Securing the Summit: How Non-G7 Leaders Are Protected at Kananaskis 2025 – 2025 G7 Security Series #12

Introduction

The 2025 G7 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, is not only a gathering of the world’s most influential economies but also a convergence point for key global leaders beyond the G7. Ensuring the safety of these dignitaries is a monumental task that involves meticulous planning, international cooperation, and the deployment of elite security units. This article delves into the protective strategies employed for non-G7 leaders, highlighting the collaborative efforts that make such a high-stakes event secure and successful.

European Union (EU Commission & Council)

• Protective Detail & Structure: The EU’s top representatives – European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel – rely on a close protection team coordinated through the European External Action Service (EEAS) Security office, often augmented by Belgian Federal Police personal protection officers. In Brussels, more than 150 Belgian specialized officers protect EU leaders at summits, and a select subset travels abroad to guard the EU principals. Once on host country soil, the host nation assumes primary responsibility for their safety, so in Canada the RCMP would lead outer security while EU security officers provide immediate close protection and advice.
• Intelligence & Liaison: EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) likely liaises with Canadian intelligence (CSIS and Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre) for threat assessments. The EU delegation will plug into the summit’s multi-agency security hub to share any concerns about hybrid threats (disinformation, cyber, etc.) and to receive threat updates from Five Eyes partners. EU INTCEN does not collect its own intel but aggregates member states’ insights, which can be passed to hosts to bolster situational awareness.
• Transport & Diplomatic Movement: Lacking a dedicated “Air Force One,” EU leaders typically use chartered aircraft for official trave. (For example, von der Leyen frequently charters private jets for trips, a practice that has drawn some criticism.) They are likely to arrive in Calgary via a chartered business jet or an EU member state’s government aircraft. Motorcade and vehicle support are arranged by the host; Canada would provide armored vehicles and police escorts. Protocol and logistics officers from the EU work with Canadian officials on everything from secure motorcade routes to scheduling, much like any national delegation.
• Protective Immunities & Arms: As heads of an international organization, the EU Presidents are granted privileges and immunities comparable to diplomatic heads of mission. Their security officers may be afforded the status of “experts on mission,” but Canadian law prohibits foreign security from carrying firearms without permission. In practice, EU security personnel do not generally carry weapons abroad; instead, they rely on the RCMP and local police for any armed response. The RCMP’s VIP Protection Detail – which safeguards visiting dignitaries – will integrate EU security staff into the protective plan (e.g. allowing them close access to the EU VIPs and in secure zones).
• Summit Experience: The EU is a full participant in G7 summits, so its leaders are well-versed in summit security procedures. They will have a minimal footprint – a small close-protection team, advance security liaison officers, and possibly an EU INTCEN analyst in the host’s joint intel cell. Open-source indicators of their security prep may include notices of EU liaison visits to Canadian authorities or EU security vehicles (with diplomatic plates) moving in the summit area under RCMP escort.

India (PM Narendra Modi)

• Protective Entities: The Prime Minister of India, the authoritarian populist Narendra Modi, is protected by the Special Protection Group (SPG), an elite agency mandated for PM security, with augmentation from the National Security Guard (NSG) “Black Cat” commandos for counter-assault and quick reaction. When traveling abroad, a substantial SPG detail accompanies the PM – historically, even on visits to friendly countries like the U.S., around 25 armed SPG personnel have surrounded the PM at all times. This SPG team handles close bodyguard duties, luggage screening, and medical support, while the host nation’s forces provide perimeter and route security.
• Integration with RCMP: In Canada, the RCMP is the lead for VIP protection on Canadian soil. The RCMP’s International Protected Persons program will work closely with SPG officers to ensure seamless protection. An SPG advance team would arrive weeks prior to liaise with RCMP Protective Operations and map out venues. Any SPG agents carrying firearms will have obtained explicit RCMP authorization per Canadian regulationsi. Typically, a limited number of SPG officers (those in immediate proximity to the PM) might be allowed sidearms, while others remain unarmed and defer to armed RCMP close protection officers in an emergency.
• Deployment Doctrine Abroad: The SPG treats foreign visits with the same seriousness as domestic ones. They bring equipment like jammers, portable X-ray machines, and sometimes even bullet-resistant cars. (India has, on occasion, flown the PM’s armored vehicle overseas – for example, PM Modi’s armored Range Rover was used in nearby countries like Sri Lanka.) For a distant summit like G7 Canada, however, India may rely on Canadian-provided armored SUVs due to logistical complexity. The SPG will occupy key positions in the motorcade (riding immediately around the PM’s car) and coordinate with RCMP motorcade units for timing and motorcade formations.
• Intelligence Sharing: Given heightened Sikh extremism tensions recently, intelligence liaison will be critical. Expect a close collaboration between India’s Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Intelligence Bureau with Canada’s CSIS to share threat indicators, as well as real-time coordination through a Joint Intelligence Group at the summit. The SPG themselves carry out their own threat assessments and will integrate those with the RCMP/CSIS threat picture. Any local issues (protests by diaspora groups, etc.) will be jointly managed through this intel-sharing framework.
• Precedents: India has participated in G7 outreaches frequently (Modi attended Germany’s G7 in 2022 and Japan’s in 2023). During the 2022 Schloss Elmau summit, Indian SPG worked alongside German Federal Police; similarly at the 2022 G20 Bali, SPG coordinated with Indonesian Paspampres. Those cases set a precedent of tight integration without incident, indicating the SPG can adapt to foreign security environments. We can expect the same in Kananaskis 2025, with perhaps Canadian officials leveraging lessons from Modi’s previous visits to Canada (e.g. his 2015 state visit) on how to accommodate the large Indian security contingent smoothly.

Ukraine (President Volodymyr Zelenskyy)

• Protective Entities: President Zelenskyy is guarded by the State Guard Department of Ukraine (UDO), which is analogous to the U.S. Secret Service for Ukraine. In wartime, his protection has become even more robust – elements of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), including its Alpha Group special forces, often augment the presidential security detail for additional counter-sniper and counter-assault capabilities. Any delegation to G7 2025 will likely include a blend of UDO close-protection officers and SBU tactical teams due to the elevated threat from Russian agents or proxies.
• Extraordinary Security Measures: Unique to Ukraine’s situation is the constant threat of Russian retaliation even abroad. Thus, Zelenskyy’s travel plans are usually highly classified and involve Western assistance. For instance, during the 2023 G7 in Hiroshima, Zelenskyy made a surprise appearance by arriving on a French government jet under tight secrecy. We can expect similar precautions for Canada: possibly military transport aircraft or allied planes ferrying him with fighter jet escorts or AWACS surveillance overhead. NORAD will be on alert for any unusual air activity given the theoretical (if remote) threat of foreign adversaries attempting to target his flight.
• Host Nation Coordination: Canada, as a staunch ally of Ukraine, will treat President Zelenskyy’s protection as a top priority. The RCMP’s VIP Protection Detail will lead on ground, essentially assigning a full close protection team to him as if he were a G7 leader. In fact, when Zelenskyy visited Washington, D.C. in 2022, the U.S. Secret Service provided him an official state visit–level detail “from the moment he landed, while his own Ukrainian bodyguards formed a secondary layer. The RCMP is expected to do the same – a heavy protective bubble with RCMP tactical units (Emergency Response Team) on standby, and UDO officers working alongside. His motorcade in Alberta will be extensive, likely similar to what G7 leaders have, given his profile.
• Protective Intelligence & Liaison: Western intelligence services are actively involved in securing Zelenskyy’s travels. CSIS and RCMP will be plugged into Ukraine’s intelligence (possibly GUR military intelligence or SBU) to exchange any threat reports. For example, if there were indications of Russian sabotage teams or surveillance in Canada, that intel would be shared in real-time. During Zelenskyy’s September 2023 visit to Ottawa, Canadian signals intelligence (CSE) and the Communications Security Establishment reportedly monitored for cyber or communications threats, and such support will continue for G7. The U.S., UK, and other allies likely contribute to the protective intelligence umbrella as well, given the international interest in his safety.
• Logistics: President Zelenskyy usually travels on either a military transport or a borrowed allied aircraft. His ground transportation in Canada will be entirely host-provided (armored SUVs and police cruisers). We might see OSINT clues like Royal Canadian Air Force planes accompanying his arrival or NOTAMs (Notice to Airmen) indicating special flights from Rzeszów, Poland (a known transit point for his trips). The general public can expect tight security zones – when Zelenskyy visited Canada, security perimeters and police sniper overwatch were visibly present (media noted the extraordinary measures). All these elements underscore that Ukraine’s delegation will have one of the summit’s most robust security packages, despite not being in G7 – a reflection of the threat environment around their leader.

South Korea (President of South Korea)

• Protective Entity: The Presidential Security Service (PSS) of South Korea handles President Lee Jae-myung’s personal security. The PSS will dispatch an advance team to Canada to coordinate all aspects of the visit, from airport arrival to hotel security. They work very closely with host country forces; for example, at the 2021 G7 in Cornwall and 2022 NATO Summit (where South Korea was invited as a partner), PSS agents were embedded with local security details to jointly protect the president.
• Summit Coordination (RCMP & NORAD): In Canada, PSS will integrate with the RCMP-led protective command. They’ll station officers at the RCMP Unified Command Centre in Kananaskis to liaise on movements. Uniquely, because of the North Korean threat, there is awareness of potential DPRK provocations (like missile tests) during high-profile summits. NORAD’s air defense umbrella – including a temporary no-fly zone enforced by armed fighters – is part of summit security and something PSS will factor into air threat contingency plans. (While a North Korean attack on Canadian soil is extremely unlikely, South Korean security never ignores that possibility entirely.)
• VIP Aircraft & Travel: The South Korean president will arrive on Code One, the call sign for the presidential Boeing 747-8i. This aircraft, introduced in 2022, has advanced defensive systems and secure communications suitable for a head of state. It will likely fly into Calgary International Airport, where Canadian Armed Forces and RCMP units will secure the tarmac. Onboard will be not just the delegation but also a few PSS vehicles or equipment pallets; South Korea sometimes brings along a couple of its own armored Genesis sedans or Hyundai SUVs for the President’s use, though they may alternatively rely on Canadian-provided vehicles to simplify logistics.
• Movement Protocols: The President’s motorcade in Alberta will be coordinated by RCMP traffic units with input from PSS. Standard protocol puts an RCMP lead vehicle, then the President’s car (with a mix of PSS and RCMP agents inside), followed by a close escort vehicle of PSS agents, and then support vehicles (medical, communications). PSS agents will be stationed at the venue doors, performing last-mile protection as the President moves between secured zones. They also typically operate jamming equipment to thwart IED/drone threats. Canadian authorities will have mapped drone mitigation plans as part of summit prep – relevant given North Korea’s use of drones, though in this context more likely to counter civilian drones.
• Past Examples: South Korea has ample experience in global events – it hosted the G20 in 2010 and regularly attends international summits. Notably, when President Yoon visited NATO’s summit in 2022, his PSS detail coordinated with NATO security and local Spanish police without issue, showcasing their ability to integrate internationally. For Kananaskis 2025, one can watch for Korean Air Force flights delivering equipment early, or local Korean-Canadian community engagement events which often have PSS presence – subtle OSINT cues that the South Korean security advance team is on the ground.

Australia (Prime Minister’s Delegation)

• Protective Entity: The Australian Federal Police (AFP) Close Personal Protection (CPP) unit protects Prime Minister Albanese and will deploy abroad as part of his entourage. The AFP is well-versed in protecting VIPs “both here and overseas,” including foreign dignitaries, and maintains a permanent CPP team for the PM. About a dozen AFP officers (plainclothes) will travel with the PM to Canada: some forming the close guard and others handling liaison and vehicle driving.
• Five Eyes Coordination: Being a Five Eyes intelligence partner, Australia enjoys exceptionally smooth info-sharing with Canada. In practice, this means Australian security services (ASIO for intelligence, AFP for policing) will be in constant contact with CSIS, CSE, and RCMP leading up to and during the summit. They will readily exchange threat assessments or any persons of interest. Any protective intelligence “watch-list” (e.g. potential protestors or hostile actors) that Canada develops will be shared with the Australian detail, and vice versa – essentially a fused intel picture. This trusted relationship reduces bureaucratic hurdles that sometimes occur with other countries’ teams.
• Protective Footprint: The Australian CPP officers will embed within RCMP’s structure. At least one AFP liaison officer typically sits in the integrated command center for major events, ensuring real-time comms between Australian and Canadian teams. The PM’s immediate close protection will be a mix of AFP and RCMP officers, often literally shoulder-to-shoulder around him. (During the 2018 APEC summit and other events, AFP CPP agents have demonstrated a willingness to coordinate in mixed formations with host nation agents, highlighting a flexible approach.) The AFP also has a Protective Operations Response Team for high-threat incidents; while they may not deploy en masse abroad, a few tactically trained members could be on hand in case of emergencies.
• Aircraft & Logistics: Australia’s PM will arrive on a Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A Voyager (an Airbus A330 MRTT) outfitted for VIP transport. This jet, delivered in 2019 with secure comms and a VIP cabin, first saw PM service with Scott Morrison’s U.S. visit in 2019. The KC-30A has the range to fly nonstop to Western Canada and ample space for staff and equipment. (The RAAF also operates smaller Boeing 737-BBJ and Dassault Falcon 7x jets for VIPs – one of those could be used if additional delegation transportation is needed.) Upon landing, the Canadian Forces and RCMP will grant the Australian plane diplomatic clearance to unload directly at a secure area. Any Australian-brought equipment (weapons, comms gear) will have been declared in advance per import rules.
• Historical Context: Australia has been invited to G7 gatherings in recent years (e.g., UK 2021, Germany 2022) and has hosted big events itself (G20 Brisbane 2014, etc.), so the AFP is highly experienced in summit security. An example of seamless Five Eyes cooperation was at the 2021 G7 in Britain, where Australian CPP worked under UK police command – similar harmony is expected in Canada. For OSINT observers, signs of the Australian security presence might include RAAF aircraft tail numbers (such as A39-007 for the KC-30A) appearing on flight trackers or Aussie-accented personnel seen in Banff/Kananaskis wearing AFP liaison badges. The overall Australian security footprint will be efficient and low-key, leveraging deep trust with Canadian counterparts.

Brazil (Observer – President’s Security)

• Protective Detail: Brazil’s President will travel with a protective detail overseen by the Gabinete de Segurança Institucional (GSI), i.e. the Institutional Security Cabinet of the presidency. Notably, the current administration shifted much of the close protection responsibility from the military to the Brazilian Federal Police (PF) for President Lula da Silva. This means the core personal bodyguards are PF officers from a specialized Presidential Security unit. They will be the ones forming a ring around the President and accompanying him in vehicles. The President’s aide-de-camp and a few military ceremonial guards may also be present, but the heavy lifting abroad is done by these vetted PF agents.
• Liaison and Legalities: Prior to the visit, Brazil will have sent a diplomatic security advance team to coordinate with the RCMP. Any armed Brazilian officers have to be explicitly cleared by the Canadian side; Brazil will have formally requested permission for select PF officers to carry firearms during the G7 events (in line with Canada’s requirement of “express written authorization of the police of jurisdiction” for foreign security arms). Canada has granted such permissions to other countries in past summits on a reciprocity or need basis. Expect perhaps a handful of Brazilian agents to be armed (likely with concealed handguns), while the rest of the Brazilian detail remains unarmed and integrated with RCMP units. Brazilian and Canadian security will share radio communications for motorcade movements and have joint protective formations (e.g., Brazilian agents riding in the immediate follow car, while RCMP leads the route).
• Aircraft & Transport: Brazil’s presidential fleet has seen recent upgrades. In 2023 the Brazilian Air Force introduced two Airbus A330-200 “KC-30” aircraft for presidential transport, replacing the older Airbus A319CJ (known as VC-1A). The President will fly on one of these A330s (tail numbers FAB 2901 or 2902). The callsign on international flight plans will be Brazilian Air Force 01 (BRS01) when the President is aboard. Upon landing in Calgary, the Brazilian Air Force plane and any accompanying support plane (sometimes a Hercules carries equipment) will be met by RCMP and Canadian military security. Regarding ground vehicles: Brazil sometimes brings a presidential armored Mercedes-Benz S-Class in a cargo plane for long visits, but for a short summit, they may rely on Canadian-provided armored vehicles to simplify logistics. The motorcade will be modest – perhaps a lead car, the principal limo, one security SUV, and one follow car/ambulance – all provided by Canada with Brazilian flags affixed.
• Intelligence & Command Integration: Brazil’s intelligence agency (ABIN) typically sends officers as part of the delegation who will connect with the Canadian intelligence task force. Although not part of Five Eyes, Brazil has an interest in monitoring any potential threats to its president (for example, any activist groups in North America or transnational criminal targets). ABIN and PF will coordinate with CSIS/RCMP if any threat information arises. On the command side, a Brazilian security liaison will sit in the joint security command center to represent the delegation’s interests. Language isn’t a barrier, as many in the Brazilian team will speak English or have translators; plus, Brazil has experience from past summits (e.g., President Bolsonaro’s team liaised with Japanese police at G20 Osaka 2019, and Lula’s team did so in Portugal for EU-CELAC summit 2023).
• OSINT Clues: Plane spotters might track the arrival of the KC-30 (which may use a military flight number). Look for Canadian NOTAMs around mid-June 2025 referencing military flights from Brazil. Media may also report on President Lula’s attendance and could mention his security – for example, any local Brazilian community events where heightened security is observed. Brazilian journalists often travel with the president and sometimes note security details in their coverage. A telltale sign of Brazilian security presence is the sight of PF agents in dark suits with a distinctive lapel pin of the Brazilian flag/GSI emblem near the President during public photo-ops.

Indonesia (Observer – President’s Security)

• Protective Detail: The Indonesian President, Prabowo Subianto, is protected by Paspampres (Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden), which is the Presidential Security Force composed of elite troops from the TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces). A contingent of Paspampres will accompany the President to Canada. They are responsible for close protection, immediate response, and some ceremonial duties. In certain high-risk scenarios, Indonesia’s Kopassus special forces or Den-81 counter-terror unit can be attached, but for a Canada visit, it will primarily be Paspampres officers in suits. These officers are highly trained; for example, during Indonesia’s home G20 summit, Paspampres coordinated tightly with foreign personal security teams as effectively as the U.S. Secret Service or India’s SPG.
• Coordination with Host Security: Indonesian Paspampres will coordinate with the RCMP through diplomatic channels and an advance team. At the summit, they function as the inner layer of Jokowi’s security while RCMP and other Canadian units form the outer layers. They will join the daily security briefings. Since they operate under military discipline, their team will likely include a mix of unarmed close-protection officers and possibly a sniper team that could collaborate with Canadian snipers for venue overwatch. All armed presence, again, is subject to Canadian approval – any weapons (typically Paspampres might carry Glock pistols or FN P90 PDWs) must be declared and authorized. It’s quite possible that Paspampres will decide not to carry firearms at all and instead rely on RCMP Emergency Response Teams for firepower, focusing their role on physically shielding the President and evacuating him if needed.
• President’s Transport: Indonesia’s primary presidential aircraft is a Boeing 737-800 BBJ2 acquired in 2014, painted sky-blue and red with “Republik Indonesia” markings. This jet (tail number A-001) has the range to reach Canada with one stop (likely via Hawaii or Anchorage). For longer direct flights or larger delegations, Indonesia has chartered Garuda Indonesia’s Boeing 777-300ER widebody. In fact, Garuda operated a specially liveried 777 for President Jokowi’s trips to the U.S. and Europe in 2022. For the G7, it’s possible they use the 737 BBJ2 with aerial refueling stopovers, or the Garuda 777 if more convenient. Once in Canada, the arrival will be treated as a state aircraft arrival with full honors and security.
• Motorcade & Protocol: Canada will provide appropriate armored vehicles – likely an armored sedan (such as a Mercedes S-class or BMW) for President Jokowi, plus backup SUVs. Paspampres traditionally runs a tight motorcade with their officers riding close to the principal’s car. We might see Indonesian security driving one of the vehicles (often, Paspampres members are trained drivers as well). They’ll also handle the President’s briefcase and immediate needs. During movements, expect road closures and possibly airspace restrictions (drones banned, etc.) as for other VIPs. Culturally, Indonesian security might place emphasis on not separating the President from his security at any time – even in meeting rooms, one Paspampres officer might remain just outside the door for rapid response. Canadian protocol officers are generally understanding of this, given precedents.
• Notable Precedents: Indonesia is frequently invited to high-level forums (Jokowi was at G7 Germany 2022 and G7 Japan 2023 as a guest). No major security incidents have occurred during those, indicating strong cooperation. One interesting aspect: Jokowi has a very down-to-earth public persona and sometimes tries to mingle – Paspampres will be on alert to prevent unscripted deviations in Canada, especially under RCMP’s watch. From an OSINT perspective, watchers could note when an Indonesian Air Force advance transport (like a Hercules or Boeing 737 military) arrives in Canada – that likely carries logistics personnel and vehicles, signaling Paspampres prep work. Local Indonesian embassy announcements about “high-level visits” would also hint at the security mobilization.

South Africa (Observer – President’s Security)

• Protective Detail: South African President Cyril Ramaphosa’s security is managed by the Presidential Protection Unit (PPU) of the South African Police Service. Approximately 8–10 PPU members usually travel with the President on foreign visits, covering close protection shifts, advance reconnaissance, and motorcade driving. The PPU is supplemented by members of the SANDF (South African National Defence Force) for certain tasks at home, but abroad it’s primarily the police unit in charge. South Africa also has a State Security Agency (SSA) which will send operatives to liaise on intelligence (especially since South Africa monitors any potential threat from extremist groups or opposition protesters targeting their President overseas).
• Integration with RCMP: As with others, the RCMP VIP Protection Detail will integrate South Africa’s PPU into the security plan. South African officers will likely be unarmed in Canada or limit arms to a couple of principal bodyguards if authorized. (There is precedent for South African security operating without firearms in strict jurisdictions and trusting host protection.) The PPU team will maintain radio contact with their Canadian counterparts and station some officers at key vantage points when the President is at the venue (for example, one PPU near the stage during photo-ops, another at the entrance of the bilateral meeting room, etc., all coordinating with RCMP stationed alongside them). Communication shouldn’t be an issue – all speak English and many have worked with RCMP before during state visits.
• Transport & Aircraft: The South African presidential jet “Inkwazi”, a Boeing 737-700 BBJ (registration ZS-RSA), is the usual transport. However, Inkwazi has had reliability issues and on occasion President Ramaphosa has had to use chartered aircraft (e.g., a private Bombardier business jet). For a trip as important as a G7, they will try to send Inkwazi if it’s operational, since it’s outfitted with secure communications and an office cabin. Whether on Inkwazi or a charter, the flight will use a South African Air Force callsign (typically “South African 1”). Arrival would be at Calgary or a designated airbase; Canada will accord it full diplomatic clearances. On board, besides the President and staff, are a couple of PPU members and possibly a doctor. South Africa sometimes also dispatches a military Airbus (or charter) in advance with the motorcade vehicles – but more often they rely on host-provided vehicles to cut costs. It’s likely Canada will supply all necessary vehicles, given South Africa’s current cost-saving drive.
• Security Protocols: In public, South African PPU officers are often seen in close proximity in a diamond formation around the President. Expect the same in Canada, albeit blended with RCMP. The PPU also employs counter-assault team members (heavily armed back-up) when Ramaphosa is in high threat situations – in Canada, any such role would be covered by RCMP Emergency Response Team and perhaps the Canadian Forces. Legally, South African guards have no special authority in Canada, so they will act under RCMP’s direction if any incident occurs. Culturally, South Africa’s team is used to a relatively relaxed crowd control approach (Ramaphosa often wades into crowds at home, with his PPU managing by presence). The RCMP, however, will enforce stricter perimeters at a G7, meaning PPU won’t have to fend off any crowd — there won’t be one within arm’s length of the President.
• Past Instances: South Africa has attended previous G7 outreach sessions (Ramaphosa was present at the 2021 UK and 2022 Germany summits). Those went without security incidents, indicating effective coordination. One notable event: at the 2019 African Union summit in Niger, Ramaphosa’s security convoy reportedly encountered issues with local protocol – by contrast, in Canada, everything will be structured and agreed in advance, so such hiccups are not expected. For those tracking, watch for South African Air Force flights (flight trackers may show a bizjet or Inkwazi heading to Canada a day or two prior – possibly a recon/advance team). Also, local South African expat communities might be alerted to the visit, but any public interaction will be minimal under the tight summit schedule.

Mexico (President Claudia Sheinbaum)

• Protective Detail & Mandate: The President of Mexico is protected by the elite Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP), though this unit was disbanded in 2018 under President López Obrador and replaced with a hybrid model relying on the Mexican Army’s Guardia Nacional and Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA) personnel for direct protection. However, under President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration, early signs suggest a partial reinstatement or reorganization of presidential protection, potentially under a new presidential guard within SEDENA or a specialized joint task force. The current protocol mirrors military precision, with highly trained army personnel conducting close protection, secure transport, and advance reconnaissance. For the G7 Summit, a handpicked detail—likely drawn from elite Mexican Army units—will accompany the President.
• Coordination with RCMP: In Canada, protection falls under the RCMP’s jurisdiction. A Mexican advance security team will have already arrived to coordinate operational zones, vehicle assignments, and emergency protocols. The Mexican officers—typically plainclothes but with clear military discipline—will form the inner ring around the President, while the RCMP provides outer security and motorcade control. Mexico is not part of the Five Eyes, so intelligence integration will be managed through diplomatic protocols, with situational updates shared via the RCMP-led summit security command center.
• Weapons & Legal Clearance: Any Mexican personnel carrying firearms in Canada must receive explicit authorization under Canadian law. Given Canada’s precedent for accommodating select armed details (e.g., India, Brazil), it is likely that one or two senior members of the Mexican detail—such as the President’s lead bodyguard—may be granted special clearance to carry sidearms. All weapons would be declared in advance, and coordination would follow the “express written authorization” model enforced by the RCMP’s International Protected Persons program.Aircraft & Arrival Logistics: The Mexican President typically travels aboard the Boeing 737-800 TP-01 “José María Morelos y Pavón,” maintained by the Mexican Air Force (FAM). However, amid past controversies over presidential jet expenses, recent administrations have explored charter alternatives or more austere travel. Nonetheless, for a major summit like G7, the TP-01 or another FAM transport plane (such as the newer 737-800 acquired for dignitary use) will likely be deployed. The aircraft will land in Calgary under full diplomatic clearance, escorted by Canadian Forces ground teams. Accompanying flights may include a FAM transport carrying equipment or motorcade vehicles, though Canada is expected to provide the primary armored car and escort units for efficiency.
• Intelligence & Threat Picture: The Mexican delegation will liaise through the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI), which replaced the infamous CISEN as Mexico’s civilian intelligence agency. Although Mexico lacks Five Eyes status, bilateral cooperation between CNI and CSIS will allow for limited threat data exchange, especially if there are concerns related to organized crime, transnational protests, or diaspora activism. The RCMP may also coordinate directly with Mexican Federal Police or SEDENA liaison officers embedded in Ottawa or Washington. Summit-specific alerts will be routed through the central Canadian Joint Intelligence Group, ensuring shared situational awareness.
• Motorcade & Movement: Mexican presidential movements in Canada will follow a standard protected dignitary template. Canada will provide armored SUVs or a black sedan (e.g., Cadillac or Mercedes) for the principal, accompanied by RCMP-led motorcade vehicles. Mexican agents will likely ride in the follow car and potentially operate the lead scout or counter-surveillance vehicle if pre-approved. The RCMP will direct traffic closures and drone interdiction in coordination with NORAD. Pairs of Mexican agents will likely be visible near venue entrances and during transitions between secured areas.
• Past Summit Integration: Mexico has attended G7 and G20 summits frequently, and its security staff are experienced in liaising with foreign counterparts. For instance, during the 2022 North American Leaders’ Summit in Washington, D.C., Mexican security coordinated closely with the U.S. Secret Service and Department of Homeland Security. A similar model of integration is expected in Canada. Notably, during President Sheinbaum’s prior visits abroad as Mayor of Mexico City, her team emphasized disciplined security presence and minimal disruption—a style likely to continue at the summit.
• OSINT Clues: Look for Mexican Air Force flight numbers (e.g., FAM3526 or TP-01) appearing on trackers approaching Alberta. Additional signs may include Canadian press noting liaison meetings at Global Affairs Canada or airport tarmac photos showing Mexican military personnel unloading equipment. Security watchers may also spot Mexican military attachés or embassy staff coordinating logistics in Banff or Calgary days before the summit. The overall security presence will be professional and tightly controlled, with a strong preference for operational discretion over visibility.

Conclusion

The protection of non-G7 leaders at the Kananaskis Summit exemplifies the pinnacle of international security collaboration. Through the integration of specialized protection units, adherence to diplomatic protocols, and seamless coordination with Canadian authorities, the summit stands as a testament to global unity in ensuring the safety of world leaders. As the summit unfolds, these measures not only safeguard individuals but also uphold the integrity and success of international diplomacy.