The Arctic Flight Nobody Noticed: How Canada’s Alert Station Became NATO’s Answer to Trump’s Greenland Threats

Open-source intelligence reveals a pattern: every time Trump threatens Greenland, operations at Canada’s northernmost military installation intensify. Yesterday’s flight is just the latest.

By Kevin J.S. Duska Jr. | January 14, 2026

---

The Flight

On January 13, 2026, three days after President Donald Trump declared the United States would seize Greenland “whether they like it or not,” likely because of Greenland’s tremendous resources and the GIUK Gap, a Royal Canadian Air Force CC-130J Hercules quietly flew to Canada’s northernmost military installation as Denmark has been increasing its military presence in Greenland.

According to publicly available flight tracking data from FlightRadar24, RCAF aircraft tail number 130615 departed CFB Trenton, Ontario on January 12, staged through Iqaluit, Nunavut, and continued north on January 13. The return leg showed a flight time of 3 hours and 49 minutes, and the aircraft’s trajectory pointed to a destination 817 kilometers from the North Pole: Canadian Forces Station Alert.

On its face, nothing remarkable. The Canadian military regularly resupplies Alert, a tiny outpost on Ellesmere Island that serves as Canada’s Arctic sovereignty presence. Military transports fly north, deliver cargo and personnel, and return south. Routine operations.

Except for three details that make this flight worth examining:

• First, the timing. Trump’s “whether they like it or not” threat came on Friday, January 10. Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand called her Danish and Greenlandic counterparts on Saturday, January 11, to express support for Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland. And on Monday, January 13, Canada flew to Alert.
• Second, the schedule. Alert’s major resupply operation – called Operation BOXTOP – happens twice annually: spring (April/May) and fall (September/October). According to Department of National Defence documentation, these are intensive three-week operations with multiple aircraft making continuous shuttle flights. January is not a BOXTOP month. This was an out-of-cycle flight.
• Third, and most significant: Alert is not just any Arctic outpost. It’s 680 kilometers from Thule Air Base in Greenland – the U.S. military installation Trump would use to control the island. And Alert is a signals intelligence facility designed to monitor radio communications across the Arctic.

To understand why a single military transport flight to a remote Arctic station matters, you need to understand what Alert is, what it can do, and what’s been quietly happening there since Trump first threatened Greenland.

The story is bigger than one flight.

---

Part I: What Alert Actually Does

Canadian Forces Station Alert sits at 82°30′ North latitude on the northeastern tip of Ellesmere Island. At roughly 57,000 square kilometers, Ellesmere is slightly larger than Croatia, with a human population of roughly 150 people scattered across three permanent settlements. Alert is the northernmost of these, and the northernmost permanently inhabited place on Earth.

But Alert is not a settlement in any traditional sense. According to official Canadian government sources, it’s a signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercept facility – a sophisticated listening post monitoring radio communications across Arctic and transpolar regions.

CFS Alert’s official mission, per official Canadian sources:

• “Maintain signals intelligence facilities to support Canadian military operations”
• “Geolocation capability to support operations”
• “High Frequency and Direction Finding facilities to support Search and Rescue and other operations”

Translation: Alert intercepts, analyzes, and geolocates radio communications. Its extreme northern position provides unique advantages for monitoring signals across “the northern half of the globe,” according to Royal Canadian Air Force documentation.

The Technical Capabilities

Based on official DND sources and declassified technical documentation, Alert operates:

High-Frequency (HF) and Very High-Frequency (VHF) Antenna Arrays: Long-range signal interception systems capable of detecting communications hundreds to thousands of kilometers away. Multiple frequency bands allow monitoring of different communication types – military, commercial, maritime, aviation.

Direction-Finding Systems: Antenna arrays can determine the bearing and approximate location of radio transmitters through triangulation techniques. When coordinated with other SIGINT stations, this provides precise geolocation of emitters.

Remote Operations Architecture: Most intercepted signals are automatically collected and transmitted south via the High Arctic Data Communications System (HADCS) – a chain of microwave repeaters and satellite links connecting Alert to Communications Security Establishment (CSE) headquarters in Ottawa. Only about six operators remain on-site; the analysis happens elsewhere.

ECHELON Network Integration: Alert is part of the Five Eyes signals intelligence alliance linking the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Intelligence collected at Alert feeds into this shared system and is distributed to partner nations.

What Alert Can Detect

Alert’s position at 82°30’N provides several intelligence advantages:

• Arctic Signal Propagation: High-frequency radio signals bounce off the ionosphere, and Arctic atmospheric conditions enhance long-range propagation. Signals that would dissipate in southern latitudes travel much farther in the high Arctic.
• Line-of-Sight Coverage: From Alert’s elevation, there’s direct line-of-sight to vast stretches of Arctic airspace, sea routes, and – critically – Greenland. RCAF materials note that “on a clear day the peaks and cliffs of Greenland can be seen 56 km to the south-east.” Alert will likely be a critical installation for Canada’s future over-the-horizon radar capabilities.
• Traffic Pattern Analysis: Modern military communications use sophisticated encryption that’s essentially unbreakable. But signals intelligence doesn’t need to decrypt content to be valuable. Monitoring when communications increase, what frequencies activate, how much traffic occurs, and which systems are active provides actionable intelligence about operational tempo and military posture.
• Baseline Establishment: Decades of continuous monitoring establish “pattern-of-life” baselines for the Arctic region. Deviations from normal patterns indicate something interesting is happening – deployments, exercises, heightened alert status, or actual operations.

The Thule Problem

Alert sits 680 kilometers from Thule Air Base (recently renamed Pituffik Space Base), the U.S. Space Force installation in northwest Greenland. To put this in perspective:

• Toronto to Montreal: 504 km
• Alert to Thule: 680 km
• Alert to Ottawa: 4,160 km

Alert is closer to the U.S. base at the center of Trump’s territorial ambitions than it is to most of Canada.

Thule, according to U.S. Space Force documentation, is the only military airfield in Greenland capable of supporting large-scale operations. It features a 10,000-foot runway that can handle strategic airlift aircraft, bombers, and heavy transports. Approximately 150 U.S. Space Force personnel are permanently stationed there, operating ballistic missile early warning systems and satellite control infrastructure. The base has a deep-water port (seasonal, ice-permitting) and extensive fuel storage and maintenance facilities.

Any U.S. military operation in Greenland – whether “the easy way or the hard way,” as Trump phrased it – would stage through Thule.

And Alert can monitor it.

---

Part II: The Pattern Nobody Discussed

Here’s what makes the January 13 flight more than routine: it’s part of a pattern that began when Trump first started threatening Greenland.

In May 2025, just weeks after Trump’s initial threats to acquire Greenland during his second term, something unusual happened at Alert: the Royal Air Force participated in Operation BOXTOP.

According to an official RAF press release dated May 7, 2025:

“Twelve members of No. 99 Squadron RAF have spent the past week in the Arctic Circle to help resupply the most northerly station on Earth. The RAF C-17 Globemaster aircrew and ground support crew have been working alongside their Canadian counterparts as they resupply Canadian Forces Station (CFS) Alert, more than 1,100 miles inside the Arctic Circle.”

The release explained that RAF aircrews were learning “how their allies from the Great White North conduct polar operations” and training in “landing on semi-prepared ice runways.”

The RAF press release noted this was “for the second year running” – meaning RAF participation began in 2024, when Trump was actively campaigning on acquiring Greenland.

Why This Matters

RAF participation in Operation BOXTOP is not routine multinational cooperation. Here’s why:

Alert is a Canadian sovereign facility with a classified SIGINT mission. Canada doesn’t typically invite foreign militaries to train at intelligence installations. The official explanation – that RAF needed Arctic landing training – is thin. The UK has no Arctic territories requiring routine C-17 operations to ice runways.

The timing is too precise. RAF participation began in 2024 (Trump campaigns on Greenland acquisition), continued in May 2025 (Trump threatens Greenland as president), and now in January 2026 we see an out-of-cycle Canadian flight to Alert three days after Trump’s “whether they like it or not” statement.

C-17 Globemasters represent a capability upgrade. The RAF’s C-17s can carry significantly more cargo than Canada’s CC-130J Hercules. The May 2025 operation delivered “nearly two million litres of jet fuel” according to the RAF release. This isn’t routine resupply – it’s capacity building, pre-positioning massive fuel reserves that would support intensified operations.

UK is developing independent Alert access. By training RAF crews on Arctic operations and Alert’s runway, the UK is building the capability to reach Alert independently of Canadian airlift. This suggests Alert is being positioned as a facility that Five Eyes partners can access directly.

The Strategic Implication

The pattern reveals Alert is being transformed from a Canadian national SIGINT facility into something more significant: a multinational Arctic intelligence hub specifically positioned to monitor and respond to U.S. activity in Greenland.

This didn’t happen accidentally. This is NATO – or at minimum, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance – quietly positioning assets to maintain independent monitoring capability of Thule while Trump threatens Denmark.

---

Part III: The Five Eyes Paradox

Alert’s role in the Greenland crisis exposes a fundamental tension in Western intelligence architecture.

Alert is part of the ECHELON network – the Five Eyes SIGINT alliance between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Under this agreement, the five nations share intercepted communications and, theoretically, do not spy on each other’s governments.

But Denmark is not part of Five Eyes. Denmark is a NATO ally and hosts a major U.S. military installation on its territory (Thule), but it has no access to Five Eyes intelligence sharing.

This creates an intelligence gap that becomes critical during the current crisis:

Denmark cannot independently monitor U.S. military activity at Thule. It’s Danish territory, but U.S.-operated. Denmark has no signals intelligence infrastructure capable of monitoring the base. Denmark’s entire active military is roughly 21,000 personnel – smaller than the New York Police Department, as Trump noted. Denmark lacks the technical capabilities for sophisticated SIGINT operations.

The U.S. intelligence community is unlikely to share operational planning for potential military action against Denmark. Even within Five Eyes, compartmentalization limits what’s shared. If the U.S. is planning operations Denmark would oppose, those plans stay classified.

Other NATO allies lack Arctic monitoring capability. European NATO members have no installations positioned to monitor Thule. They’re dependent on what the U.S. chooses to share.

Only Canada has independent monitoring capability – geographic proximity, established infrastructure, technical systems, and operational experience in the Arctic environment.

This makes Canada uniquely valuable to Denmark and to NATO during this crisis. Canada can provide intelligence that no one else can: independent verification of U.S. military activity at Thule.

The Intelligence Sharing Dilemma

Here’s where it gets complicated.

If Alert monitors increased U.S. military activity at Thule – heightened communications, additional flights, operational preparations – Canada faces a choice:

• Option 1: Share through Five Eyes channels, where the U.S. would see that Canada is monitoring Thule. This could create diplomatic friction and might result in the U.S. restricting what it shares with Canada.
• Option 2: Share directly with Denmark outside Five Eyes channels. This violates the spirit (if not the letter) of Five Eyes agreements, but serves Canada’s interest in supporting a NATO ally.
• Option 3: Share selectively with other Five Eyes partners (UK, possibly) who then share with Denmark through their own channels, providing plausible deniability.

The evidence suggests Canada is pursuing some combination of options 2 and 3. The RAF’s operational integration into Alert operations indicates intelligence coordination with the UK. And Canada’s direct diplomatic engagement with Denmark (Anand’s January 11 call) suggests intelligence sharing is likely happening through those channels.

---

Part IV: What Alert Would Monitor

Based on standard signals intelligence collection practices and Alert’s documented capabilities, here’s what the station could detect regarding Thule:

Communication Volume and Patterns

Even without decrypting content, monitoring the amount of communication provides intelligence value:

• Baseline vs. Surge: Alert would have years of data establishing Thule’s normal communication patterns – routine administrative traffic, daily operations, scheduled exercises. A sudden increase in volume indicates something non-routine is occurring.
• Frequency Activation: Military installations maintain multiple communication systems for different purposes. Some frequencies only activate during heightened operations. Alert’s direction-finding systems can identify when dormant frequencies suddenly become active.
• Timing Patterns: Communications outside normal working hours, weekend activity, or sustained 24/7 operations indicate elevated operational tempo.

Aircraft Activity

Radio communications associated with aircraft operations provide indicators:

Approach/Departure Communications: Aircraft communicating with Thule tower on approach and departure frequencies provide real-time tracking of flight operations.

Aircraft Types: Different aircraft have different radio signatures. Strategic airlift (C-5 Galaxy, C-17 Globemaster), tankers (KC-135, KC-46), fighters, and special operations aircraft all have distinct communication patterns.

Flight Frequency: Establishing baseline aircraft movements allows detection of surge operations – multiple flights per day, continuous operations, or deployment of unusual aircraft types.

Operational Security Posture

Changes in how communications are conducted provide intelligence:

• EMCON (Emissions Control): If Thule suddenly reduces radio communications, this indicates operations security concerns – possibly meaning something sensitive is about to occur.
• Encryption Changes: Shifts to different encryption systems or communication protocols suggest operational changes.
• Authentication Procedures: Increased use of challenge-response authentication indicates heightened security posture.

What Alert Cannot Do

Important limitations:

Modern military encryption is unbreakable in real-time. U.S. military communications use sophisticated encryption systems. Alert cannot decrypt content of classified military communications.

Fiber-optic and satellite communications may not be detectable. Alert primarily monitors radio-frequency communications. Hardline communications or certain satellite links might not be interceptible.

Single observation point limits triangulation accuracy. While Alert can detect signals and determine general bearing, precise geolocation often requires multiple monitoring stations.

But Pattern Analysis Still Provides Value

Even without decryption, Alert can assess:

• Something is happening (increased activity)
• Operational tempo (how much activity)
• Timing (when it’s happening)
• Systems activation (what capabilities are being used)
• Departure from baseline (normal vs. abnormal)

For strategic warning and intelligence assessment, this is sufficient. Canada doesn’t need to read U.S. military communications to know if Thule is preparing for large-scale operations.

---

Part V: Crisis Operations at Alert

Based on standard military intelligence operations and Arctic warfare doctrine, here’s how Alert’s mission would likely evolve during the Greenland crisis:

Phase 1: Peacetime Baseline (Pre-2024)

Normal operations:

• ~55 personnel on station
• Routine SIGINT collection on designated targets (Russian Arctic forces, Chinese activity)
• Biannual resupply via Operation BOXTOP (spring and fall)
• Intelligence shared through Five Eyes channels
• Six-month personnel rotations

Phase 2: Heightened Awareness (2024 – Trump Campaign)

When Trump began Greenland rhetoric:

• Collection priorities expand to include Thule monitoring
• Enhanced reporting to Ottawa on Arctic activity
• RAF begins participating in BOXTOP (capability building)
• Fuel and supplies pre-positioned for potential surge operations
• Intelligence coordination with UK increases

Phase 3: Active Monitoring (2025 – Trump Presidency)

Trump threats intensify:

• Dedicated collection focus on Thule communications
• Real-time reporting of significant activity
• Out-of-cycle personnel rotations if needed
• Intelligence sharing directly with Denmark (outside Five Eyes)
• Additional equipment deliveries for enhanced monitoring
• Coordination with other Canadian assets (CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol, satellite imagery)

Phase 4: Crisis Response (January 2026 – Current)

Trump declares “whether they like it or not”:

• Possible specialist augmentation (additional SIGINT analysts, technical experts)
• Enhanced security posture at Alert
• Increased reporting frequency to political leadership
• Direct coordination with Danish intelligence
• Ad-hoc flights outside BOXTOP schedule (January 13 flight)
• Preparation for potential intelligence surge if U.S. operations commence

The January 13 flight likely represents Phase 4 activity – crisis response outside normal schedules.

---

Part VI: Why Canada Matters

In the current Greenland crisis, Canada occupies a position no other nation can replicate:

Geographic Position

Alert is the closest non-Greenlandic military installation to Thule. No other NATO member has comparable access.

Technical Capability

Decades of Arctic SIGINT operations provide unmatched institutional knowledge and infrastructure.

Political Independence

Canada is:

• NATO ally with strong democratic credentials
• No direct territorial claims on Greenland
• Historical ally of both U.S. and Denmark
• Can serve as honest broker while maintaining intelligence capability

Operational Flexibility

Canada can:

• Operate independently of U.S. intelligence community
• Share intelligence with Denmark without Five Eyes restrictions
• Coordinate with other NATO members bilaterally
• Provide verification function for alliance decision-making

What Denmark Cannot Do Alone

Denmark’s dilemma is acute:

• Cannot independently monitor Thule (U.S.-operated on Danish territory)
• Not part of Five Eyes (no access to SIGINT sharing)
• Limited military capabilities overall (~21,000 active personnel)
• No Arctic SIGINT infrastructure outside Greenland

Denmark needs Canada’s intelligence to understand U.S. military posture at Thule.

What This Means for NATO

If the U.S. takes military action against Greenland, NATO faces an unprecedented scenario: one member potentially attacking another member’s territory. Article 5 – collective defense – would technically apply, but defending Denmark against the United States would shatter the alliance.

NATO requires:

• Independent verification of U.S. actions (not relying on U.S. reports)
• Early warning of military preparations (time to respond diplomatically)
• Factual basis for consultations (credible intelligence for decision-making)

Alert provides all three. This makes Canada’s intelligence capability indispensable to NATO’s response.

---

Part VII: The Broader Context

The January 13 flight occurred within a week of intense diplomatic activity:

• January 6, 2026: Prime Minister Mark Carney met Danish PM Mette Frederiksen in Paris, stating “The future of Greenland and Denmark are decided solely by the people of Denmark.”
• January 10, 2026: Trump told reporters “We’re going to do something on Greenland whether they like it or not” and threatened doing it “the hard way” if diplomacy fails.
• January 11, 2026: Foreign Minister Anand called Danish and Greenlandic counterparts to “reiterate Canada’s steadfast support for the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
• January 13, 2026: RCAF flew to Alert (this analysis).
• January 13, 2026 (today): Defense analyst Scott Taylor published an article in The Hill Times titled “How to foil Trump’s annexation of Greenland,” proposing NATO offer Greenland direct membership to complicate U.S. military options.

Canada’s actions span diplomatic, intelligence, and strategic domains – a coordinated response treating Trump’s threats as credible.

---

Part VIII: What Happens Next

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) can monitor several indicators of Alert’s evolving role:

Flight Activity

Watch for:

• Additional flights outside BOXTOP schedule
• Multiple aircraft on same routes
• Use of larger aircraft (CC-150 Polaris, additional C-17s)
• Pattern of regular flights vs. one-off missions

Allied Participation

Monitor for:

• Further RAF involvement
• Australian or New Zealand participation (other Five Eyes members)
• Norwegian coordination (NATO Arctic partner)
• Increased NATO exercises in the region

Policy Indicators

Track:

• Canadian defense spending announcements for Arctic capabilities
• Statements linking Alert to Arctic sovereignty
• Intelligence-sharing agreements with Denmark
• NATO consultations on Arctic security

Infrastructure Development

Look for:

• Construction contracts for Alert facilities
• Equipment procurement for Arctic operations
• Communications infrastructure upgrades
• Expansion of personnel accommodations

---

Conclusion: The Flight That Matters

The January 13 RCAF flight to Alert, viewed in isolation, could be routine. An out-of-cycle resupply, a personnel rotation, an equipment delivery – all plausible explanations.

But viewed as part of a pattern that began in 2024 when Trump first threatened Greenland, the flight takes on different meaning:

• 2024: RAF begins Alert participation (Trump campaigns on Greenland)
• May 2025: RAF delivers massive fuel reserves (Trump threatens as president)
• January 2026: Canada flies out-of-cycle (Trump escalates to “whether they like it or not”)

This is not coincidence. This is a coordinated NATO/Five Eyes response positioning Alert as an independent intelligence facility for monitoring U.S. activity in Greenland.

Alert provides something no other nation can: independent verification of what’s actually happening at Thule, the base that would stage any U.S. military operation in Greenland.

That capability makes Canada indispensable to NATO’s response. Denmark needs Canada’s intelligence because Denmark cannot monitor Thule themselves. European NATO members need Canada’s intelligence because they have no Arctic assets. The alliance needs Canada’s intelligence because decisions about responding to potential U.S. action against Denmark must be based on facts, not assumptions.

The January 13 flight represents Canada maintaining – and possibly enhancing – that capability during a week of crisis. Whether it delivered additional monitoring equipment, specialist personnel, or simply maintained routine operations, the message is clear: Canada is ensuring Alert remains operational and capable during the most serious NATO crisis since the alliance’s founding in 1949.

In intelligence work, being ready matters more than being used. Alert may never need to provide warning of U.S. military action against Greenland. The crisis may resolve diplomatically. Trump may back down.

But if he doesn’t, NATO will need to know what’s actually happening at Thule. And Alert is the only place that can provide that information independently.

That’s why yesterday’s flight matters.

And that’s why, as long as Trump threatens Greenland, we should expect to see more flights to Alert – whether BOXTOP season or not.

---

Methodology Note

This analysis relies exclusively on open-source intelligence (OSINT):