Executive Summary

The 2025 federal election has concluded with a Liberal victory for Mark Carney against a backdrop of intense political polarization, heightened distrust in institutions, and rising threats toward public figures. While Canada traditionally experiences peaceful transfers of power, current conditions suggest an elevated—but still moderate—risk of isolated political violence in the short term. This report provides a structured assessment of potential threats in the immediate and medium-term periods following the election, offering policymakers a grounded understanding of evolving security risks and helping inform appropriate mitigation strategies.

Overall Risk

Canada faces a moderate risk of isolated acts of political violence in the immediate aftermath of the election, with lower probability of large-scale organized unrest. While widespread post-election violence is unlikely, the highly polarized climate has increased threats toward officials​. Short-term incidents are most likely to involve lone actors or small extremist clusters, whereas more organized or sustained campaigns could emerge over the medium term (several months).

Most Likely Threats

The greatest immediate concern is lone-wolf attacks or harassment (e.g. assaults on candidates, hate-motivated violence) and spontaneous protests that could turn aggressive. Recent years have seen a surge in harassment and threats against Canadian politicians​, suggesting a ~15–20% chance of sporadic violent incidents (assaults, vandalism) in coming days. Larger protest movements (e.g. convoys, blockades) have a ~20% short-term likelihood, potentially rising to ~35% over the next year if grievances fester.

Less Likely Scenarios

Coordinated terrorism or separatist violence remains highly unlikely (<<10% probability). Separatist terrorism, such as a revival of Quebec’s FLQ-style militancy or Western separatist militias, is very low risk (~1–5%) given the absence of broad support or organization today. Political assassinations of high-profile figures are also low probability (<10%), though not impossible – especially by lone extremists – considering the rise in extremist rhetoric. Mass unrest (widespread riots nationally) is very improbable (~5–15%), as Canada lacks a history of election disputes triggering nation-wide violence.

Provincial Hotspots

The risk of election-related violence varies regionally. Alberta and Ontario stand out as higher-risk zones for post-election turmoil. Alberta’s intense anti-Ottawa sentiment and presence of militant anti-government groups (e.g. armed individuals at the 2022 Coutts blockade​) make it a potential flashpoint. The emergence of the Maple MAGA movement and the extremist rhetoric of Premier Danielle Smith both represent fundamental threats to Canada.

Ontario, housing the federal capital, could see Ottawa-focused demonstrations or lone actor threats (many extremist networks also operate in Ontario​). Quebec has historical precedent of separatist violence but today likely ranks moderate-to-low risk (grievances persist, but the separatist milieu is far less violent now). British Columbia and Saskatchewan carry moderate risk related to ideological protests (BC for left-wing or indigenous-led actions; SK similar dynamics to Alberta on the right). Atlantic Canada and the northern territories are assessed as lowest risk, with only isolated incidents (if any) anticipated there.

Security Mitigation

Canadian security agencies are on high alert and generally serve as a mitigating force, but their actions can also influence outcomes. The RCMP and CSIS have bolstered monitoring of election-related threats – for the first time in 2025, the integrated SITE Task Force explicitly monitored domestic extremist threats to the election process​. Protective measures (e.g. offering private security to threatened candidates​) and intelligence-sharing with party leaders are in place to prevent violence. These efforts likely reduce the odds of organized terrorism or assassination plots succeeding. However, lapses or heavy-handed responses carry some risk of exacerbating tensions – for instance, perceived policing double-standards (leniency toward certain protest groups) or infiltration of law enforcement by extremists​ could embolden violent actors. Overall, vigilant security posture and responsive policing are key to keeping post-election violence sporadic and contained.

Introduction: A Tense Post-Election Climate

The national election concluded today with a Liberal victory against a backdrop of sharply heightened polarization in Canada’s political discourse​. Partisan divides have grown deeper in recent years, fueled by personal and emotional rhetoric rather than policy debate​s. This has already manifested in rising hostility toward public officials – from death threats and harassment to physical attacks. For example, in 2021 Prime Minister Trudeau was pelted with gravel by angry protesters during a campaign stop​. In 2022, an anti-vaccine protest convoy occupied downtown Ottawa for weeks, harassing residents and defying authorities​. Such incidents underscore that Canada is not immune to political volatility, even though it has long prided itself on peaceful democracy.

In stable democracies, outright election-related violence has historically been rare. Canada’s elections are generally peaceful transitions. However, today’s result – and the charged political context surrounding it – could trigger atypical unrest. Public trust in institutions has been strained by misinformation and conspiracy theories, some imported from abroad or from U.S. culture wars​. Officials have warned that ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is “one of the most serious threats we are facing today,” driven by extreme anti-government anger and conspiracy-fueled grievances​.

This report provides a structured risk assessment of potential post-election political violence or terrorism in Canada, examining likely scenarios in the short term (days to weeks) and medium term (months up to one year). We assess different threat types – from lone attacks to organized terrorism – with estimated likelihood percentages, and break down where in Canada such threats are most and least probable. Historical precedents from Canada and comparable democracies (U.S., U.K., Spain, etc.) are referenced to contextualize these risks. We also evaluate how Canada’s security apparatus (RCMP, CSIS, and others) might mitigate or inadvertently influence these threats.

The aim is to inform policymakers of the foreseeable security challenges following the election and to support proactive measures that can prevent violence while safeguarding democratic expression. The tone herein is evidence-based and objective, focusing on factual indicators and expert analyses rather than speculation. The following sections detail specific threat scenarios and their justifications.

Conclusion

Overall, Canada is expected to maintain broad political stability in the wake of the 2025 election, with only localized or isolated incidents of political violence likely. Lone actor threats, spontaneous protests, and fringe extremist actions represent the primary risks in the short term, while the medium term could see more organized protest movements if grievances are left unaddressed. Proactive security measures, equitable policing, and political leadership that emphasizes unity over division will be critical to minimizing violence. With vigilance, resilience, and a continued commitment to democratic norms, Canada can navigate this tense period without major disruption.

Short-Term Risks: Days and Weeks Ahead

In the immediate aftermath of the election, emotions are at their peak. Candidates’ victories or defeats are fresh, and any contested outcomes or perceived injustices can spark rapid mobilization – whether celebratory gatherings, protests by disappointed supporters, or acts of anger by extremists. Based on current indicators, the short-term (next few days to weeks) will likely see isolated or small-scale incidents rather than organized, sustained violence. Key short-term threat vectors include:

1. Spontaneous Protests & Unrest

Public demonstrations are the most probable short-term response to the election outcome. These can range from peaceful rallies to unruly protests or clashes with authorities if passions run high. Notably, if a segment of voters believes the election was “stolen” or fundamentally unfair, they may take to the streets in protest (even without evidence of fraud, as seen in other countries). In Canada, major parties are expected to accept the results, but fringe groups or passionate supporters could still organize demonstrations, especially via social media.

Image: Protesters (and counter-protesters) gather outside Parliament in Ottawa during the “Freedom Convoy” occupation in early 2022. This incident – led by far-right activists – saw hundreds of anti-government demonstrators disrupt the capital for weeks, with some supporters openly hoping it would inspire “our own January 6 event.” The convoy highlighted how political grievances can rapidly escalate into large-scale occupations. In the immediate post-election period, smaller protests could materialize similarly if groups feel disenfranchised, though on a lesser scale than 2022.

In the next few days, protests are likely to remain localized and issue-specific:

• Ottawa: As the seat of federal power, Ottawa is a focal point. Demonstrations by disgruntled partisans (e.g. supporters of the losing party) could occur near Parliament or the Governor General’s residence (especially if there are accusations of an illegitimate government). Given Ottawa’s experience with the 2022 convoy, authorities will be prepared, but even a few hundred protesters could disrupt downtown. The chance of a protest in Ottawa turning disruptive (blocking roads, confrontations with police) in the next week is perhaps around 20%.
• Major Cities: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary – if the election outcome is controversial (e.g. a very narrow result or a perceived regional imbalance of power), expect some rallies or marches in these cities. For instance, urban progressive activists might protest if a right-leaning government is elected (focusing on issues like climate or social policies), whereas right-leaning or anti-establishment groups could protest if the incumbents stay in power (echoing themes of government overreach). These protests would likely be peaceful, but small scuffles or vandalism cannot be ruled out. The probability of minor violence (e.g. shoving, throwing objects) at one of these city protests in the coming weeks is low to moderate (~10%).
• Election Offices or Legislatures: Another possible flashpoint in the short term is local election offices or provincial legislatures. If rumors spread about irregularities in certain ridings, small crowds might gather to “protect the vote” or demand recounts. Canada’s robust election process and quick certification make U.S.-style prolonged protests (à la “Stop the Steal”) unlikely. Still, isolated incidents – such as angry citizens trying to enter a ballot counting center – could happen in the immediate aftermath, albeit with very low likelihood.

Crucially, Canadian protests rarely turn into full riots. Unlike some countries, there is no recent precedent of post-election mass rioting in Canada. The closest parallels – such as the Stanley Cup riots in Vancouver (2011) or the Montreal student protests (2012) – were unrelated to elections. Thus, any unrest in the coming days is expected to involve dozens or hundreds of people at most, not thousands, and any violence would likely be limited (pushing, minor property damage). Police crowd-control tactics and protester intentions will determine if these gatherings remain lawful or tip into clashes.

Estimated short-term likelihood of significant protest-related violence: ~20% (moderate). In plain terms, there is about a 1 in 5 chance that within the next few weeks Canada will see a protest related to the election that involves some level of violence or intimidation – though this violence would likely be limited and not widespread. Most protests, if they occur, are expected to be peaceful demonstrations of dissent, as is the norm in Canada.

2. Lone-Actor Attacks and Political Aggression

Another short-term risk comes from isolated actors – individuals who might impulsively commit violence motivated by the election outcome or extreme ideologies. Given the “worrying trend” of escalating threats against officials in Canada​, this category merits close attention in the immediate aftermath:

• Attacks on Politicians: The days right after an election can be perilous for high-profile figures, who are often in public celebrating or conceding. A lone extremist, believing drastic action is justified against “enemy” leaders, might attempt to physically harm a victorious candidate or prominent incumbent. Canada has seen foiled or failed attempts in recent years – in July 2020, an armed reservist breached the gates at Rideau Hall intending to confront Prime Minister Trudeau, in what the court deemed an extremist act influenced by anti-government beliefs. Fortunately no one was hurt, but it exemplifies the danger. Similarly, during this election campaign, multiple candidates reported death threats and one even wore a bulletproof vest at events, illustrating the perceived risk. In the short term, the likelihood of an assassination attempt or physical assault on a politician is low (<5%), but not zero. Heightened security in the immediate aftermath (RCMP protective details, local police at events) helps keep this probability very low.
• Violence at Rallies or Celebrations: Election night gatherings or victory parties could become targets for violence. A bitter opponent or an unhinged individual might attempt an attack at such an event. For example, someone disgruntled by the result could show up armed to a winner’s rally. However, these events typically have notable security, and Canada has no recent history of mass attacks at political events (unlike the U.S., where in 2017 a gunman targeted a Congressional baseball practice). The short-term probability of a public attack at a political gathering is low (~5–10%); if it occurred, it would most likely be a lone wolf with a personal grievance rather than part of a group plan.
• Targeted Harassment or Minor Assaults: More likely than a deadly attack are lower-level acts of aggression by individuals: stalking an MP, attempting to vandalize an opponent’s office, or minor assaults. Already in this election cycle, there were instances of volunteers being accosted and lawn signs vandalized. Immediately post-election, a zealous supporter might, for example, shove or punch a rival party’s celebrants in a heated confrontation. Police in P.E.I. recently charged a man with assault for shoving a provincial minister at a public meeting – a sign that even in calmer provinces, tensions can boil over into physicality​. We estimate a 15% chance of such isolated assaults or property damage incidents nationwide in the next few weeks. These would be scattered and not necessarily coordinated – essentially the “sore loser” or angry protester scenarios.

Overall, short-term lone-actor violence is a real concern but with limited scope. Canadian security officials are cognizant of this: just before the election, the government issued personal security guidance to candidates, including a new program offering private security guards for those facing intimidation​. This unprecedented step was prompted by the “constant and concerning rise in the number and intensity of threats” to people in politics​. That context suggests that while severe violence (like assassination) is unlikely in the next days, attempts at harassment or minor violence are plausible and being actively guarded against. Citizens are also on alert; they often film and call out aggressive behavior (as seen when Deputy PM Chrystia Freeland was verbally accosted in 2022, which bystanders widely condemned).

3. Hate Crimes and Ideologically Driven Attacks

Post-election periods can sometimes act as a catalyst for hate-motivated violence, if results are interpreted along racial, religious, or ideological lines. Canada’s election outcomes might embolden or anger certain extremist subgroups:

• Far-Right Extremist Actors: If the election is seen as a loss for far-right ideologies (for instance, if a progressive government is formed or if far-right fringe candidates performed poorly), there is a risk – albeit small – that white supremacist or ultranationalist extremists could lash out. This could take the form of vandalism of minority community institutions, menacing demonstrations (like torchlight marches, as seen occasionally in the U.S.), or even an attack on a visible minority group blamed (in the extremist’s mind) for the political outcome. Canadian intelligence has noted that IMVE (Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism) actors often merge grievances – anti-government, racist, misogynist – into a general impulse for violence. A volatile individual from this milieu could see the election as a trigger. Short-term, the chance of a hate crime spike related to the election is moderate (~10–15%), mainly in the form of isolated incidents (e.g. graffiti, assault on someone wearing a political T-shirt or religious attire). Law enforcement across provinces will be monitoring known extremist circles closely in these weeks.
• Left-Wing or Single-Issue Militancy: On the other end of the spectrum, a far-left or anarchist individual might commit sabotage or violence as a form of protest if a right-leaning government takes power. For example, a radical environmentalist might attempt to damage property (say, vandalize a pipeline facility or political office) to oppose policies of a new conservative government. Historically, Canada’s far-left militancy has been limited (there’s no equivalent of the 1970s Weather Underground here), and contemporary leftist protests (climate marches, anti-G7 protests, etc.) have been largely peaceful with occasional property damage. The short-term likelihood of violent left-wing extremism is very low (~5%), since such actors typically mobilize over policy decisions that unfold over time (not immediately on election night). If a new administration signals drastic moves (e.g. scrapping climate initiatives), one might see more militant protest actions in coming months rather than days.
• Anti-Authority and Conspiracy-Driven Violence: Beyond left/right labels, Canada has seen growth in anti-authority, conspiracy-fueled movements (anti-vaccine, QAnon, anti-“globalist” sentiments). These are not strictly partisan – they view the entire system with suspicion. A subset of these could react violently if the election outcome doesn’t align with their worldview or if they believe false narratives (for instance, a conspiracy theory that the election was rigged by a shadowy cabal). Short-term, this might manifest as threatening behavior at a local government office or a protest at a media outlet accused of bias. While a large mobilization of conspiracy theorists right after the vote is unlikely (absent a high-profile figure stoking it), the risk of an isolated violent act by a conspiracy believer is tangible (~10%). This could include attacking what they see as “symbols” of authority – be it a government building or even a pandemic-related facility (carryover anger from COVID policies remains in some circles).

Canadian authorities (notably CSIS and the RCMP) have highlighted that since the pandemic, extreme anti-government rhetoric has intensified, often rooted in weaponized conspiracy theories​. In the very short term, much of this will stay online as angry chatter. However, as we learned from the January 6, 2021 events in Washington, violent online chatter can rapidly translate into real-world action if galvanized​. Canada “shouldn’t be complacent” in thinking it can’t happen here​. For now, no credible calls for post-election violence have been publicized, but security services will be watching extremist online forums in these critical days for any actionable threats.

In sum, the short-term period (days/weeks following the election) is most likely to see small-scale, ad hoc incidents – brief outbursts at protests, lone confrontations, or minor property damage. The odds of a major, orchestrated violent event in this timeframe are low, thanks to preparedness and the general acceptance of election results by the public and leaders. Nonetheless, even a single dramatic incident (e.g. an assassination attempt or a riotous protest) could shock the nation, so vigilance is essential.

Medium-Term Risks: The Months Ahead (Up to One Year)

Looking beyond the initial aftermath, the medium-term horizon (the next 12 months) presents a different set of dynamics. As the new government (or continuing government) begins to implement policies, opposition may coalesce; initial anger could either dissipate or morph into organized movements. Historical patterns suggest that significant political violence, when it occurs in democracies, often comes months after an election, rather than immediately, once discontent has time to ferment. We examine likely scenarios in this medium term:

1. Organized Extremist Movements and Prolonged Protests

One of the most prominent risks in the medium term is the emergence of organized protest movements that can sustain themselves and potentially turn disruptive or violent over time. In Canada’s context, a few possibilities stand out:

• “Freedom Convoy” Copycats or Successors: The 2022 truckers’ convoy protest against COVID mandates has created a blueprint for sustained occupation-style protests in Canada. In the coming year, a similar nationwide convoy or protest could be organized around electoral/political grievances. For instance, if the federal government pursues policies deeply unpopular with a certain constituency (e.g. strict climate regulations impacting Alberta’s oil industry, or conversely, cuts to social programs angering progressives), those groups might stage large protests in Ottawa or provincial capitals. There is roughly a 30–35% chance that in the next year we’ll see a major protest movement linked to political discontent. Whether it turns violent is another question – the convoy itself was mostly non-violent in terms of direct attacks, but it was unlawful and some participants expressed willingness to use force​. If a sequel movement arises, authorities are better prepared (legally and logistically) to handle it. Still, prolonged standoffs could occur. Notably, intelligence reports found that after early 2022, far-right groups in Canada felt “emboldened” and better organized​, suggesting they might mobilize again given an opportunity. A future protest could be sparked by anything from new health measures, to gun control laws, to a carbon tax – any issue where a segment feels the government is illegitimate or overreaching due to the election outcome.
• Separatist Agitation (Quebec or Western): While outright separatist terrorism is unlikely (discussed further below), we may see political movements pushing separation gain momentum if regional discontent grows under the new government. For example, if Western provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan) feel alienated by the federal policies, the Wexit movement (Western separatism) could revive in rallies and blockades. Similarly, in Quebec, if the federal outcome is seen as hostile to Quebec’s interests (or if Quebec nationalists use the moment to advance their cause), there could be an uptick in separatist demonstrations. These movements in the medium term are likely to remain non-violent politically-driven activism, but splinter factions might consider aggressive tactics. In Spain, we saw how a contentious referendum led to mass protests that occasionally descended into vandalism and clashes with police​, even if the core movement was peaceful. Quebec’s 2017 Catalonia-style scenario is not on the cards now – support for independence is relatively low and mainstream separatist leaders renounce violence – but smaller hardline groups might stage symbolic acts (e.g. raising barricades or defacing federal symbols). The medium-term risk here is more about civil disobedience than terrorism, yet any volatile situation can breed confrontations.
• Labor and Social Unrest: After elections, new governments often implement policy changes that can provoke labor strikes or social justice protests. If these become large and are met with force, violence can result (as seen historically in some G7 nations). For instance, austerity measures might trigger union protests, or Indigenous groups might mobilize if treaty rights are perceived to be infringed. A relevant scenario: a government approves a contentious natural resource project (pipeline, mine) – within months, indigenous land defenders and ecologists could set up blockades (a scenario Canada witnessed in early 2020 with rail blockades in solidarity with Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs). Those blockades were largely peaceful but did involve sabotage of rail lines and tense standoffs. Over the next year, the probability of such issue-driven mass protests is moderate (around 25%), and while most would be peaceful, the risk of clashes with police or sabotage is present if negotiations fail. The medium-term timeline allows for these movements to organize and gain support, unlike the immediate aftermath where everyone is catching their breath.

To quantify, organized movements capable of disruption have roughly a one-in-three chance of arising in the next year in Canada, given current divisions. The likelihood that these movements lead to violence (e.g. rioting, pitched battles with police, or armed resistance) is lower, perhaps in the 10–15% range, because Canadian protest culture – even when disruptive – tends to avoid open violence. However, the presence of extremist elements can change that. Recall that at the Coutts border blockade in Alberta, a cell of individuals had amassed a cache of firearms and were ready “to use force against police” to maintain the protest​ – essentially, a conspiracy to commit violence piggybacking on a larger protest. This indicates that even peaceful movements can harbor violent splinter factions, raising the stakes.

Security services like CSIS will be monitoring known extremist networks for signs they plan to infiltrate or exploit any protest movements. Close collaboration between law enforcement and protest organizers (when they are peaceful) can also help isolate those intent on violence. The medium-term outcome will heavily depend on how authorities handle early signs of organized unrest – with dialogue and measured response, or with actions that galvanize protesters further (as heavy-handed crackdowns sometimes do).

2. Domestic Terrorism Plots (Far-Right, Far-Left, or Single-Issue)

Over the medium term, Canada must consider the possibility of more organized terrorist plots emerging from domestic extremist groups. While Canada hasn’t experienced a large-scale politically-motivated bombing or attack in decades, the environment today has some parallels to eras that bred domestic terrorism (e.g. the late 1960s Quebec separatist FLQ, or more recently, U.S. militia and neo-Nazi plots). Here are the sub-scenarios:

• Far-Right Terror Cells: Canada has documented the existence of several far-right extremist groups with violent ideologies – some overt, some clandestine. The government has even outlawed groups like the Proud Boys, Atomwaffen Division, and The Base as terrorist entities in recent years due to their violent propaganda or plots. Over the next year, one could imagine a small cell of white supremacists or anti-government militiamen attempting an act of terror in reaction to the election outcome (especially if they view the new government as “tyrannical” or aligning with hated policies). Potential targets might include: a government building, a media organization (seen as “propaganda”), or a minority community (out of racist motive). For example, in December 2023 two Ontario men linked to neo-Nazi groups were arrested for producing terrorist propaganda and recruiting videos​. While propaganda isn’t an attack, it shows ongoing activity; the worry is that others in such networks might progress from words to deeds. We estimate the likelihood of a far-right terrorist plot attempt in the next year at roughly 10–15%. This could range from a bombing plot (vehicle-borne improvised explosive, etc.) to a planned armed assault. The chance of such a plot actually being executed (not interdicted) is on the lower end of that range because of vigilant counter-terrorism efforts.
• Left-Wing or Anarchist Extremism: Historically, Canada’s experience with left-wing terrorism is essentially the FLQ (which was more ethno-nationalist Marxist). In modern times, there have been rare instances of environmentally motivated sabotage (sometimes dubbed “eco-terrorism”) – for instance, equipment vandalism at pipeline construction sites, or the 2022 Coastal GasLink site attack in BC where unknown assailants damaged property and allegedly assaulted workers. Those incidents, while criminal, are not on the scale of say, Europe’s left-wing militant groups of the 1970s. In the coming year, if the government aggressively expands fossil fuel projects, a fringe of radical environmentalists might escalate to dangerous tactics. Similarly, anarchist or anti-capitalist militants could conceivably target symbols of the state or capitalism (police cruisers, bank buildings during a protest, etc.). The probability of organized leftist terrorism in Canada in a year’s span is quite low (~5%), given limited precedent and support. However, smaller-scale political violence like pipeline bomb attempts or G7 summit riots, while still unlikely, is slightly more conceivable (perhaps in the 5–10% range). Canadian security forces also monitor these angles, but traditionally far-right and Islamist extremism have been bigger concerns for CSIS; left/anarchist violence has been minimal.
• Separatist Terrorism Resurgence: This is a subset of domestic terrorism but tied to regional nationalism. As noted, the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) carried out numerous bombings and two high-profile kidnappings in the 1960s, pushing Canada into the October Crisis of 1970. That episode resulted in 8 deaths and dozens of injuries over 7 years of FLQ violence​, and it only ceased when the public turned against the violence and massive police action was taken. Today, Quebec’s separatist movement is political and peaceful; even hardcore factions have not engaged in terrorism for decades. A revival of FLQ-style terrorism in the next year is exceedingly unlikely (<1%). The conditions (widespread revolutionary fervor among youth, foreign inspiration from decolonization movements, etc.) are absent. Likewise, the Western separatist fringe (e.g. talk of Alberta independence) has not gone beyond rhetoric and some protest parties – it lacks an organized militant wing. The one caveat is if a foreign intelligence or provocateur tried to stir up trouble by arming or urging a separatist fringe (a very unlikely scenario addressed later under foreign interference). Barring that, separatist terrorism is essentially a negligible concern in the short-to-medium term – a view reinforced by the decline of analogous movements in peer democracies (e.g. Spain’s Basque ETA definitively ended its armed campaign in 2011 after killing over 800 people in the prior decades​, and no new separatist terror has replaced it in Spain’s democracy since).
• Foreign-Influenced Domestic Terrorism: (This straddles domestic and international, but since the perpetrators would be on Canadian soil, we include it here.) One medium-term possibility is that diaspora or foreign proxy conflicts lead to terrorism in Canada. For instance, Canada has a large Sikh diaspora, including pro-Khalistan separatists; historically this led to the Air India bombing in 1985 (the deadliest terror attack in Canadian history, though targeting India). If India–Canada relations remain tense (as they have recently over allegations of interference), it’s conceivable (though rare) that violence could erupt on Canadian soil related to that (e.g. an attack on an Indian diplomat by extremists, or vice versa). Similarly, tensions involving Chinese democracy activists, Iranian dissidents, or others could spark an incident (Iranian-Canadian tensions have seen some suspicious incidents, though not full-blown terror attacks). These are low-probability (~5%) but high-impact scenarios, and CSIS/RCMP are aware of them. They are less directly tied to the election outcome, except insofar as the new government’s foreign policy could heighten or reduce such tensions.

Given these considerations, the overall medium-term likelihood of a domestic terror attack (all stripes combined) is roughly estimated at 15–20%. That is, there is perhaps a one-in-five chance that some form of politically motivated terror attempt (bombing, assassination, mass shooting plot, etc.) will occur in Canada in the next year, driven by domestic actors. This percentage reflects the uneasy reality that Canada’s threat environment has intensified – as experts note, people who come to view political opponents as existential “enemies” may find violence “reasonable”.". For comparison, the U.S. has seen multiple domestic terror plots post-election (e.g. armed men plotting to kidnap a state governor in 2020, arson attacks on party offices and ballot drop boxes in 2022)​, and agencies warn of more to come. Canada’s incidence rate is lower, but not zero.

Fortunately, Canadian security forces have a strong track record in intercepting plots early. Integrated units like INSET (Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams) combine RCMP, local police, and CSIS intelligence to investigate leads on extremism. For example, in early 2023, RCMP arrested members of the far-right “Diagolon” network and others, seizing weapons and preventing potential attacks (some tied to the Coutts group). These pre-emptive actions reduce the chance that a plot reaches execution. Key will be continued diligence in the post-election period when some extremists may feel “now or never” for drastic action.

3. Political Assassination and Targeted Violence

The targeted killing of a politician or public figure is one of the most severe forms of political violence, and it carries a low probability yet grave consequences. In the medium term, as the government enacts policies and opposition hardens, the personal risk to high-profile leaders and officials remains a concern:

• Elected Officials: Cabinet ministers, party leaders, and outspoken MPs could become targets for extremists who feel that conventional politics has failed them. The longer time frame allows a determined would-be assassin to plan (acquire weapons, study targets’ routines, etc.). Modern Canadian history thankfully has no successful assassinations of federal politicians. However, we should note the 2014 incident where an armed extremist did kill a soldier at the National War Memorial and stormed Parliament (before being stopped) – that was ideologically driven (Islamist motives), not tied to an election, but it proved that attacks on political institutions are conceivable. Also, Canada’s provincial politicians have faced violence (e.g. in 2012, Quebec’s incoming Premier Pauline Marois narrowly escaped a shooting at a victory rally; two people were shot, one killed, by a man who opposed Quebec separatism). That incident, though isolated, shows post-election events can be targeted. We assess the chance of an assassination attempt on a Canadian political figure in the next year at around 10% (low, but not negligible). The chance of such an attempt being successful is lower, given security measures and the rarity of highly skilled assassins.
• Journalists and Other Public Figures: Sometimes violent actors target those they see as influential in politics beyond just politicians – e.g. prominent journalists, judges, or activists. If the political climate remains toxic, high-profile media personalities could face threats turning real. This is more likely if conspiracy narratives (like “the media is lying about the election”) persist. For instance, in the U.S., a man broke into House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s home and attacked her husband in 2022, evidently seeking the Speaker – a case of a conspiracist targeting a perceived political enemy. In Canada, some far-right rhetoric demonizes journalists and experts. The medium-term probability of a violent attack on a non-politician public figure (for political reasons) is perhaps 5–10%. While not as prominent as politicians, these figures often have less security, making them seen as “softer” targets to unhinged actors.

To guard against assassination threats, Canada has taken new steps: CSIS now directly briefs MPs of credible threats against them​, and the RCMP coordinates with local police for VIP protection more than before. After this election, those protective measures will continue for key figures. Even opposition leaders might discreetly get extra security if threat levels spike. This multi-layered approach, including “panic buttons” given to all MPs after a wave of threats​, indicates a recognition of the risk. It likely keeps the odds of a successful assassination extremely low. Nonetheless, given comparable countries’ experiences – the UK saw two MPs murdered in the last 7 years (Jo Cox in 2016 by a far-right extremist, and David Amess in 2021 by an Islamist) – Canada must remain on guard​. Those UK cases were during polarized moments (Brexit and a toxic political climate). If Canada’s polarization continues or worsens, the medium-term danger to individuals increases.

4. Mass Unrest and Civil Disorder Scenarios

At the extreme end of the spectrum is the possibility of widespread civil unrest, meaning simultaneous or cascading violent events across multiple regions – essentially a breakdown of public order on a larger scale. This remains highly unlikely in Canada but is worth evaluating in a medium-term scenario:

• Election Legitimacy Crisis: One trigger for mass unrest in some democracies is a contested election result that one side refuses to accept. In Canada’s case, today’s election result, while perhaps divisive, is not expected to be contested by any major institutional actor (courts, etc.). All parties historically abide by the independent election commission’s count. Therefore, the scenario of dueling governments or large groups refusing to acknowledge the winner (as happened in the U.S. 2020 election aftermath) is extremely remote. Without that catalyst, mass unrest (like a Million Man March on Ottawa turning into chaos) is improbable.
• Economic or Social Crisis Post-Election: If over the next year Canada were to slip into a severe economic crisis or another pandemic wave, and if the government’s handling is seen as illegitimate by a large portion of the populace, this could spark nationwide protests that include violent elements. For example, protracted double-digit inflation coupled with austerity might bring people to the streets in many cities (akin to “Yellow Vest” protests in France). The election link is indirect but real – people could say “we didn’t vote for this hardship” and blame the sitting government or the system. Historically, Canada has not seen such unrest on a national scale in modern times. Thus the chance of concurrent mass riots or looting in multiple Canadian cities is very low (~5–10%) in the coming year.
• Institutional Conflict (Federal vs Provincial): A scenario to consider is a serious federal-provincial standoff resulting from the election. For instance, if the federal government enforces a law that a province staunchly opposes (imagine a scenario like Alberta refusing enforcement of a federal gun control measure or carbon tax). If a provincial leader encouraged defiance, it could lead to pockets of lawlessness or citizen “resistance” movements. We have a mild precedent: during COVID, some Alberta and Saskatchewan communities defied federal health advisories; or historically, Newfoundland’s premier once ordered removal of Canadian flags during a dispute. If such a confrontation escalated, protests and counter-protests could engulf those provinces, potentially with violence. However, Canada’s strong legal framework and the likely willingness to compromise make this scenario again very unlikely. If anything, it might result in court battles, not street battles.

In summary, the medium-term is more concerning than the short-term in that more complex and organized forms of political violence could crystallize. But even over a year, the overall risk of large-scale violence remains modest. Isolated incidents or small campaigns (like a few sabotage actions or a single violent protest event) are more probable than any sustained violent conflict. We can tabulate the estimated likelihood of various types of violence in both short and medium term for clarity:

These percentage estimates are subjective assessments based on precedent and current conditions; they convey that no category of political violence is expected to be common, but the relative risk is higher for smaller-scale incidents than for large-scale terrorism or insurgency.

Regional Variations: Provincial Breakdown of Threat Sources

Political violence risks are not uniform across Canada. Different provinces have different political climates and histories that influence the likelihood and nature of post-election unrest. Below is a provincial breakdown, from highest to lowest risk, along with the primary potential sources of violence in each:

• Alberta: High relative risk. Alberta has been a hotbed of anti-federal government sentiment, especially under Liberal administrations. Today, with the election returning a Liberal-led government, Alberta is likely the province with the deepest resentment. We’ve seen militant elements surface here: the Coutts border blockade incident where an armed group prepared for violence​ is a stark example. Potential violence sources in Alberta include: far-right anti-government extremists (some with separatist “Wexit” leanings), anger over energy policy (oil workers or agitators sabotaging infrastructure if they feel the federal government is destroying their livelihood), and spillover from U.S. influences (militia-style groups). The provincial government itself has flirted with defiant rhetoric (the Alberta Sovereignty Act to ignore federal laws, for instance), which could embolden fringe actors. Cities like Calgary and Edmonton are generally calm, but rural Alberta and border areas could host flashpoints (e.g. another border blockade or a standoff at a federal facility). Expect the highest vigilance by RCMP in Alberta due to these factors.
• Ontario: High risk (especially Ottawa and certain rural pockets). As Canada’s most populous province and home to the nation’s capital, Ontario could see a range of issues. Ottawa is a prime target for demonstrators (as seen in 2022) and could again be the stage for large protests if a movement arises. The presence of Parliament, the PM’s residence, and other federal institutions means any mass protest or march is likely to converge here. Ontario also harbors various extremist groups – from urban centers where white supremacist cells have operated (e.g. some of the recent neo-Nazi arrests were in Ontario​), to rural areas that had anti-mask militias. Southern Ontario saw angry anti-vaccine protests during the pandemic (e.g. a mob swarming Jagmeet Singh in Peterborough in 2022, shouting threats). The province also has a political divide – rural/small-town Ontario leans more conservative and has shown flashes of anger towards liberal elites (e.g. the gravel-throwing at Trudeau in London, ON​). That said, Ontario also has strong police presence (OPP, municipal police) and resources to manage unrest. The most likely violence in Ontario would be an Ottawa protest turning unruly or a lone wolf attempt on a politician in the Toronto area (since many politicians live or work there). The presence of multiple high-profile targets (MPs, media headquarters, etc.) slightly elevates Ontario’s risk.
• Quebec: Moderate risk. Quebec has the most historical experience with political violence (the FLQ crisis). Today, separatist terrorism is dormant, and mainstream Quebec society strongly disfavors violence. If the federal election outcome is perceived as hostile to Quebec’s interests (for instance, if a government with low Quebec representation takes power), the reaction will likely be political (Quebec leaders demanding decentralization, etc.) rather than violent. However, Quebec has seen a rise in some far-right nationalist sentiment in recent years (e.g. groups like La Meute, which are anti-immigrant, have held rallies). There’s also an anti-sanitary-measures crowd; some of the largest anti-vaccine protests happened in Montreal. We cannot entirely dismiss the possibility of fringe violence in Quebec: an extremist could target a federal building in protest (for example, in 2020 a Quebec man rammed his truck and stormed Rideau Hall armed with guns to “arrest” Trudeau over pandemic policies). Notably, that individual was from Manitoba but carried out his act in Ottawa – showing how lines blur. Within Quebec, perhaps the highest concern would be lone actors motivated by either far-right ideology (e.g. the 2017 Quebec City mosque shooter was a far-right Quebecer influenced by anti-Muslim, anti-Liberal sentiments, though not election-related) or hardline separatism (very unlikely now). Montreal, as a large city with active protest culture, might see demonstrations but these are usually well policed. The province also vividly remembers the 2012 election night Metropolis shooting (one person killed) – an attack by an Anglo extremist against the separatist Parti Québécois victory party, yelling that “the English are waking up!” That one-off event is a reminder that even outside the expected narrative (it wasn’t a separatist attacking, but someone attacking separatists), violence can intrude. So Quebec’s risk is moderate mostly due to unpredictability of lone actors.
• British Columbia: Moderate risk. B.C. has a distinct political climate – progressive on many issues, but also home to strong environmental and Indigenous movements that have clashed with authorities. Potential violence in B.C. medium-term might stem from eco-radicalism or Indigenous land conflicts – for example, if the new federal government green-lights pipeline projects or ignores climate concerns, protests in B.C. (at the pipeline route or in Vancouver) could escalate. Past incidents include the fiery raid on Coastal GasLink site in early 2022 by unknown assailants with flare guns and axes – no injuries, but significant damage. Also, B.C. has a significant anarchist scene in Vancouver which occasionally engages in property destruction during large protests (e.g. smashing windows during the 2010 Olympics protest). Another angle is anti-authority: B.C. had large anti-lockdown rallies and a few high-profile confrontations (like individuals accosting health officials). If those anti-establishment networks pivot their anger toward the federal election outcome (say, not liking the winner’s agenda), they could protest in Victoria or Vancouver. On the whole, B.C.’s likelihood of serious violence is moderate – more likely in the form of sabotage or clashes in remote areas than urban terrorism. The province’s law enforcement (e.g. Vancouver Police, RCMP E-Division) have dealt with everything from Stanley Cup riots to pipeline standoffs, so they are experienced. One must also recall B.C.’s Air India bombing history (1985) – that was foreign-related, but it happened in B.C. – illustrating that Vancouver’s international communities can sometimes be entangled in overseas conflicts (Khalistani militants then; potentially Chinese or Iranian dissident tensions now). Those would be isolated incidents but possible in a diverse hub like B.C.
• Saskatchewan and Manitoba: Moderate-to-low risk. These Prairie provinces share some of Alberta’s conservative, anti-Liberal federal leanings, but on a smaller scale population-wise. Saskatchewan in particular has vocal separatist sentiment in some quarters (Buffalo Party, etc.), though it hasn’t manifested in significant protest movements. The most notable recent unrest was farmers with tractors protesting federal policies – which stayed peaceful. Saskatchewan and Manitoba both have some presence of far-right and anti-government groups (e.g. the Diagolon network had supporters across the Prairies). A concern in these provinces is the relatively sparse law enforcement in rural areas – an extremist could potentially operate in remote parts with less scrutiny. However, due to smaller population and less symbolic targets, we rank them lower than Alberta. An example risk: a militant could attack a federal grain research center or rail line in protest of agricultural or gun regulations (a hypothetical scenario). The chance of that is low, but not zero. Manitoba’s capital Winnipeg has seen Indigenous-led blockades and protests (e.g. rail blockades in 2020). Those were peaceful, but if grievances (like land rights or MMIW injustice) remain unaddressed, demonstrations could recur. Still, any violence in these provinces would likely be an isolated act. On balance, risk is moderate-low (~10% chance of any notable violent incident) over the next year.
• Atlantic Canada (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland & Labrador): Low risk. The Atlantic provinces are generally more politically centrist or liberal and have not been hotbeds of extremism. They have smaller populations and a culture of civility in politics. While polarization has increased everywhere, Atlantic Canada saw fewer and smaller anti-lockdown protests, for example. One recent case of note: In Nova Scotia, during the 2021 federal election, a People’s Party supporter was charged for throwing gravel at Prime Minister Trudeau (similar to the Ontario incident) – showing that even the Atlantic can produce lone actors. But that was a person from out of province who traveled to protest. Locally, Atlantic Canadians have gripes (e.g. economic woes, fisheries disputes) but tend to handle them peacefully or through legal means. The biggest protests there in recent memory might be fisheries disputes (sometimes tense between Indigenous and non-Indigenous fishermen, occasionally resulting in property damage – like the 2020 lobster pound arson in Nova Scotia amid a fishing rights conflict). If anything post-election, perhaps Newfoundland could see some labor protest if equalization becomes an issue, or NB/NS if energy policies affect their industries – but these would be mild. Overall, the Atlantic region is expected to remain calm; any violence would be a very isolated anomaly.
• Northern Territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut): Very low risk. These have tiny populations and are far from power centers. They do experience social issues and protests (for example, recent protests in Nunavut over housing), but nothing suggests election-related violence. If anything, discontent there revolves around local governance and living conditions, not federal election outcomes. We do not anticipate any election-linked violence in the North in either short or medium term.

In summary, Alberta and Ontario (especially Ottawa) are the provinces to watch most closely for potential post-election violence or terrorism. They have the combination of motivated actors and symbolic targets. Quebec and B.C. follow, mainly for specific issue-based risks and historical precedent. The Prairies (outside Alberta) and the rest present progressively lower risks. It is important for law enforcement and intelligence to tailor their alertness to these regional differences – for instance, focusing extremism surveillance in Alberta’s online forums, ensuring robust security in Ottawa’s Parliamentary precinct, and maintaining dialogue with Indigenous leaders in B.C. to manage any conflicts peacefully.

Canadian authorities appear to be doing exactly that: the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) produces threat assessments that guide local police on region-specific concerns, and RCMP divisional units liaise with provinces. The provincial breakdown of threats above should inform where to allocate preventive resources (e.g. more RCMP presence in western protests, reinforcing Ottawa security cordons, etc.).

Role of Security Agencies: Mitigating or Exacerbating the Threat

Canadian security and intelligence agencies – chiefly the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), along with provincial and municipal police – play a dual role in this landscape. Their actions can prevent and deter political violence or, if mishandled, can unintentionally inflame tensions. Here we evaluate their role:

Mitigation and Prevention:

• Intelligence Gathering and Threat Monitoring: CSIS, in partnership with the RCMP and other agencies, has been actively monitoring election-related threats. Prior to the vote, the government stood up the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, which for this election not only watched for foreign interference but also expanded to monitor domestic violent extremism threats to electoral security​. This means potential troublemakers were likely identified early. CSIS has improved intelligence-sharing with police and even with political parties – for example, providing threat briefings to party security liaisons and directly warning MPs of credible threats​. Such measures can stop violent plots in their incubation stage and prompt protective measures for those targeted.
• Protective Security Measures: The RCMP is responsible for VIP protection (Prime Minister and certain ministers) and assists local police in protecting other officials. We’ve seen innovations like the Privy Council’s Candidate Security Program offering private guards to threatened candidates​ – this likely helped candidates campaign without incident. Post-election, the RCMP’s Protective Policing will remain with the PM and any ministers, and Parliamentary Protective Service will secure Parliament Hill. These reduce the risk of successful attacks on high-value targets. Also, increased police presence at likely protest sites in the short term will act as a deterrent to violence.
• Law Enforcement Response and Coordination: One lesson from the 2022 convoy was the need for better coordination among police (Ottawa Police, OPP, RCMP). By the end of that protest, a national operation cleared the blockade. Now, if protests arise, an integrated command (as recommended by the subsequent inquiry) should respond faster, preventing illegal occupations from festering into larger conflicts. Public Order Units of police, equipped and trained for crowd control, are on standby in major cities. Quick, proportionate action – neither overly aggressive at first nor naively hands-off – is key. A swift arrest of agitators at the first sign of violence can prevent escalation.
• Counter-Extremism and Community Outreach: Over the medium term, security services also mitigate threats by working with communities to counter radicalization. CSIS and public safety departments have programs to engage community leaders, flag early warning signs of violent extremism, and debunk disinformation. For example, recognizing that foreign disinformation can “mobilize some to violence” in a confused population​, the government has been promoting digital literacy and factual public communication​. A more informed public is less likely to be swayed by calls to violence based on false narratives. The new government (or continuing one) will likely continue funding these prevention initiatives as a national security priority.

Risks of Exacerbation:

Despite these efforts, how security forces conduct themselves can also influence the likelihood of violence:

• Perceived Bias or Inaction: A frequent criticism from different sides is that police either under-react or over-react based on who is protesting. For instance, during the Freedom Convoy, many observers (especially in Ottawa) felt the police were too lenient at first, allowing an unlawful occupation and even fraternizing with protesters. This was contrasted with the much harsher crackdowns Indigenous and environmental protesters have faced. Such perceived double standards can breed resentment. If far-right actors feel police will treat them with kid gloves, they might be emboldened to push further (raising risk of a violent showdown eventually). Conversely, if marginalized groups feel police only show force to them, it can erode trust and make confrontation likelier in a protest. Security agencies must strive to enforce laws equally and fairly to avoid feeding narratives (on the right or left) that justify violence as the “only option.”
• Heavy-Handed Crackdowns: On the flip side, an overly militarized or forceful response to peaceful protests can itself trigger violence. The invocation of the Emergencies Act in 2022 to clear the convoy was debated – while it ended the protest, some argue it inflamed anti-government sentiment among protesters’ sympathizers. A future scenario: if a protest in, say, Alberta is met with mass arrests and aggressive tactics, it could become a rallying cry and push some individuals into extremist action. Historically, Spain’s harsh measures during the Catalan crisis (imprisoning leaders, using force on referendum day) arguably intensified short-term unrest​. Canada should heed that lesson – maintaining public order with minimal necessary force and maximizing dialogue can keep situations from radicalizing participants further.
• Infiltration and Insider Threats: Worryingly, there have been instances of extremists within the ranks of security services. Reports have found that white nationalist and far-right ideologies have permeated some elements of the military and law enforcement in Canada​. If not addressed, this could undermine responses – e.g. an officer sympathetic to a cause might leak information or refuse orders, or worse, an extremist in uniform could abuse their power to target certain communities. The agencies are aware of this and have been trying to root out such elements (for example, the CAF removed some members tied to hate groups). Continued vigilance is needed to ensure those tasked with stopping violence are not covertly encouraging it.
• Public Communication Missteps: Another factor is how officials communicate threats. If security agencies are too opaque or, alternatively, if they issue alarming warnings without context, both can be counterproductive. Transparency and factual updates can dispel rumors that fuel conspiracy theories. The government’s Critical Election Incident Protocol (a panel that informs the public of any serious threats to the election) was in place​, but fortunately was not triggered by any major incident. Maintaining public trust through honest communication about security issues will help ensure citizens don’t buy into fringe calls for violence (often predicated on “you can’t trust the system” narratives).

In balance, Canada’s security establishment is more likely to prevent violence than cause it. The integrated approach to election security – spanning intelligence, policing, cyber-defense (to counter online incitement), and emergency laws if needed – provides a strong shield. The fact that the election concluded without major incident is partly a credit to these preparations. Moving forward, as long as agencies act within law and with restraint, they will deter most actors from attempting violence. A misstep, however, could be seized upon by propagandists to validate extremist rhetoric (e.g. a violent police incident could be spun as “proof of tyranny,” recruiting more extremists). Thus, a careful, even-handed security posture is essential in the volatile post-election period.

The Specter of Foreign Influence and False Flag Scenarios

No assessment of political violence in today’s world is complete without considering the role of external actors – whether foreign governments, extremist international networks, or the murky realm of false-flag operations. While one must be cautious not to drift into conspiracy, there are real instances of foreign interference and provocations that have stoked unrest in democracies. Canada is not exempt, as evidenced by recent headlines about election interference by countries like China and Russia.

Foreign State Interference in Unrest:
Adversarial foreign governments might seek to destabilize Canada by amplifying internal divisions or even facilitating violence indirectly. Tactics could include disinformation campaigns, funding extremist groups, or espionage and sabotage. Some points to note:

• Disinformation and Social Media Manipulation: Experts have warned that Russia (and to a lesser extent China or Iran) use online propaganda to deepen polarization in Western countries​. By spreading narratives of election fraud or government tyranny, they create “confusion that mobilizes some to violence.” For example, Russian-linked trolls might push hashtags claiming the election was rigged, hoping Canadian conspiracy theorists pick it up. While it’s hard to quantify, this information warfare raises the risk that impressionable individuals resort to violence on false premises. The best defense is the resiliency of Canadian media literacy and timely fact-checking by authorities.
• Direct Foreign Orchestration: It is unlikely that a foreign state would overtly conduct a violent operation on Canadian soil in response to a Canadian election – the geopolitical stakes aren’t that high typically. However, there have been murmurings: e.g. allegations that Indian intelligence may have targeted Sikh separatists in Canada (an issue currently straining Canada-India relations) raise the question of foreign hits on Canadian residents. Or consider that China might push its agents to intimidate Chinese-Canadian dissidents or politicians critical of Beijing. The election result could influence this (a government hawkish on China might face more such pressure). Similarly, one could imagine extremist U.S. individuals (not the U.S. government, but private actors) providing support or inspiration to Canadian counterparts – as seen when American alt-right media personalities cheered on the Ottawa convoy and U.S. donors sent money. The probability of foreign-directed political violence in Canada is low (~5%), but not zero. It would likely be covert and deniable if it occurred. Canadian intelligence (CSIS, RCMP) is actively focused on foreign interference; a high-profile violent incident traced back to a foreign power would provoke a major diplomatic and security response, which likely deters states from attempting anything so blatant.
• Cross-Border Extremist Links: The flow of ideas and people across the Canada-U.S. border means if large unrest happens in the U.S., it could spill over. The Canadian government is notably concerned about U.S. instability – a recent government report even considered scenarios of a U.S. civil conflict and how Canada should brace for spillover​. Armed groups in the U.S. could conceivably assist or encourage allied groups in Canada. We saw this with the January 6 Capitol riot: Canadian far-right forums hailed it and some participants of the Ottawa convoy later said they wanted something similar​. If post-election tensions in Canada align with narratives in the U.S. (for example, both countries’ far-right sharing “stop the steal” lies), there could be cross-pollination of troublemakers. The medium-term risk of U.S.-linked agitators joining Canadian events is modest – perhaps 10% chance in a major protest. Not foreign government interference per se, but foreign ideological interference.

False Flag Operations:
The term “false flag” refers to acts perpetrated by one group but made to appear as though another group is responsible. In the Canadian context, one could imagine scenarios such as:

• An extremist committing violence but framing it as if the other side did it, to discredit them. For instance, a far-right individual could vandalize a campaign office but paint slogans to blame left-wing activists, seeking to make the left look violent (or vice versa). In the heat of post-election passions, such tricks can sow confusion and mutual hostility. There’s no public evidence of such an event in recent Canadian elections, but historically, agitators have used these tactics elsewhere. The likelihood of a deliberate false-flag violent incident is low, but the impact could be significant by inflaming divisions. Canadians should be cautious about jumping to conclusions on attribution if an incident occurs under suspicious circumstances.
• Agent Provocateurs in Protests: A related notion is undercover agents (from either police or extremist groups) inciting violence during otherwise peaceful protests to justify a crackdown or to smear a movement. This has some precedent – e.g., in 2007 in Montebello, QC, police agents provocateurs were caught trying to incite violence in a protest (the police later acknowledged this, claiming they were preventing violence by flushing out radicals). If protesters suspect this, trust erodes and clashes may escalate. On the other side, an extremist could join a peaceful protest of their opponents and start throwing rocks to make them look bad. Both have happened in various countries. In Canada’s upcoming protests, organizers and police alike will need to be vigilant for unusual instigators. Keeping lines of communication open can help – for instance, if protest leaders can coordinate with police to identify and isolate rogue actors.

In essence, foreign/false-flag factors are wildcards – low probability but high complexity. The best approach for Canada is to continue its current trajectory of transparency about foreign interference (public inquiries, etc.) and to maintain professional, restrained policing that doesn’t give credence to conspiracy theories.

The public should also be prepared for misinformation: For example, if some violent incident occurs, one can expect a blizzard of online claims assigning blame (often inaccurately) – perhaps foreign bots will blame a certain ethnic group or political faction before facts are known. Responsible media and officials must clarify facts swiftly in such cases.

One positive note: Canada’s diverse communities by and large coexist peacefully, and foreign attempts to incite inter-communal strife have not gained much traction. A recent worry was that investigations into Chinese interference could spur anti-Asian hate​, but Canadian leaders took care to distinguish the Chinese government from Chinese-Canadians. Similarly, the Sikh community and government have dialogued to manage tensions around the Khalistan issue non-violently. These efforts reduce the chance that foreign meddling will produce violence.

Conclusion: Outlook and Key Findings

In the wake of Canada’s national election, the risk of political violence is present but contained. Our analysis suggests that immediate threats are limited to sporadic incidents – a reflection of heightened tensions but also of Canada’s enduring stability. As we project into the coming year, vigilance is warranted: polarization and extremist undercurrents mean that a determined few might still attempt harmful acts. However, the fabric of Canadian society and the proactive measures of its security agencies provide robust defenses against large-scale turmoil.

Key findings include: Canada will likely avoid large-scale violence connected to the election, but it may experience isolated acts such as aggressive protests or lone offender attacks (with an overall probability in the order of 20–30% for such events). Regions like Alberta and the National Capital should be monitored closely, given their prominence in current grievances. Importantly, historical lessons from both home and abroad reinforce our estimates – we recall the FLQ’s short-lived terror in Quebec and see that no comparable militant movement exists now; we learn from the U.S. Capitol riot that extremist narratives can translate to action if not rebutted, but also from the U.K.’s tragedies that lone wolves remain a threat even in stable democracies​.

Canadian authorities, notably the RCMP and CSIS, are actively engaged in mitigating these risks, through improved threat intelligence sharing​, security provisions for officials​, and readiness to enforce the law. Their balanced approach will be crucial in either thwarting or inadvertently fueling violence – so far, the approach appears well-calibrated toward prevention.

Finally, while foreign interference and false narratives swirl in the background, Canadians are relatively resilient. The electorate’s broad acceptance of the election results (barring fringe conspiracy adherents) is a bulwark against insurgent behavior. The onus is now on political leaders across the spectrum to tone down rhetoric that paints opponents as enemies, as that kind of language has been directly linked to spikes in political violence​. A conciliatory, nation-building tone post-election can help defuse residual anger.

In conclusion, short-term calm is a real possibility – Canada may well navigate this election aftermath with only peaceful democratic engagement. The medium-term demands continued attention, addressing legitimate grievances through dialogue and policy rather than allowing them to be exploited by extremists. By learning from precedents and heeding intelligence warnings, Canada can maintain its global reputation as a safe, functioning democracy, even amid the turbulences of populism and polarization seen elsewhere. The percentages and scenarios outlined in this report are not fate; they are risk projections that can be lowered further by wise governance and community resilience. Canada has both the tools and the public will to ensure that ballots, not bullets, remain the arbiters of its political future.

Conclusion

As Canada emerges from the 2025 federal election with Mark Carney's Liberal Party elected to government, the country stands at a delicate juncture between stability and strain. While the immediate risk of large-scale political violence remains low, the combination of intense polarization, ideological radicalization, and foreign influence attempts has elevated the potential for isolated acts of disruption in the months ahead. Lone-actor attacks, targeted harassment of officials, and spontaneous protest movements represent the most plausible threats in the short term, while more organized extremist mobilization, infrastructure disruptions, or politically motivated terror plots could materialize over the medium term if grievances deepen.

Regional disparities are pronounced: Alberta and Ontario—particularly Ottawa—represent the highest-risk zones for unrest, given their combination of symbolic political targets, active grievance networks, and precedent for confrontational protest. Quebec and British Columbia also warrant close attention, though their risks are more tied to issue-specific or ideological catalysts rather than direct rejection of the electoral outcome. Atlantic Canada and the Northern Territories, by contrast, remain low-risk environments.

Canadian security institutions—chiefly the RCMP, CSIS, and provincial and municipal forces—have shown strong awareness of these challenges, expanding intelligence efforts and protective measures in anticipation of post-election tensions. Their effectiveness will be critical not only in preempting specific plots or violent incidents but also in avoiding actions that could inflame public distrust or radicalize fringe elements further. Equally important will be the tone set by political leaders: refraining from inflammatory rhetoric and actively working to de-escalate tensions will play a decisive role in whether grievances evolve through peaceful democratic channels or are hijacked by extremists.

Foreign interference, whether through disinformation campaigns, ideological cross-pollination from the United States, or potential diaspora-linked provocations, remains a low-probability but high-impact wildcard. Managing this threat will require continued transparency, proactive counter-messaging, and robust diplomatic and security responses without succumbing to conspiratorial thinking.

Ultimately, the risks outlined in this report are neither predetermined nor immutable. They are conditional probabilities shaped by the collective choices of policymakers, institutions, and citizens over the coming weeks and months. With foresight, proportional security measures, and sustained investment in social resilience, Canada can weather the post-election period with its democratic foundations intact—ensuring that, even amid the turbulence of a more volatile world, ballots, not bullets, continue to decide the nation's course.