Base Profile: Al Watiya Air Base (Libya) — How Turkey Rewrote the Rules of Air War

Introduction

Al Watiya Air Base has been a battlefield, a prize, a covert insertion point, and ultimately, a laboratory for the future of warfare. Between 2019 and 2021, the base became the focal point of what the UN’s Special Representative to Libya called “the largest drone war in the world.” What happened at Al Watiya during this period didn’t just decide the outcome of Libya’s civil war — it reshaped how militaries think about air power, electronic warfare, and the strategic value of cheap, expendable unmanned platforms.

This analysis examines the tactical and strategic operations conducted at and around Al Watiya, the technologies deployed, and the intelligence consequences — including the covert US extraction of a Russian air defense system that made headlines in early 2021.

The Base Before the Storm

Al Watiya’s infrastructure tells its own story. Originally constructed by French contractors in the 1970s, the base houses close to 30 hardened aircraft shelters — reinforced concrete structures designed to protect aircraft from air strikes. During Gaddafi’s era, these shelters housed Mirage F1 fighters and Su-22 bombers at peak strength. By 2015, most of those aircraft were decommissioned, rotting in their shelters due to years of sanctions, isolation, and neglected maintenance.

The base survived the 2011 NATO intervention largely because those shelters contained almost exclusively non-operational aircraft, making them low priority targets. This preservation of infrastructure would later become strategically significant: the base retained its runway, taxiways, fuel systems, and shelter network even as the aircraft inside them deteriorated beyond use.

By 2014, fighters from the city of Zintan had seized control of Al Watiya and aligned with General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army. Under LNA control, the base served as a forward operating position, a logistics hub, and a launch point for airstrikes against the Government of National Accord in western Libya. The Su-22s and remaining Mirage F1s underwent intermittent overhaul work, with some brought back to limited operational capability.

This was the strategic asset that Turkey would spend over a year trying to neutralize.

The Drone War Begins: Summer 2019

Turkey’s intervention on behalf of the GNA fundamentally altered the military calculus at Al Watiya. Beginning around May 2019, Turkey supplied the GNA with Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles — medium-altitude, long-endurance drones manufactured by Turkish defense company Baykar. The TB2 can fly at altitudes up to 24,000 feet for up to 24 hours, carries precision-guided munitions including MAM-L thermobaric warheads and MAM-C high-explosive warheads, and is equipped with electro-optical and infrared sensor systems.

The first confirmed TB2 strike against LNA assets at Al Watiya occurred on June 19, 2019, when a Su-22 fighter-bomber was destroyed while parked on the taxiway. Whether the Su-22 was a deliberate target or a target of opportunity remains unclear, but the strike’s implications were immediate and profound: any activity visible from above at Al Watiya could now be engaged with precision from an altitude where the drone would be invisible to ground observers and well beyond the range of small arms fire.

The effect was described by analysts as a lockdown. Activities on the base ground to a halt. Overhaul work on aircraft in the hardened shelters effectively ceased, because any movement near the shelter entrances could alert a TB2 potentially loitering overhead, which could then strike the shelter entrance or the aircraft within. Al Watiya was, in operational terms, besieged from the air — without a single manned aircraft engaging it directly.

The Pantsir Problem

The LNA and its primary external backer, the United Arab Emirates, had not anticipated the drone threat materializing at this speed or with this effectiveness. The UAE had been supplying Haftar’s forces with Chinese-made Wing Loong armed drones, operated by Emirati personnel from Al Khadim airbase in eastern Libya, since 2016. These platforms had proven effective in earlier phases of the civil war. But the Wing Loong program remained largely static — the platforms didn’t evolve in response to changing conditions, and their operators showed less adaptability than their Turkish counterparts.

To address the growing aerial threat, the UAE began deploying Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and gun systems to western Libya. The Pantsir-S1 (NATO designation SA-22 Greyhound) is a Russian-designed, truck-mounted system combining two 30mm automatic cannons with twelve 57E6 command-guided surface-to-air missiles. It is designed for close-in, low-altitude air defense — theoretically capable of engaging precisely the kind of threat the TB2 represented.

The deployment proved catastrophic. Almost all Pantsir-S1 systems were positioned southeast of Tripoli rather than in the immediate vicinity of Al Watiya, creating a coverage gap at the base itself. More critically, the systems demonstrated a consistent inability to engage TB2 drones effectively. Reports indicated that sophisticated Turkish electronic warfare systems — specifically the Koral signal jamming platform — were being employed to disrupt the Pantsir’s radar tracking, effectively blinding the defense system before TB2s engaged it with precision munitions.

The result: at least six Pantsir-S1 systems were destroyed by Bayraktar TB2s during the western Libya campaign. Multiple systems were caught with their radars active when struck, suggesting they were attempting to track and engage the drones but failing to do so before being hit. The “hunter became the hunted” — a complete tactical reversal that would have significant intelligence implications for both Russia and the broader international defense community.

The Capture: May 18, 2020

The ground assault on Al Watiya began on May 5, 2020, and initially failed, with GNA-aligned forces suffering significant casualties. Military analysts noted at the time that a direct ground assault, even with air cover, would struggle to succeed against a prepared defensive position. The GNA adjusted its strategy: surround the base, cut supply lines, and maintain relentless aerial pressure until the position became untenable.

Over the preceding days, Turkish drones conducted over 100 air raids against Al Watiya. Turkish naval vessels off the Libyan coast provided additional fire support. The sustained campaign destroyed infrastructure, equipment, and the morale of defenders.

On May 18, 2020, LNA forces withdrew from Al Watiya. Libyan military sources indicated the withdrawal was orderly — forces departed with their personnel and equipment toward Zintan. What happened immediately after remains a subject of competing accounts.

Official GNA statements credited their forces with liberating the base. However, a retired Libyan Army officer told The Arab Weekly that Turkish forces were actually the first to enter, describing a convoy of six black armored vehicles — likely belonging to Turkish military intelligence — entering the base in the early morning hours after LNA forces had departed. The base was deserted at the time.

Whatever the sequence of initial entry, GNA forces subsequently occupied and secured Al Watiya. Among the equipment left behind or destroyed during the operation: the remains of two Mirage F1s and one Su-22, multiple destroyed or damaged Pantsir-S1 systems, various military vehicles, and — most significantly for intelligence purposes — at least one Pantsir-S1 captured in relatively intact condition.

The Pantsir Extraction: A Covert Intelligence Operation

The capture of an intact Pantsir-S1 at Al Watiya set in motion one of the more revealing intelligence operations to emerge from Libya’s civil war — and one that demonstrated the competing interests operating within the broader conflict.

The captured Pantsir was initially seized by Mohamed Bahroun, a GNA-aligned militia commander known by the name “the Rat,” who had reported connections to arms smugglers and Islamist militant networks. Forces under GNA Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha moved to take possession of the system from Bahroun’s militia, citing concerns about it falling into dangerous hands. The Pantsir was transported to a base where Turkish military forces were present.

At this point, both the United States and Turkey recognized the intelligence value of the captured system. The Pantsir-S1 had been operated in Libya by Wagner Group mercenaries — a Russian private military company with strong links to Russian military intelligence (GRU). Reports indicated that a Wagner-operated Pantsir had been responsible for shooting down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone near Tripoli in 2019, with Haftar subsequently refusing to return the wreckage when asked. The US had a direct interest in examining the system.

In June 2020, a US Air Force C-17A Globemaster III transport aircraft flew to Zuwarah Airport west of Tripoli. Using online flight tracking data, observers determined the aircraft had departed Joint Base Charleston in South Carolina for Ramstein Air Base in Germany just days after Al Watiya’s capture. The C-17A made multiple trips to and from Libya in the first week of June, with at least one additional stop in Turkey, before returning to Charleston on June 7.

The exact disposition of the captured Pantsir-S1 became the subject of conflicting reports. The Times of London reported it was flown to Ramstein. The Paris-based Africa Report, citing Libyan officials, suggested the system was actually sent to Turkey, with Washington and Ankara subsequently negotiating joint study of the captured hardware. Libyan officials involved in the process reportedly described feeling “like children in a divorce.”

By early 2021, reports indicated the US and Turkey had reached an agreement to share access to the captured system, allowing both NATO allies to examine Russian air defense technology that had been compromised on the Libyan battlefield. The intelligence value extended beyond the hardware itself: Arabic-language operator manuals recovered at Al Watiya provided additional documentation of system capabilities and procedures.

The July 4 Attack: Someone Sends a Message

Turkey moved quickly to fortify Al Watiya after its capture. Satellite imagery showed runway extensions and repaving. MIM-23 Hawk surface-to-air missile systems were deployed to protect the base. Apron markings appeared on both sides of the runway, configured for six fighter aircraft each — preparation for potential Turkish F-16 deployment.

The fortification efforts were tested on the night of July 4, 2020, when unidentified aircraft struck Al Watiya just hours after Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar had visited Libya. The attack damaged some of the newly deployed Turkish air defense systems but achieved limited overall destruction.

The identity of the attacking aircraft remains officially disputed but has been the subject of significant open-source analysis. Sonic booms detected over Sebha in southwestern Libya suggested aircraft operating from Egyptian territory, having flown via the Sahara to avoid detection by Turkish naval vessels off the Libyan coast. Analysts identified the attackers as likely Egyptian or Emirati aircraft — with Dassault Mirage 2000s operating from Sidi Barrani airbase in Egypt emerging as the primary suspects. Satellite imagery showed multiple Mirage 2000s at that facility with national markings painted over, a standard practice for plausible deniability operations.

An advisor to the Emirati Royal Family posted — then quickly deleted — a statement that “the UAE has taught a lesson to Turks.” The attack represented a direct challenge to Turkish presence at the base and a signal that Al Watiya remained within the strike range of nations backing Haftar.

The Base Becomes Turkish Territory

Turkey’s commitment to Al Watiya extended well beyond the initial capture. Open-source aircraft tracking data documented an extensive air bridge operation between Turkey and Al Watiya, active continuously after the base’s capture. C-130 and A400M cargo aircraft that previously landed at Misrata could now operate from Al Watiya directly, streamlining logistics for GNA forces and Turkish military operations.

The Turkish military included Al Watiya in its annual New Year commemoration videos in both 2022 and 2023, openly acknowledging the base’s operational status. Satellite imagery recorded the runway being extended and repaved on three separate occasions after the July 2020 attack.

Reports from multiple sources indicated that Al Watiya, along with Mitiga base in Tripoli and several ports, had effectively entered an extraterritorial status — operating under Turkish military control with Libyan access restricted. The Turkish Parliament approved an extension of military presence in Libya through 2026.

The strategic implications extend beyond Libya’s borders. Al Watiya’s location — 27 kilometers from the Tunisian border, positioned to cover the Libya-Tunisia-Algeria border triangle — gives Turkey a forward position on Africa’s northern coast. Defense analysts have noted this fits a broader pattern of Turkish military base establishment across the region, from Somalia to Qatar to northern Iraq.

Lessons from the Al Watiya Campaign

The operations at Al Watiya between 2019 and 2021 produced several lessons that continue to influence military doctrine:

Drone warfare maturity

The TB2’s performance demonstrated that armed drones had crossed a threshold from supplementary asset to war-deciding capability. Turkey refined its drone tactics in Libya in real time — adjusting altitude profiles, employing electronic warfare in coordination with strikes, integrating AI drones into its kill chain, and training local forces to integrate UAV support into ground operations. The Wing Loong’s static performance on the opposing side underscored that drone warfare requires continuous adaptation.

Electronic warfare integration

The reported use of Turkish Koral jammers to blind Pantsir-S1 radar systems before TB2 engagement represented a sophisticated integration of electronic warfare and precision strike. This combination — jam, then strike — proved devastatingly effective and has been studied by militaries worldwide.

Air defense vulnerability

The systematic destruction of Pantsir-S1 systems demonstrated significant vulnerabilities in Russian-designed short-range air defense against drone threats. Russia acknowledged this through the subsequent Pantsir-S1M upgrade program, which incorporated lessons from both Syria and Libya combat experience.

Intelligence value of captured equipment

The covert extraction of the Pantsir-S1 demonstrated the lengths intelligence services will go to acquire enemy hardware — and the diplomatic friction that can result when multiple allies compete for the same captured asset.

Base fortification in the drone age

Turkey’s rapid fortification of Al Watiya, including deploying SAM systems, extending runways, and establishing air bridge logistics, demonstrated how quickly a captured base can be transformed into a forward military position.

The Continuing Shadow

Al Watiya’s story does not end with Turkey’s occupation. The base that saw 20 US commandos expelled in December 2015 now operates as a de facto Turkish military installation on African soil. The Pantsir-S1 systems that failed to stop Turkish drones have been studied by US and Turkish intelligence services. The drone tactics refined in Libya’s skies have since been replicated in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, and other theaters of conflict and integrated with Artificial Intelligence as Turkey pursues its own version of America’s Project Maven.

For anyone tracking the evolution of modern warfare, Al Watiya represents a case study in how a single location can concentrate the full spectrum of contemporary military competition: conventional forces, proxy armies, drone warfare, electronic warfare, intelligence operations, and geopolitical maneuvering — all within a 140-kilometer radius of Tripoli.

The base’s 30 hardened aircraft shelters, once home to Libya’s Cold War-era fighters, now shelter Turkish equipment and personnel. The runway that saw a C-146A Wolfhound arrive unannounced in 2015 has been extended and repaved multiple times. The air bridge to Ankara operates continuously.

Whatever questions remain about December 2015, the events of 2019 through 2021 answered one clearly: Al Watiya is not just a base. It is a strategic prize — and the nations that fight over it are rewriting the rules of how wars are won.

Related Reading:

The Al Watiya Incident: When 20 US Commandos Landed in Libya Without Permission — The December 2015 unauthorized landing that started this story
OPSEC Failures: How Social Media Exposed Black Operations (Coming Soon) — The Facebook posting that compromised US SOF
Five Eyes in Libya’s Shadow War: International SOF Operations 2015–2016 (Coming Soon) — The broader intelligence community presence
C-146A Wolfhound: The Spy Plane Hiding in Plain Sight (Coming Soon) — Technical analysis of the aircraft from the December 2015 incident
ISIS in Libya: The Sirte Stronghold 2015–2016 (Coming Soon) — The threat environment that drove US engagement