back.
• They controlled access to irrigation and used it as a tool for local governance.

USAID’s failure to secure the project meant that American tax dollars ended up funding insurgents.

And now? That lesson is still being ignored.

• The State Department is still funding major infrastructure projects in conflict zones.
• Aid money is still being siphoned by militant groups through protection rackets.
• No one in Washington is seriously questioning why these projects keep failing.

The next Gomal Zam is already being built somewhere—funded by a U.S. government that still hasn’t learned its lesson.

Final Verdict: Gomal Zam Deserves Its Place in the USAID Hall of Shame

This is just #10 on our list of USAID’s worst disasters—but it’s a perfect entry point into the agency’s long history of failure.

• A $114 million dam that fell apart within three years.
• An irrigation system that never worked.
• Millions lost to fraud and corruption.
• A Taliban stronghold built with U.S. funds.

USAID deserved to be dismantled, but not like this. Instead of fixing what was broken, Trump’s administration just buried the agency while keeping the same wasteful spending model alive.

And that means the next Gomal Zam is already in the works—funded by the same dysfunctional system, with the same doomed outcome.

USAID may be gone, but its legacy of failure lives on.